英文文献：Debt Contracts with ex-ante and ex-post Asymmetric Information: An Example-以事前和事后信息不对称的债务合同为例
英文文献作者：Guillaume Carlier,Ludovic Renou
英文文献摘要：
We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less discriminating the optimal menu of contracts is.

我们考虑一个借贷的简单模型，它结合了两个信息问题:逆向选择和昂贵的状态验证。我们的分析强调了这两个信息问题之间的相互作用。我们明显地表明，监测成本越高，最优合同菜单的差别就越小。