There has been much talk about America’sdecline in recent years, with the corollarythat Chinawill take its place. But, while the United Statesdoes indeed face problems that urgently need to be addressed, if China is to rise further, to say nothing of supplanting the US internationally, it must firstput its own house in order.
Those who argue that America is in decline have adifficult case to make in economic terms. For all its recent woes (which many countries would gladly exchangefor their own), the USremains a dynamo of industry and innovation,and may be emerging as an energy powerhouse as well.
What threatens America’s global leadership is,rather, some of the most divided and disruptive domestic politics in itshistory. A country whose people have traditionally pridedthemselves on practicality is experiencing a debilitatingbout of excessive theorizing, ideology, andso-called “new ideas,” thereby forestallingthe practical ideas that come from constructive interaction with one’spolitical opponents.
The demise of compromise and collegialityin domestic politics has raised new challenges in America’s interaction with othersas well. Foreign-policy debate in the US has become a proxy for who is“tougher,” which does not necessarily mean wiser.
Thus, the American art of diplomatic engagement, theability to talk with different sides while holding one’s own views to oneself,has been largely replaced by a penchant forloud talk, finger-pointing, self-righteousness, and recrimination.Countries used to welcome and look for American engagement. Now some are morelikely to fear it, especially if it comes in the form of playing to domesticAmerican constituencies’ appetite for supposed toughness.
But, before the US hands over international leadership to theChinese, it would be instructive to look at China’s own internal political divisions and inability to synchronize its domestic politics with itsgrowing global responsibilities. China’sproblems make those afflicting the US polity seem trivial in comparison.
In recent years, Chinahas been increasingly embroiled in anineteenth-century-style dispute with several of its Southeast Asian neighborsover conflicting claims to the South China Sea. Before one lamentsAmericans’ unwillingness to crack a history bookon an international subject, it is enlightening to watch China in action, systematicallycomplicating its vitally important relationships in the region over…what?
China’s so-called “nine dashes” claim,which essentially seeks to turn the entire South China Seainto a southern Chinese lake, represents a legacy of Chiang Kai-Shek’s Republicof China. And where did the Generalissimo find the inspiration for this claim? China argues that the waters have been Chinesefor a thousand years, but the likelierinspiration is more recent, reflecting Imperial Japan’s occupation of Taiwanuntil 1945. Thus, China,whose culture and achievements are the envy of the world, is today in a war ofwords – and a few naval vessels as well –with almost all of its southern neighbors over a recently inherited claim on anissue that calls for a respectful process of international negotiation.
Various considerations typically underlie policy choices insuch situations. But, in the case of China’sham-handedness in the South China Sea,domestic constituencies decrying “weakness”and demanding toughness from political leaders are a key factor. Among China’s500 million Internet users, for example, one senses a palpablerise in nationalist sentiment, reflected in bitter criticism of official“weakness” in defending Chinese interests.
China’s government is extremely sensitive to such attacks. If a Chineseblogger criticizes the government over itscrackdown on **** Gong, or supports Tibet’s opposition, the Internetpolice rush to the scene of the supposed crime. But if the blogosphere emits jingoistic calls for more raw materials, thegovernment salutes and works harder toobtain them.
Domestic pressures have tied China in knots on other issues aswell. Many international observers might forgive Chinaits behavior in the South China Sea, giventhat many countries, large and small, have maritimedisputes with neighbors. But China’sown constituencies, whether netizens or competing official institutions, havecontributed to an international record that is earning China derisionfrom small neighbors and great powers alike.
China’s continued support for a nuclear aspirantlike North Koreais a case in point. No responsible country in the world today sees any merit toNorth Korea’sbehavior. Yet China’s preoccupation with its internal politics is suchthat it cannot see the price that it pays for reacting to every North Korean outrage with only vagueopprobrium, combined with expressions ofhope-over-experience that North  Korea will reform. For example, the equanimity of its response to North Korea’smilitary attacks against South Korea in 2010 left South Koreans, who are alsoChina’s neighbors, in despair aboutbilateral relations.
The origin of China’sdesultory policy lies in its leadership’sfailure to shape or sharpenthe drift of domestic politics: many Chinese still see pluckylittle North Koreaas a friend and ally. So Chinadoes nothing to signal a more serious way forward, much less earn respect inthe broader international community, which is now thoroughly disgusted by North Korea’sbehavior.
The list of untenablepolicies goes on. Syria is thelatest international problem that China, again constrained bydomestic politics, cannot seem to get right. No one expects China to line up inperfect formation with the US or the European Union on thisand other issues. But its consistent preference for lining up on the other sideof the divide – even when doing so runs counter to itsown national interests – calls into question whether it has the internal fortitude to be a leader.
None of this is meant to minimize the consequences ofpolitical polarization in the US.But, whereas America’sproblem in the world today is that domestic pressures sometimes lead to anexcess of fortitude, China’sproblem is that similarly constraining pressures produce foreign-policyweakness.