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Preface
1Motivation 1
Structure of the thesis 4
Main contributions 11
Further issues 14
References 17
Essay 1: Corporate governance in banking: a survey of the
literature
231. Introduction 24
2. Corporate governance as a determinant of performance 27
2.1 What is corporate governance? 27
2.2 Corporate governance as a determinant of performance 30
2.2.1 Board of directors 30
2.2.2 Ownership structure 32
2.2.3 Incentive pay 36
2.2.4 Legal protection of minority investors 36
3. The corporate governance of banks 37
3.1 What is special about banks? 37
3.2 Regulation and supervision 40
3.3 What is special about the corporate governance of banks? 444. Bank governance and performance 55
4.1 What is performance? 55
4.2 Determinants of bank performance 57
4.3 Corporate governance as a determinant of bank performance 60
4.3.1 Board of directors 60
4.3.2 Ownership structure 61
4.3.3 Incentive pay 64
4.3.4 Legal aspects 66
5. Summary and conclusions 67References 72
Essay 2: A cross-country study of corporate governance in
European banks
831. Introduction 84
2. Literature review 87
3. Data and variables 95
3.1 Sample collection and data sources 95
3.2 Variables 96
3.2.1 Financial variables 96
3.2.2 Corporate governance variables 97
4. Ownership structure and board of directors of European banks 100
4.1 Descriptive statistics 100
4.1.1 Financial variables 1004.1.2 Ownership structure 101
4.1.3 Board of directors characteristics 102
4.2 Is there a “nation effect”? 104
5. Boards, ownership and performance in European banking: an
exploratory analysis 107
6. Does the legal family influence the way board size and
independence relate to bank performance? 110
6.1 Board and ownership characteristics across legal families 112
6.2 Analysis 116
6.3 Robustness 121
7. Conclusions 124
References 128Essay 3: Board effectiveness in the European banking
industry
1531. Introduction 154
2. Literature review 161
2.1 Board size 161
2.2 Board independence 162
2.3 Board size and independence in banking 163
3. Data and variables 164
3.1 Sample collection 164
3.2 Descriptive statistics 165
3.2.1 Financial variables 165
3.2.2 Board variables 166
4. The relationship between board size and composition and
performance 168
4.1 Model specification 168
4.2 Empirical results 169
4.3 Further specifications 172
5. Results from an alternate sample 1755.1 Descriptive statistics 176
5.2 Model specification 177
5.3 Results 178
6. Conclusions 181
References 185Essay 4: The interaction between blockholder ownership and
performance in European banks
2011. Introduction 202
2. Literature review 206
2.1 Theory 206
2.2 Previous empirical evidence 211
3. Methodology 214
4. Data and variables 2184.1 Sample collection and variables 218
4.2 Descriptive statistics 221
5. Results 223
5.1 Non-linear relationship 226
5.2 Blockholder ownership and return on assets 229
6. Conclusions 231
References 233
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