前两篇的摘要

Revisiting the Japan Analogy with the US
Attention has turned  once again to the
analogy between the US economy and
Japan’s, which suffered a “lost decade” after
its real estate bubble burst in the early 1990s.
We take another look here at a roadmap of
the post-bubble adjustment in both
economies.

The main  similarity between the US and
Japan experiences is that, in each case, the
bubble was followed by long-term balance-
sheet restructuring problems, which led to
downward pressure on consumer prices.
The main  differences, in our view, are as
follows:
(1)  Post-bubble balance-sheet restructuring
was concentrated in the corporate sector
in Japan, versus the household sector in
the US.  
(2)  The balance-sheet restructuring and
related asset price corrections have taken
place at a much faster pace in the US.
(3)  The labor market adjustment centered
on wages in Japan, whereas in the US the
workforce bore the brunt of the
adjustment.
(4)  The US was much faster to launch QE,
and other policy responses.  In addition,
CPI inflation started to rise in the US
following the introduction of QE.
(5)  The demographic issues that Japan faces
have given rise to deflationary pressure.

This comparison of the respective post-
bubble adjustments suggests that the
differences still outnumber the similarities,
which leads us to believe that long-running
deflation is unlikely to take hold in the US as
it did in Japan.

Along the Knife-Edge
After a turbulent summer, it is clearer than
ever that the key characteristics of a post-bust
recovery (a sluggish and fragile demand
recovery alongside continuing downward
pressure on interest rates) are firmly in place.
So the key short-term question will be whether
the latest financial disruptions are enough to
prompt fresh deterioration in an economy that
was already growing slowly, pushing the US,
and perhaps Europe, into another recession.  
In tracking that transmission, we continue to
focus on three channels: the hit to confidence
and the forward indicators, as captured by our
GLI and its components; any signs of
tightening in financial conditions; and
increased signs of stress in the banking system
and renewed sovereign stress. We continue to
be most concerned about the last channel (and
the European element of this in particular).
And with an intensifying European policy
calendar, September could see sustained focus
here after an already rocky start. We are likely
to remain cautious until the deterioration on
each of these fronts reverses.
Both for the economy and for markets, we
think the current position is unlikely to be
sustainable. For the economy, the feedback
loops inherent in both the US labour market
and the sovereign stresses in Europe suggest
that we will either recover towards our
baseline or slip towards something worse. And
for markets, current pricing still looks like a
balancing of the probabilities of two different
views, meaning that a resolution in either
direction is likely to affect prices in rates and
equities, perhaps quite significantly. The
market now appears to be assessing a
somewhat higher probability of a US recession
than we do. But without clearer signs that the
pressures from the data, financial conditions
and banking/sovereign stresses are beginning
to change, it will be hard for markets to sustain
a recovery.