Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Game

defeniks

2496

收藏 2007-02-13

91379.pdf
大小:(362.55 KB)

只需: 3 个论坛币马上下载

In repeated games there is in general a large set of equilibria. We also know that
in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies,
but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper investigates whether and
how neutrally stable strategies can be upset in a process of mutation and selection.
While neutral stability excludes that mutants have a selective advantage themselves, it
does not rule out the possibility that mutants that are neutral can enter a population
and create a selective advantage for a second mutant. This will be called an indirect
invasion and the central results show that, for high enough continuation probability,
there is no strategy that is robust against indirect invasions. Such stepping stone paths
out of equilibrium generally exist both in the direction of more and in the direction of
less cooperation.

[此贴子已经被作者于2007-3-2 2:55:28编辑过]