【经济学问题】一道关于Rubinstein bargaining game鲁宾斯坦讨价还价博弈
经济学问题：鲁宾斯坦讨价还价博弈。：假设一共有五轮，在最后一轮进行的是最后通牒博弈。第一三五轮甲propose，第二四轮乙propose。请列出预期的结果。假设现在一共有三轮，最后一轮进行最后通牒博弈。第一三轮甲propose，第二轮由乙propose。请列出预期结果。比较两组结果，说明甲更愿意play哪一个game？ 谢谢。（甲的discount rate是a，乙的discount rate是b.）原题如下：We are going to expand the three-period Rubinstein’s Bargaining Game (division of one dollar)we have seen in class to five periods. It is assumed that in the last period, the remaining game is an Ultimatum Game（最后通牒博弈）. A proposes in the first, the third, and the last period, and B gets her turn in the second and the fourth period. Based on our theory, explain what you expect the outcome will be. Would A prefer to play in this five-period game, or the original one with only three periods?。（甲的discount rate是a，乙的discount rate是b.）three period 的结果已列出PERIOD      A         B1            1-b(1-as)  b(1-as)2              as        1-as3                s          1-s   （最后一轮是通牒博弈所以 s=1, 1-s=0)拜托各位啦！！！！！ 还有一题比较简单，以牙还牙策略为什么能成为最终的赢家？ TIT FOR TAT can never score better than the other strategy it is playing against in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Why is it so? With such a property, explain how it is possible that TIT FOR TAT can become the winner in both rounds of the computer tournament?拜托各位啦！！！！！