<P><B>Handbook of New Institutional Economics</B></P>
<P align=left>Ménard, Claude; Shirley, Mary M. (Eds.) </P>
<P align=left>2005, XIII, 884 p., Hardcover</P>
<P align=left>ISBN-10: 1-4020-2687-0</P>
<P align=left>ISBN-13: 978-1-4020-2687-4</P>
<P align=left> </P>
<P align=left>INTRODUCTION - Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley</P>
<P align=left>SECTION I: THE DOMAIN OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS</P>
<P align=left>Ch.1: Institutions and the Performance of Economies over Time - Douglass C. North, Washington University in St. Louis </P>
<P align=left>Ch.2: The Institutional Structure of Production - Ronald Coase, the University of Chicago</P>
<P align=left>Ch.3: Transaction Cost Economics - Oliver E. Williamson, University of California at Berkeley </P>
<P align=left>SECTION II : POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE STATE</P>
<P align=left>Ch.4: Electoral Institutions and Political Competition: Coordination, Persuasion and Mobilization - Gary Cox, University of California at San Diego </P>
<P align=left>Ch.5: Presidential versus Parliamentary Government - John Carey, Washington University in St. Louis </P>
<P align=left>Ch.6: Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle - Matthew McCubbins, University of California at San Diego </P>
<P align=left>Ch.7: The Performance and Stability of Federalism: An Institutional Perspective - Barry Weingast, Stanford University </P>
<P align=left>SECTION III : LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF A MARKET ECONOMY</P>
<P align=left>Ch.8: The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments - Gillian K. Hadfield, University of Southern California </P>
<P align=left>Ch.9: Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges - Paul Rubin, Emory University </P>
<P align=left>Ch.10: Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking - Benito Arrunada and Veneta Andonova, Pompeu Fabra </P>
<P align=left>Ch.11: Legal Institutions and Financial Development - Thorsten Beck, the World Bank and Ross Levine, University of Minnesota</P>
<P align=left>SECTION IV: MODES OF GOVERNANCE </P>
<P align=left>Ch.12: The New Institutional Approach to Organization - Claude Menard, University of Paris- Pantheon Sorbonne </P>
<P align=left>Ch. 13: Vertical Integration - Paul Joskow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology </P>
<P align=left>Ch. 14: Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in Firms - Gary Miller, Washington University in St. Louis </P>
<P align=left>Ch. 15: The Institutions of Corporate Governance - Mark Roe, Harvard </P>
<P align=left>Ch. 16: Firms and the Creation of New Markets - Erin Anderson and Hubert Gatignon, INSEAD</P>
<P align=left>SECTION V: CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS</P>
<P align=left>Ch. 17: The Make or Buy Decisions: Lessons from Empirical Studies - Peter Klein, University of Missouri </P>
<P align=left>Ch. 18: Agricultural Contracts - Douglas Allen, Simon Fraser University and Dean Lueck, Montana State University </P>
<P align=left>Ch.19: The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering - Victor Goldberg, Columbia University </P>
<P align=left>SECTION VI : REGULATION</P>
<P align=left>Ch.20 : The Institutions of Regulation. An Application to Public Utilities. - Pablo Spiller, University of California at Berkeley and Mario Tommasi, University of San Andres </P>
<P align=left>Ch.21: State Regulation of Open-Access, Common-Pool Resources - Gary Libecap, University of Arizona </P>
<P align=left>Ch.22: Property Rights, and the State - Lee Alston, University of Colorado and Bernardo Mueller, University of Brasilia </P>
<P align=left>Ch.23: Licit and Illicit Firm Responses to Public Regulation -Lee Benham, Washington University in St. Louis</P>
<P align=left>SECTION VII: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE</P>
<P align=left>Ch.24: Institutions and Development - Mary M. Shirley, The World Bank and Ronald Coase Institute </P>
<P align=left>Ch.25: - Institutional and Non-Institutional Explanation of Economic Differences Stanley L. Engerman, University of Rochester and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, University of California at Los Angeles </P>
<P align=left>Ch.26: Institutions and Firms in Transition Economies - Peter Murrell, University of Maryland </P>
<P align=left>Ch.27: Social Capital, Social Norms and the New Institutional Economics- Philip Keefer and Steve Knack, The World Bank </P>
<P align=left>Ch.28: Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange - Avner Greif, Stanford University </P>
<P align=left>SECTION VIII: PERSPECTIVES</P>
<P align=left>Ch.29: Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics - Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg, Cornell </P>
<P align=left>Ch.30: Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies - Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University </P>
<P align=left><B> </B></P>
<P align=left><B>中文目录及部分内容的链接</B></P>
<P align=left><B>第一部分 新制度经济学的研究范围</B></P>
<P align=left>第一章 时间维度下的制度和经济绩效</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://www.esnie.org/pdf/textes_2004/shirley2_North-Revised.pdf" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://www.esnie.org/pdf/textes_2004/shirley2_North-Revised.pdf</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第二章 生产的制度结构</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://www.jstor.org/view/00028282/di976315/97p01342/0" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://www.jstor.org/view/00028282/di976315/97p01342/0</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第三章 交易成本经济学</P>
