Book sharingA Crash Course on Crises——MACROECONOMIC CONCEPTS FOR RUN-UPS, COLLAPSES, AND RECOVERIES

by MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER and RICARDO REIS

Some introduction
  THE UNITED STATES ’ financial crisis of 2008–10 and the euro area’ssovereign debt crisis of 2010–12 were stark examples of how financialcrashes can bring down whole economies. Unlike in previous decades, thesecrashes were not limited to wild gyrations in asset prices nor to great gainsand losses for sharks and fools. They did not only afflict countries whereinstitutional problems and clear fault lines in the way financial marketsoperate make a crisis a matter of time. Rather, these were macro-financialcrises. They brought economic hardship to households throughout the world,in rich and emerging countries alike. Financial economists have naturallyexerted much effort understanding manias and panics in financial markets,while macroeconomists have always been just as busy making sense of greatrecessions and depressions.Over the last decade, instead, there has been an enormous amount ofresearch at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance devoted to timeswhen financial markets and the macroeconomy move violently. Researchershave explored new ideas, new evidence, and new explanations for what wesaw, and applied them to not just recent global crises, but also to make senseof regional crashes over the previous 30 years. This book provides a shortintroduction to some of these ideas.

Table of Contents
1    Introduction 
1.1    Crashes 
1.2     Organization of the Book    
1.3     Uses of the Book    
1.4     Acknowledgments    
PART I. GROWING FRAGILITIES: THE RUN-UP TO CRISES
2     Bubbles and Beliefs    
2.1     A Model of Bubbles with a Keynesian Beauty Contest    
2.2     The Japanese Bubble of the Mid-1980s    
2.3     The Internet Bubble of 1998–2000    
3    Capital Inflows and Their (Mis)allocation    
3.1     A Model of Misallocation    
3.2     The Seeds of the Euro Crisis: Portugal’s Twenty-First CenturySlump   
3.3     Chile’s 1970s Liberalization and 1982 Crash    
4     Banks and Their Cousins    
4.1     Modern and Shadow Banks    
4.2     U.S. Subprime Mortgages and Securitization    
4.3     The Spanish Credit Boom of the 2000s    
PART II. CRASHES: TRIGGERS AND AMPLIFIERS
5     Systemic Risk, Amplification, and Contagion   
5.1     Strategic Complementarities, Amplification, Multiplicity    
5.2     Systemic Risk in the Irish Banking Sector in the 2000s    
5.3     The Emerging Markets’ Storm of 1997–98    
6     Solvency and Liquidity   
6.1     Debt and the Challenging Illiquidity-Insolvency Distinction    
6.2     The Run on the German Banking System in 1931    
6.3     The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2010–12 and the IMF   
7     The Nexus between the Private and Public Sectors    
7.1     The Diabolic/Doom Loop    
7.2     European Banks and Their Sovereigns in 2007–10    
7.3     Argentina’s 2001–02 Crisis    
8     The Flight to Safety    
8.1     Safe Assets    
8.2     Borrowing Costs in the Euro Area: The 2010–12 Crisis    
8.3     The Pandemic Flight to Safety of 2020    
PART III. POLICIES AND RECOVERIES
9     Exchange Rate Policies and the Speed of Recoveries    
9.1     A Model of Exchange Rates and Recovery    
9.2     The Mexican Tequila Crisis of 1994–95    
9.3     The Lasting Stagnation from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis    
10   The New Conventional Monetary Policy    
10.1   Reserve Satiation and Quantitative Easing    
10.2   The Bank of Japan’s Innovations since 1998    
10.3   The Euro Area Yield Curve during Crisis    
11   Fiscal Policy and the Real Interest Rates    
11.1   Savings and Investment, Revisited    
11.2   The Rise of Savings during the 2020 Pandemic    
11.3   The End of the U.S. Great Depression    
PART IV. PARTING WORDS
12   Conclusion    
Bibliography    
Index