The Economics of Organised Crime

·        Edited by: Gianluca Fiorentini, Università degli Studi, Florence

·        Edited by: Sam Peltzman, University of Chicago

insert all attachments·        Paperback

·        ISBN:9780521629553

·        DOI: 10.2277/ 0521629551

·        Publication date:August 1997

·        320pages

·        6 b/w illus. 11 tables

·        Dimensions: 228 x 152 mm

·        Weight: 0.47kg

·        Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer

·        ￡31.00

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This isthe first book to use economic theory in the analysis of all the differentaspects of organised crime: the origins, the internal organisation, marketbehaviour and deterrence policies. The theory of rent-seeking is adopted tohelp understand the origin of criminal organisations from a state of anarchy,while modern industrial organisation theory is used to explain the design ofinternal rules in the organised crime sector. The market behaviour of organisedcrime is analysed taking into account its double nature of competitive firm andof monopolist on rule-making. Finally, the 'crime and economics' approach isapplied to the analysis of corruption that occurs when the organised crimesector and the government collude to exploit their monopoly on rule-making.This book provides a careful balance between theoretical and institutional orempirical contributions. Each chapter outlines the normative results of theanalysis in order to design more sophisticated deterrence policies.

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Table of Contents

Foreword
1. Introduction Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman
Part I. Theories of the State and the Origin of Criminal Organisations: 2.Organised crime, Mafia and governments Annelise Anderson
Discussion Maurizio Franzini
3. Gangs as primitive states Stergios Skaperdas, and Constantinos Syropoulos
Discussion William J. Baumol
Part II. The Criminal Organisation as a Firm: 4. Internal cohesion andcompetition among criminal organisations Michele Polo
Discussion Pier Luigi Sacco
5. Conspiracy among the many: the Mafia in legitimate industries Diego Gambettaand Peter Reuter
Discussion Luigi Campiglio
Part III. Organised Crime and State Intervention in the Economy: 6. Rivalkleptocrats: the Mafia versus the state Herschel I. Grossman
Discussion Marco Celentani
7. Corruption: arm's-length relationships and markets Vito Tanzi
Discussion Flavio Delbono
Part IV. Deterrence Policies Against Legal Firms Involved in IllegalActivities: 8. Auditing with 'ghosts' Frank A. Cowell and James P. F. Gordon
Discussion Domenico Siniscalco
9. The reputational penalty firms bear from committing criminal fraud JonathanM. Karpoff and John R. Lott Jr.
Discussion Michele Polo
Part V. Deterrence Policies Against Organised Crime: 10. Regulating theorganised crime sector Marco Celentani, Massimo Morelli and Riccardo Martina
Discussion Carlo Scarpa
11. Oligopolistic competition in illegal markets Gianluca Fiorentini
Discussion Sam Peltzman
Index.