Paper

production,information costs and economic organnization   1972  
the cost and benefits of ownership:a theory of lateral and vertical integration  1986
incomplete contracts and renegotiation 1985
vertical integration appropriable rents and  the competitive contracting process 1978
hierarchical control and optimal firm size 1967
the new institutional economics :taking stock,looking ahead 2000

---

---

book


firms,contracts,and financial structure 1995
markets and hierarchies analysis and antitrust implications 1975

你把论文引用誊抄一下，实在不想打字搜索了

注意：这是第十八讲所列文献中我所能找到的所有论文，书籍暂未寻找（说真的你看得过来么:-)）。
Hart. 1985 没找到这本书，只发现一片同名主旨论文。

• Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. The American Economic Review, 62(5), 777–795.
• Arrow, K. J. (1974). The Limits of Organization. The Fels lectures on public policy analysis; (Vol. 1). New York: Norton.
• Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x
• Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 691–719.
• Hardman Moore, J., & Hart, O. (1985). Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 60). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. Retrieved from http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/60.html
• Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1988). Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica, 56(4), 755–785. doi:10.2307/1912698
• Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978). Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2), 297–326.
• Kreps, D. M. (1996). Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory. Industrial and Corporate Change, 5(2), 561–595. doi:10.1093/icc/5.2.561
• Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (1999a). Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts. The Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 83–114.
• Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (1999b). Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature. The Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 139–149.
• Williamson, O. E. (1967). Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size. Journal of Political Economy, 75(2), 123–138.
• Williamson, O. E. (1983). Markets and Hierarchies : Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press.
• Williamson, O. E. (2000). The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3), 595–613.
  

你说的看的完不，这个我没想过。
其实我没有要所有的参考文献，只是把自己感兴趣的和书中详细讲解的模型的paper，其实我只要了后面高微的大部分paper哈。

扪心自问，勤奋一点，老实一点，时间上应该没有问题。

求十八讲的勘误表啊。。。。！！！