ABSTRACT
How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape
Contractual Reference Points?
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Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central
assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)’s theory of contractual reference points.
However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal
agreements and ex post renegotiation. We investigate the relevance of these features
experimentally. Our evidence indicates that the central behavioral mechanism underlying the
concept of contractual reference points is robust to the presence of informal agreements and
ex post renegotiation. However, our data also reveal new behavioral features that suggest
refinements of the theory. In particular, we find that the availability of informal agreements
and ex post renegotiation changes how trading parties evaluate ex post outcomes.
Interestingly, the availability of these additional options affects ex post evaluations even in
situations in which the parties do not use them.
JEL Classification: C91, D03, D86, J41

Keywords: contracts, reference points, fairness, renegotiation, informal agreement

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