第26期——主题“审计定价相关研究”（2011年8月7日——8月14日） 1、审计风险、审计定价与相对谈判能力——以受监管部门处罚或调查的公司为例，会计研究，2011,2 2、监管信号、 风险评价与审计定价:来自审计师变更的证据，审计研究，2004,1 3、Litigation risk and audit fees: evidence from UK firms cross-listed on US markets，Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (2002)
Simunic(1980)是最早提出审计定价模型。把审计服务看成是被审计单位财务报告系统的一个子系统，并假设客户的规模、业务复杂程度和审计风险将使得审计师付出不同的努力，从而决定了审计定价的差异。经验调查发现，客户规模对审计定价差异的解释力达到57%，经资产调整后的外部审计费用与客户业务复杂程度、固有风险、审计风险显著正相关，与“审计师是否八大”(普华除外)有轻微的负相关。
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[5] Marc A. Rubin. Municipal Audit Fee Determinants. The Accounting Review, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Apr., 1988), pp. 219-236
[6] Auditors' Perceived Business Risk and Audit Fees: Analysis and Evidence
Timothy B. Bell, Wayne R. Landsman, Douglas A. Shackelford
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Jun., 2001), pp. 35-43
[7] Larry R. Davis, David N. Ricchiute, Greg Trompeter. Audit Effort, Audit Fees, and the Provision of Nonaudit Services to Audit Clients. The Accounting Review, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 135-150
[8] Zoe-Vonna Palmrose. Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring, 1986), pp. 97-110
Litigation risk and audit fees: evidence from UK firms cross-listed on US markets
Abstract Two ingredients necessary to examine the relation between litigation risk and audit pricing are (a) a litigious legal environment. And (b) publicly disclosed auditor remuneration. We combine both ingredients by focusing on UK firms offering to sell their securities publicly in clients access US, but not non-US, capital markets. Further, we show that the higher fees cannot be fully explained by the SEC’s extensive disclosure requirements. Rather, these findings are consistent with audit fees reflecting risk differences across liability regimes.
这是Bernard9303朋友分享的文献部分，再次谢谢！
Evidence on the Audit Risk Model； Do Auditors Increase Audit Fees in the Presence of Internal Control Deficiencies?
Conclusions:In this study, we investigate how auditors respond to the higher levels of control risk experienced by firms subsequently disclosing internal control deficiencies. Our results show that audit fees are significantly higher for ICD firms after controlling for size, risk, and profitability. Furthermore, the fee increment is highest for firms that have the most substantial internal control problems. Our tests also indicate that internal control deficiency firms have higher levels of inherent risk and information risk than their industry counterparts, and that these risks are positively related to fees as well.
To the extent that audit fees are a proxy for audit effort, our results suggest that auditors are increasing their audit effort where appropriate to maintain an acceptable overall level of audit risk, consistent with the audit risk model. As stated earlier, our ability to draw inferences about audit effort and increased control risk relies on audit fees being an adequate proxy for audit effort, which has been found to be the case both in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley time period(Bell et al. 2011) and in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period (Bedard and Johnstone 2006). However, we cannot rule out the alternative explanation that the increased fees we observe are due to the existence of a risk premium for firms with internal control problems rather than to increased testing.
Fees Paid to Audit Firms, Accrual Choices, and Corporate Governance
AbstractWe examine the relation between the fees paid to auditors for audit and non-audit services, and the choice of accrual measures for a large sample of firms. Using our pooled sample, we find that the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees has a positive relation with the absolute value of accruals similar to Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson[200]. However, using latent class mixture models to identify clusters of firms with a homogenous regression structure reveals that this positive association only occurs for about 8.5% of the sample. In contrast to the fee ratio results, we find consistent evidence of a negative relation between the level of fees (both audit and non-audit) paid to auditors and accruals (i.e., higher fees are associated with smaller accruals). The latent class analysis also indicates that this negative relation is strongest for client firms with weak governance. Overall, our results are most consistent with auditor behavior being constrained by the reputation effects associated with allowing clients to engage in unusual accrual choices.
Audit Fees and Auditor dismissals in the Sarbanes-oxley era
SynopsisThe accounting scandals and Sarbanes-oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 resulted in large increases in required audit work, and corresponding increases in audit fees for public companies. This study provides early evidence regarding the relationship between higher audit fees, both levels and changes, and auditor dismissals in the period immediately subsequent to the passage of SOX. We find that clients paying higher fees are more likely to dismiss their auditors. We also find that dismissals are associated with smaller companies, companies with going-concern reports, and companies that later reported material weaknesses in their internal control. Among dismissing clients, smaller Big 4 clients, paying higher fees, tend to hire non-Big 4 successor auditors. This result holds when auditors are dividend into Big 4, national, and local tiers. We also find evidence that dismissing clients. In particular clients hiring new non-Big 4 auditors, experience smaller fee increases than nonswitching clients in the following year. These results are consistent with the notion that in the immediate post-SOX period, some companies dismissed their auditors in expectation of lower fees from the succeeding auditor.
Audit effort, audit fees, and the provision of nonaudit services to audit clients这个太多，就摘点了The results reported in this article provide no empirical evidence for the argument that providing nonaudit services for audit clients creates circumstances that may lead auditors to compromise their objectivity. Further research is needed to investigate other ways in which auditors may benefit from the joint provision of services, such as the effects of auditor tenure on client-firm bonding and economic rents earned through nonaudit services.
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