Geopolitical insight is often gained through real-life experience,rather than big-picture thinking. Arriving at Charles de Gaulle airport inParis from Conakry, Guinea, is a case in point: Conakry’s airport, located inone of the world’s poorest countries, outperforms France’s prestigious globalhub in terms of cleanliness, service, and pride.

By amplifying such exemplars into anational project, Guinea could join the small group of commodity-rich countriesthat have bucked the curse of corruption andeconomic decay that often accompanies large natural-resource endowments.

History demonstrates the difficulty of avoiding the so-called “resource curse” – andthat it does not plague only less-developed countries like Nigeria, as manyassume. In the 1980’s, the United Kingdom’s North Sea-driven oil and gas boomundermined the country’s broad-based economic competitiveness, while PrimeMinister Margaret Thatcher’s government wasted much of the revenue on handouts that encouraged excessive consumption.

While a handful of commodity-rich countries have managed to buck the curse, including Botswana, Chile, and Norway,they have, nevertheless, failed to diversify their economies, remainingdependent on natural resource-based exports. But history is not destined to repeat itself, and leaders ofcommodity-rich countries are seeking alternative futures.

Countries across Africa – including Ghana, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda,and Uganda – are showing early signs of success. Zambia recently issued a $750million inaugural ten-year bond at an annual interest rate of 5.375%. Oversubscribed by 24 times, the issue will allowZambia to borrow more cheaply than many European countries can.

Such developments reflect growing confidence in Africa’s economicprospects and, thus, in its ability to escape the resource curse. But thesecountries still face significant obstacles to development.

First, governments must balance long-term goals with short-termachievements. Given unlimited time, less-developed commodity-rich countrieswould first invest in human capital and institutions, then direct their growingcommodity revenues into infrastructure, and move on to diversify theireconomies by strengthening the agriculture, manufacturing, and service sectors.

In the real world, of course, such countries’ political economies demandshort-term gains, beginning with basic services like potable water andelectricity. If governments fail to respond to these basic demands, citizenstake to the streets, often destructively. This summer in Guinea, for example,citizens’ frustration with widespread poverty and weak institutions, memoriesof ethnic persecution, and distrust of unfamiliar democratic processes fueledviolent protests.

Second, development requires both money and the right conditions. But, inmany cases, the conditions placed on funding create barriers to investment.

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank lead the chorus of traditional players eager to help, offeringdebt write-offs and concessionary finance. Butthe stringent institutional reforms that they demand, while beneficial intheory, might not stabilize, let alone enhance, the development process.

Newcomers, most notably China, have become a ready alternative source ofcheap finance. But, in exchange, the Chinese expect businessopportunities and, to some extent, political influence.

Sovereign-wealth funds, too, are increasingly involved in financingdevelopment. But, despite being state-owned and subject to policy decisions,they function as commercial enterprises (with the possible exception ofNorway’s hydrocarbon-funded state-owned investment vehicles).

Financing for the most expensive projects – implementing green-energysystems, building transport infrastructure, and developing modern cities – mustcome from foreign institutional investors. But high-quality private investorsare resistant to financing lumpy, illiquid investments in fragile, volatile states. Those who are willing to engage oftendemand steep risk premiums that dramatically increase the cost of capital,often to usurious levels.

Global mining companies like Rio Tinto are increasingly working alongsideemerging-economy leaders like China’s Chalco to support development. As themost heavily invested, they have the most experience using cheap debt to createvalue. But, with commodity prices beginning to drop, even the most bullishcompanies are reassessing ambitious investment plans – a trend reflected in theBrazilian mining giant Vale’s recent decision to put its investment in Guinea on hold.

Bucking the resource curse requires, first and foremost,strong, legitimate domestic political leadership, underpinned by effective institutionalarrangements. But it also requires a globalinvestment community – public, private, and mixed – that can move beyondshort-term thinking, ideological bias, ignorance, and cynicism. After all, betson leadership, vision, and earnings potential should not be limited toinvestments in California-based technology start-ups.

Guinea, which is making progress despite annual per capita incomeof roughly $450, exemplifies the potential ofthe world’s poorest countries to surpassexpectations. Investors should take note.