<P>Family Firms</P>
<P>Family Firms<br>MIKE BURKART, FAUSTO PANUNZI, and ANDREI SHLEIFERn<br>ABSTRACT<br>We present a model of succession in a ¢rm owned and managed by its founder.<br>The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management<br>to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to £oat on the<br>stock exchange.We assume that a professional is a better manager than the<br>heir, and describe how the founder’s decision is shaped by the legal environment.<br>This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the<br>Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance<br>as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent<br>with cross-country evidence.</P> <br>

[此贴子已经被作者于2007-3-19 15:03:52编辑过]