1 论文标题
Decentralization and Veiled Corruption under China’s “Rule of Mandates”
2 作者信息
- London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
3 出处和链接（比如，NBER working paper No.11000）
[size=1.5em]World Development
[size=0.8em]Available online 3 April 2013
[size=0.8em]In Press, Corrected Proof
4 摘要
This paper shows why corruption is especially difficult to detect under China’s system of decentralized authoritarian rule, which I call a “rule of mandates.” Local officials must pursue high priority political targets but have immense discretion over which laws to implement. A relative standard for corruption consequently arises since non-implementation of laws may be mandate-serving or may be corrupt; and determining which requires extra information on why non-implementation occurred. The theory is supported by evidence from original survey and case research on the implementation of the village elections law. I discuss implications for anticorruption efforts, development patterns, and future research.
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