Al Roth graduated from Columbia University in 1971 with a degree in Operations research. He then moved to Stanford University, receiving both his masters and PhD in Operations research there in 1973 and 1974 respectively.
After leaving Stanford, Roth went on to teach at the University of Illinois until 1982. He then served as the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh until 1998, when he left to join the faculty at Harvard where he has remained ever since.[1]
Roth is an Alfred P. Sloan fellow, a Guggenheim Fellow, and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is also a member of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the Econometric Society.
Work
Roth has worked in the fields of game theory, market design and experimental economics. In particular, he helped redesign mechanisms for selecting medical residents, New York City high schools and Boston primary schools.
Case Study in Game theory
Main article: National Resident Matching Program
Roth's 1984 paper on the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) highlighted the system designed by John Stalknaker and F. J. Mullen in 1952. The system was built on theoretical foundations independently introduced by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962.[6] Roth proved that the NRMP was both stable and strategy-proof for unmarried residents but deferred to future study the question of how to match married couples efficiently.
In 1999 Roth redesigned the matching program to ensure stable matches even with married couples.
New York City public school system
Roth later helped design the market to match New York City public school students to high schools as incoming freshmen. Previously, the school district had students mail in a list of their five preferred schools in rank order, then mailed a photocopy of that list to each of the five schools. As a result, schools could tell whether or not students had listed them as their first choice. This meant that some students really had a choice of one school, rather than five. It also meant that students had an incentive to hide their true preferences. Roth and his colleagues designed an incentive-compatible mechanism and presented it to the school board in 2003. The school board accepted the measure as the method of selection for New York City public school students.
Boston's public school system
Working with Tayfun Sonmez, Roth presented a similar measure to Boston's public school system in 2004. Here the Boston system gave so much preference to an applicant's first choice that were a student to not receive her first or second choice it was likely that she would not be matched with any school on her list and be administratively assigned to schools which had vacancies. Some Boston parents had informally recognized this feature of the system and developed detailed lists in order to avoid having their children administratively assigned.Boston held public hearings on the school selection system and finally settled on a modified version of the algorithm used to match New York City students.
New England Program for Kidney Exchange
See also: Organ transplant
Roth is also a founder of the New England Program for Kidney Exchange along with Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver, a registry and matching program that pairs compatible kidney donors and recipients.
The program was designed to operate primarily through the use of two pairs of incompatible donors. Each donor was incompatible with her partner but could be compatible with another donor who was likewise incompatible with his partner. Francis Delmonico, a transplant surgeon at Harvard Medical School, describes a typical situation,
Kidney exchange enables transplantation where it otherwise could not be accomplished. It overcomes the frustration of a biological obstacle to transplantation. For instance, a wife may need a kidney and her husband may want to donate, but they have a blood type incompatibility that makes donation impossible. Now they can do an exchange. And we've done them. Now we are working on a three-way exchange.
Because the National Organ Transplant Act forbids the creation of binding contracts for organ transplant, steps in the procedure had to be performed roughly simultaneously. Two pairs of patients means four operating rooms and four surgical teams acting in concert with each other. Hospitals and professionals in the transplant community felt that the practical burden of three pairwise exchanges would be too large. While the original theoretical work discovered that an "efficient frontier" would be reached with exchanges between three pairs of otherwise incompatible donors, it was determined that the goals of the program would not be sacrificed by limiting exchanges to pairs of incompatible donors. Recently, however, a twelve party (six donors and six recipients) kidney exchange was performed in April 2008.
Books
Roth is the author of numerous scholarly articles, books and other publications. A selection:
* 1979. Axiomatic Models of Bargaining, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Springer Verlag.
* 1985. Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, (editor)Cambridge University Press, 1985.
* 1987. Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View. (editor) Cambridge University Press. (Chinese translation, 2008)
* 1988. The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. (editor) Cambridge University Press.
* 1990. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. With M. Sotomayor. Cambridge University Press.
* 1995. Handbook of Experimental Economics. Edited with J.H. Kagel. Princeton University Press.
* 2001. Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson. Edited with Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom.
豪斯曼教授现为美国麻省理工学院经济学教授(John and Jennie S.Macdonald Professor of Economics at the MIT)。而其辉煌的学术背景更是罕有匹敌:早年毕业于布朗大学(Brown University),1973年获得牛津大学(Oxford University)经济学博士学位,此后即在麻省理工任职至今。1980年获得计量经济联盟授予的弗里茨奖章(Frisch Medal of the Econometric Society),并于1985年获得著名的克拉克奖(John Bates Clard Award of the American Economic Association),该奖每两年颁发一次,授予那些在经济学各领域中做出了杰出贡献的青年经济学家,而其他的学术奖项和各种荣誉更是难以计数。他的研究领域是经济计量学及应用经济学。
我猜可能是保罗·罗默。
罗默可能与哈佛大学教授罗伯特·巴罗共同得奖,罗默最重要的工作是在经济增长领域,他在上世纪80年代提出了“内生经济增长理论”,巴罗致力于研究创新、公共投资与成长的关联性。
保罗·罗默(Paul M.Romer),美国经济学家,斯坦福大学教授,新增长理论的主要建立者之一。他被认为是经济增长方面的专家并且是诺贝尔经济学奖的有力候选人。罗默的研究专攻促进经济成长的科技与发展动能,这些是先前被忽略的。展示出这些对长期成长是很重要的,并使我们对促进成长的动力改观。
罗默在1986年建立了内生经济增长模型,把知识完整纳入到经济和技术体系之内,使其做为经济增长的内生变量。罗默提出了四要素增长理论,即新古典经济学中的资本和劳动(非技术劳动)外,又加上了人力资本(以受教育的年限衡量)和新思想(用专利来衡量,强调创新)。新增长理论的主要建立者是罗默(1986)和罗伯特·卢卡斯(Robert Lucas)(1988),探讨了纠正新古典经济增长模型的局限性的一些可能途径,用内生的技术来解释经济的增长。罗默在内生增长领域做出了杰出贡献,导致了经济增长分析的全面复兴。该理论的主要思想最早体现在罗默1983年的博士论文中,发表在1986年的《政治经济学期刊》(The Journal of Political Economy)上,提出了“内生经济增长理论”,探讨了纠正新古典经济增长模型的局限性的一些可能途径的论文,重新激起了经济学界对经济增长理论兴趣。1992年罗默在世界银行发展经济学年会上进一步把上述思想运用到发展中国家和地区的发展战略的研究中,并认为:能否提供和使用更多的创意或知识品,将直接关系到一国或地区经济能否保持长期增长。例如,毛里求斯在20世纪70年代和80年代实施了开放政策,吸引了香港的企业家把新思想和知识品运用到那里,从而带动了该国经济发展,摆脱了赤贫状况。
杰瑞 A 豪斯曼(Jerry A. Hausman)
美国麻州剑桥麻省理工学院(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)经济学系John and Jennie S. MacDonald教授
小哈尔伯特 L 怀特(Halbert L. White,Jr)
美国加州拉荷亚加州大学圣地牙哥分校(University of California San Diego, La Jolla)经济系Chancellor's Associates杰出教授
获奖成就:他们对计量经济学的贡献,尤其是郝斯蒙模型设定检定法