Belief Elicitation in Experiments  Is there a Hedging Problem



摘要：
Belief-elicitation experiments usually reward accuracy of stated beliefs in addition to payments
for other decisions. But this allows risk-averse subjects to hedge with their stated beliefs against
adverse outcomes of the other decisions. So can we trust the existing belief-elicitation results?
And can we avoid potential hedging confounds? We propose an experimental design that theoretically eliminates hedging opportunities. Using this design we test for the empirical relevance
of hedging effects in the lab. Our results suggest that hedging confounds are not a major problem
if hedging opportunities are not very prominent. But if hedging opportunities are transparent,
and incentives to hedge are strong, many subjects do spot hedging opportunities and respond to
them. The bias can go beyond players actually hedging themselves, because some expect others
to hedge best respond to this.


———— 不是信念偏好，具体怎么翻译我找不到特别准确的词语，简单说来就是问你对在某件事情发生之前，该事情发生的概率。