英文文献：On the Credibility of Punishment in Repeated Social Dilemma Games-论反复的社会困境博弈中的刑罚公信力
英文文献作者：Ralph-C Bayer
英文文献摘要：
Various experimental studies have shown that the availability of a punishment option can increase the prevalence of cooperative behaviour in repeated social dilemmas. A punishment option should only matter if it is a credible threat. We investigate if the degree of credibility depends on standard strategic equilibrium considerations (i.e. SPNE or NE logic) or stems from a non-strategic motivation such as reciprocity. We find that for punishment to be credible non-strategic motivations are sufficient and that subgame perfection does not further improve credibility.

各种实验研究表明，在重复的社会困境中，惩罚选项的可用性会增加合作行为的流行。惩罚选项只有在是可信的威胁时才重要。我们调查可信度的程度是否取决于标准的战略均衡考虑(即SPNE或NE逻辑)，或源自于非战略动机，如互惠。我们发现惩罚是可信的，非战略动机是充分的，而子博弈的完美性不会进一步提高可信度。