本帖隐藏的内容

Euroland’s hidden balance of
payment crisis：

Below the surface of the euro area public debt and banking crisis lies a
balance-of-payments crisis caused by the misalignment of internal real
exchange rates. At present, the Eurosystem generates real resource
transfers in the form of subsidised credits from the creditor to the
debtor countries, but this arrangement does not seem stable as these
transfers are not politically authorised and hence it will compromise the
Eurosystem if they are sustained indefinitely.
􀂄 With outright budgetary transfers from the creditor to the debtor
countries unlikely and the latter also probably unable to achieve internal
real depreciation through deflation of goods, services and asset prices,
the path of least resistance seems to be an appreciation in creditor
countries through the inflation of goods, services and asset prices.
􀂄 With representatives of debtor countries holding a majority of votes in
the ECB’s Governing Council, a policy of easy money and exchange rate
depreciation that leads to overheating in the creditor countries seems
most likely. As we pointed out in our GEP from October 5, the
authorities in creditor countries could ensure their population against
inflation and a soft currency policy by offering them index-linked
securities that would convert into a new currency should these
governments eventually decide to abandon the euro.
􀂄 Alternatively, authorities could aim at generating a combination of intra-
EMU transfers, deflation in the Latin countries, and inflation in the
Germanic countries such that the economic pain felt in each country
group is shared between them in a way that leaves it below the level
triggering a break-up of EMU.
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Monetary policy in times of the
financial crisis：

It seems that the major central banks still design their monetary policy
on the basis of the New Keynesian economic model. We believe that this
model is inadequate for the analysis of the present financial crisis and
the derivation of policy prescriptions to fight the crisis. In our view, a
modified Austrian economic model, where the economic policy counters
a break-down of the credit channel due to excessive risk aversion and
promotes economic adjustment, is a better platform for the design of
monetary policy.
􀂄 On the basis of such a model we doubt that monetary policies aimed at
closing an unobservable but perceived output gap and bringing
unemployment down in the wake of the financial crisis to pre-crisis
levels—as they are presently pursued in the US and the UK—will have
the desired success.
􀂄 At the same time, however, we see the need for monetary policy in the
euro area to support fiscal and economic policy in Italy to restore this
country to full solvency and avoid a collapse of the euro. Since European
policy makers have rejected a formal arrangement for such cooperation
in the form of ECB-backing of the EFSF they must now trust that the ECB
Governing Council will take the right decisions to achieve this
cooperation.
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