Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Daron Acemoglu

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

James A. Robinson

Harvard University, Massachusetts

Hardback

(ISBN-13: 9780521855266 | ISBN-10: 0521855268)

This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.

• Highly interdisciplinary study of government, integrating economics, political science, sociology, and history

• Real world in orientation, making it not just for students but also policy makers

• Authors are internationally known for their work on this subject

Contents

Part I. Questions and Answers;

Section 1. Paths of Political Development:

1. Britain;

2. Argentina;

3. Singapore;

4. South Africa;

5. The agenda;

Section 2. Our Argument:

6. Democracy versus nondemocracy;

7. Building blocks of our approach;

8. Toward our basic story;

9. Our theory of democratization;

10. Democratic consolidation;

11. Determinants of democracy;

12. Political identities and the nature of conflict;

13. Democracy in a picture;

14. Overview of the book;

Section 3. What Do We Know about Democracy?:

15. Measuring democracy;

16. Patterns of democracy;

17. Democracy, inequality and redistribution;

18. Crises and democracy;

19. Social unrest and democratization;

20. The literature;

21. Our contribution;

Part II. Modelling Politics;

Section 4. Democratic Politics:

22. Introduction;

23. Aggregating individual preferences;

24. Single-peaked preferences and the median voter theorem;

25. Our workhorse models;

26. Democracy and political equality;

27. Conclusion;

Section 5. Nondemocratic Politics:

28. Introduction;

29. Power and constraints in nondemocratic politics;

30. Modeling preferences and constraints in nondemocracies;

31. Commitment problems;

32. A simple game of promises;

33. A dynamic model;

34. Incentive-compatible promises;

35. Conclusion;

Part III. The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy;

Section 6. Democratization:

36. Introduction;

37. The role of political institutions;

38. Preferences over political institutions;

39. Political power and institutions;

40. A static model of democratization;

41. Democratization or repression?;

42. A dynamic model of democratization;

43. Subgame perfect equilibria;

44. Alternative political identities;

45. Targeted transfers;

46. Power of the elites in democracy;

47. Ideological preferences over regimes;

48. Democratization in a picture;

49. Equilibrium revolutions;

50. Conclusion;

Section 7. Coups and Consolidation:

51. Introduction;

52. Incentives for coups;

53. A static model of coups;

54. A dynamic model of the creation and consolidation of democracy;

55. Alternative political identities;

56. Targeted transfers;

57. Power in democracy and coups;

58. Consolidation in a picture;

59. Defensive coups;

60. Conclusion;

Part IV. Putting the Models to Work;

Section 8. The Role of the Middle Class:

61. Introduction;

62. The three-class model;

63. Emergence of partial democracy;

64. From partial to full democracy;

65. Repression: the middle class as a buffer;

66. Repression: soft-liners versus hard-liners;

67. The role of the middle class in consolidating democracy;

68. Conclusion;

Section 9. Economic Structure and Democracy:

69. Introduction;

70. Economic structure and income distribution;

71. Political conflict;

72. Capital, land and the transition to democracy;

73. Costs of coup on capital and land;

74. Capital, land and the burden of democracy;

75. Conflict between landowners and industrialists;

76. Industrialists, landowners and democracy in practice;

77. Economic institutions;

78. Human capital;

79. Conjectures about political development;

80. Conclusion;

Section 10. Globalization and Democracy:

81. Introduction;

82. A model of an open economy;

83. Political conflict - democratic consolidation;

84. Political conflict - transition to democracy;

85. Financial integration;

86. Increased political integration;

87. Alternative assumptions about the nature of international trade;

88. Conclusion;

Part V. Conclusions and the Future of Democracy;

Section 11. Conclusions and the Future of Democracy:

89. Paths of political development revisited;

90. Extensions and areas for future research;

91. The future of democracy;

Part VI. Appendix; Section 12. Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy:

92. Introduction;

93. Probabilistic voting models;

94. Lobbying;

95. Partisan politics and political capture;

Bibliography;

Index.