<P align=left><B>第二部分 政治制度和ZF</B></P>
<P align=left>第四章 选举制度和政治竞争:协调、说服和动员</P>
<P align=left>第五章 总统制ZFVS议会制ZF</P>
<P align=left>第六章 立法过程和反映原理</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu/ARTC6.PDF" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu/ARTC6.PDF</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第七章 联邦主义的绩效和稳定性:制度主义者的观点</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://www.mercatus.org/repository/docLib/MC_GPI_ForumSeries7C_2003_6_24.pdf" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://www.mercatus.org/repository/docLib/MC_GPI_ForumSeries7C_2003_6_24.pdf</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left><B>第三部分 市场经济的法律制度</B></P>
<P align=left>第八章 支持契约性承诺的若干法律制度</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&amp;context=usclwps" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&amp;context=usclwps</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第九章 作为市场交换之框架的法律体系</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=413626" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=413626</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第十章 市场制度和司法裁决</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://laep.univ-paris1.fr/sem/SEP23mars04" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://laep.univ-paris1.fr/sem/SEP23mars04</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第十一章 法律制度和金融发展</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Ross_Levine/Publication/Forthcoming/Forth_Book_Menard_LegalFinDvlpmt.pdf" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Ross_Levine/Publication/Forthcoming/Forth_Book_Menard_LegalFinDvlpmt.pdf</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left><B>第四部分 治理模式</B></P>
<P align=left>第十二章 研究组织的新制度方法</P>
<P align=left>第十三章 垂直一体化</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=833" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=833</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第十四章 公司中委托-代理问题的解决</P>
<P align=left>第十五章 公司治理制度</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=612362" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://ssrn.com/abstract=612362</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第十六章 公司和新市场的创造</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://www-ufrima.imag.fr/FORMATION/FILIERE/MASTER/SI/SiteMasterSI/Documents/SSIU/Gatignon%20-%20NPD%20-%20insead%20-%2003.pdf" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://www-ufrima.imag.fr/FORMATION/FILIERE/MASTER/SI/SiteMasterSI/Documents/SSIU/Gatignon%20-%20NPD%20-%20insead%20-%2003.pdf</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left><B>第五部分 契约安排</B></P>
<P align=left>第十七章 自制还是购买:经验研究的教训</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=529962" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://ssrn.com/abstract=529962</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第十八章 农业契约</P>
<P align=left>第十九章 契约的执行和私下调整</P>
<P align=left><B>第六部分 管制</B></P>
<P align=left>第二十章 管制制度</P>
<P align=left>第二十一章 公共资源的ZF管制</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2003/Libecap19-03.pdf" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2003/Libecap19-03.pdf</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第二十二章 财产权利和ZF</P>
<P align=left>第二十三章 公司对公共管制的合法及不合法的应对</P>
<P align=left><B>第七部分 制度变迁</B></P>
<P align=left>第二十四章 制度和发展</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://coase.org/w-shirley2003institutionsanddevelopment.pdf" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://coase.org/w-shirley2003institutionsanddevelopment.pdf</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第二十五章 经济差异的制度和非制度解释</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9989.pdf" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9989.pdf</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第二十六章 转型经济体中的制度和公司</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=337141" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=337141</FONT></A> 或者:</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/murrell/russlaw/Institutions%20and%20Firms%20in%20Transition%20Economies.pdf" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/murrell/russlaw/Institutions%20and%20Firms%20in%20Transition%20Economies.pdf</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第二十七章 社会资本、社会规范和新制度经济学</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINVTCLI/Resources/socialcapitalsocialnorms.pdf" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINVTCLI/Resources/socialcapitalsocialnorms.pdf</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left>第二十八章 承诺、强制和市场:支持交换的制度的动态本质</P>
<P align=left><a href="http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/Greif_Papers/Commitment_Coercion_Markets.pdf" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#96b0af size=2>http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/Greif_Papers/Commitment_Coercion_Markets.pdf</FONT></A> </P>
<P align=left><B>第八部分 展望</B></P>
<P align=left>第二十九章 经济社会学和新制度经济学</P>
<P align=left>第三十章 进行新制度分析:比市场和统治阶层更深入</P>
<P align=left>本文档基于以下各位的工作:</P>
<P align=left>beauty001在中国经济学教育科研网论坛“制度经济学”板块发起了《制度经济学手册》的网络搜集工作,并提供了第一、八、九、十、十一、十三、十五、十六、十七、二十一、二十四、二十五、二十六、二十八章内容的有效链接。</P>
<P align=left>Lakeqian提供了第二十七章内容的有效链接。</P>