英文文献：Conflict and Leadership: When is There a Hawkish Drift in Politics?-冲突与领导:政治上什么时候会有鹰派倾向?
英文文献作者：Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay,Mandar Oak
英文文献摘要：
We analyze an agency model of political competition to examine whether conflict encourages hawkish behavior, and if such behavior can itself aggravate conflict. We consider situations of conflict between a state and an insurgent group, such as conflict over a piece of land. Negotiations are carried out on behalf of the state by a democratically elected leader whose ability and ideology are imperfectly observed by the electorate. A more capable leader can take a hardline position in the negotiations (i.e. cede less land to the insurgents) at a lower expected cost (modeled as the cost of continued insurgency) than a less capable one. Similarly, an ideologically hawkish leader enjoys greater intrinsic utility from retaining land than a less hawkish leader. Two main results that emerge are: certain types of politicians may be excessively hawkish as compared to their first best policy choices, which itself increases the probability of conflict; and for any credible voting strategy, the re-election probability of a hawk is greater than that of a dove. Finally, we show that the voting equilibrium of this game does not always achieve a constrained Pareto optimum suggesting that third party mediation may improve welfare.

我们分析一个政治竞争的代理模型来检验冲突是否鼓励鹰派行为，以及这种行为本身是否会加剧冲突。我们考虑国家和叛乱集团之间的冲突情况，例如争夺一块土地的冲突。谈判是由一位民主选举的领导人代表国家进行的，选民对他的能力和意识形态没有完全观察到。一个更有能力的领导人可以在谈判中以较低的预期成本(建模为持续叛乱的成本)采取强硬立场(即让出更少的土地给叛乱分子)，而不是能力较差的领导人。同样地，一个意识形态上鹰派的领导人比一个不那么鹰派的领导人从保留土地中获得更大的内在效用。由此产生的两个主要结果是:与他们最初的最佳政策选择相比，某些类型的政治家可能过于强硬，这本身就增加了冲突的可能性;对于任何可信的投票策略来说，鹰派连任的可能性都大于鸽派。最后，我们证明了该博弈的投票均衡并不总是达到约束帕累托最优，这表明第三方的调解可以提高福利。