英文文献：Confusion and Learning in the Public Goods Game-公共物品博弈中的困惑与学习
英文文献作者：Ralph-C Bayer,Elke Renner,Rupert Sausgruber
英文文献摘要：
We test if confusion and learning could potentially explain all the decay of contributions in the repeated public goods games by implementing a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion. A comparison shows that the rate of decline is more than twice as high in a standard public goods game. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the contribution dynamics, which are commonly attributed to the existence of conditional cooperators. We conclhttps://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/ic goods games is not a pure artefact of confusion and learning.

通过实施有限的信息环境来模拟混乱状态，我们测试了混乱和学习是否能够潜在地解释重复的公共物品博弈中贡献的衰减。一项比较显示，在标准的公共物品博弈中，下降速度是前者的两倍多。此外，我们发现简单的学习不能产生贡献动态，这通常归因于条件合作者的存在。我们的结论是:游戏并不是纯粹的混淆和学习的产物。