英文文献：Breaking the Kareken and Wallace Indeterminacy Result-打破了Kareken和Wallace的不确定性结果
英文文献作者：Timothy Kam,Pere Gomis-Porqueras,Christopher J. Waller
英文文献摘要：
In this paper we study the endogenous choice to accept fiat objects as media of exchange, the fundamentals that drive their acceptance, and their implications for their bilateral nominal exchange rate. To this end, we consider a small open economy where agents have no restrictions on what divisible fiat currency can be used to settle transactions (i.e. no currency control). We build on Li, Rocheteau and Weill (2013) and allow both fiat currencies to be counterfeited at some fixed costs. The two currencies can coexist, even if one of the currencies is dominated by the other in rate of return. This is driven by an equilibrium outcome in which private information and threats of counterfeiting imposes an equilibrium liquidity constraint on currencies in circulation. Thus, threats of counterfeiting help to pin down a determinate nominal exchange rate, and, to break the Kareken-Wallace indeterminacy result in an environment without ad-hoc currency controls. Finally, we show that with appropriate fiscal policies we can enlarge the set of monetary equilibria with determinate nominal exchange rate.

本文研究了接受菲亚特对象作为交换媒介的内生选择、驱动其接受的基本因素及其对其双边名义汇率的影响。为此，我们考虑一种小型开放经济，在这种经济中，代理人对可分割的法定货币可以用于结算交易没有任何限制(即没有货币控制)。我们以Li, Rocheteau和Weill(2013)为基础，允许以一定的固定成本伪造两种法定货币。这两种货币可以共存，即使其中一种货币在收益率上被另一种货币所主导。这是由一种均衡结果驱动的，在这种均衡结果中，私人信息和伪造威胁对流通中的货币施加了均衡流动性约束。因此，伪造货币的威胁有助于确定一个确定的名义汇率，并打破卡勒肯-华莱士的不确定性，从而导致一个没有特别货币管制的环境。最后，我们证明在适当的财政政策下，我们可以扩大确定名义汇率下的货币均衡集。