In 2000, 189 countries collectively adopted the United NationsMillennium Declaration, which evolved into a set of concrete targets calledthe Millennium Development Goals(MDGs). These ambitious targets – ranging from halving extreme poverty andreducing maternal mortality bythree-quarters to achieving universal primary schooling and halting (and beginning to reverse)the spread of HIV/AIDS – are supposed to be met by the end of 2015. As thedeadline approaches, development experts are debating a new question: Whatcomes next?
It is virtually certain that many of the MDGs will not havebeen met by the end of 2015, but there have been striking successes in someareas. For example, the goal of halving extreme poverty (measured by the numberof people living on less than $1.25 aday) will likely be achieved ahead of time, largely thanks to China’s phenomenalgrowth.
At the same time, there is little evidence to suggest thatthose successes were the result of the MDGs themselves. Chinaimplemented the policies that engineered history’s greatest poverty eradicationprogram prior to, and independently from, the Millennium Declaration and theMDGs.
Clearly, however, the MDGs were a public-relations triumph, which is not to belittletheir contribution. Like all worthwhile PR efforts, the MDGs served to raiseawareness, galvanize attention, and mobilizeaction – all for a good cause. They amplified the global conversation aboutdevelopment and defined its terms. And there is evidence that they got advancedcountries to pay more attention to poor nations.
Indeed, the MDGs possibly had their clearest impact on aid flows from rich to poor countries. Astudy by Charles Kenny and Andy Sumner for the Center for GlobalDevelopment in Washington, DC, suggests that the MDGs not only boostedaid flows, but also redirected them toward smaller, poorer countries, andtoward targeted areas like education and public health. However, aid was notdirectly linked to performance and results, and it is much more difficult toknow whether it had the desired impact overall.
The MDGs encompass eight goals, 21 targets, and 60indicators. Much criticism has focused on the use of these numerical targets and indicators, which, skepticsargue, are misspecified, mismeasured, and divert attention from equallyimportant areas. But these complaints miss the point. Any effort that isconcrete and implementable needs to monitor the results, and setting clearnumerical targets is the best way to do so.
Still, a central paradox plagues the MDGs. The MillenniumDeclaration was meant to be a compact between the world’s rich and poorcountries. Poor countries promised to refocus their development efforts whilerich countries pledged to support them with finance, technology, and access totheir markets. But, oddly, of the eight goals, only the last one deals with“global partnership,” or what rich countries can and should do.
Even here, the MDGs contain no numericaltarget for financial aid or any other aspect of rich countries’ assistance, incontrast to the highly specific poverty-related targets set for developingcountries. It is perhaps telling that the “progresscharts” prepared by the United Nations Development Program, the agencycharged with reporting on progress toward achieving the MDGs, track onlyInternet usage under that goal.
Why we need a global effort to convince developingcountries to do what is good for them is not clear. Poverty reduction and humandevelopment should be the first order of business for governments in thesecountries, with or without the MDGs.
It is true, of course, that these governments often pursuedifferent goals, for political, military, and other reasons. But it is wishfulthinking to believe that they can be persuaded to act otherwise byinternational declarations that lack enforcement mechanisms. If we have learnedone thing in the development business, it is that real reform cannot be boughtwith donors’ money, let alone with vague promises of money.
Equally problematic, theMDGs implicitly assume that we know how to achieve development targets, andthat only resources and political will are missing. But it is doubtful thateven well-intentioned policymakers have a good handle on, say, how to raisesecondary-school completion rates sustainably or reduce maternal mortality.
Many development economists would argue that significantimprovements in governance and political institutions are required before suchgoals can be achieved. The most that rich countries can do is to provide anenabling environment for the benefit of developing countries that are willingand able to take advantage of it.
These considerations suggest an obvious direction for thenext iteration of the MDGs. First, a newglobal compact should focus more directly on rich countries’ responsibilities.Second, it should emphasize policies beyond aid and trade that have an equal,if not greater, impact on poor countries’ development prospects.
A short list of such policies would include: carbon taxesand other measures to ameliorate climatechange; more work visas to allow largertemporary migration flows from poor countries; strict controls on arms sales todeveloping nations; reduced support for repressiveregimes; and improved sharing of financial information to reduce moneylaundering and tax avoidance.
Notice that most of these measures are actually aimed atreducing damage – for example, climate change, military conflict, and financialcrime – that otherwise results from rich countries’ conduct. “Do no harm” is asgood a principle here as it is in medicine.
This kind of reorientation will not be easy. Advancedcountries are certain to resist any new commitments. But most of these measuresdo not cost money, and, as the MDGs have shown, setting targets can be used tomobilize action from rich-country governments. If the international communityis going to invest in a bold new public-relations initiative, it might as wellfocus on areas where the potential payoffs are the greatest.