哈特论著列表
Grossman,S. and Hart,O. ( 1981).“Implicit contracts, moral hazard, and unemployment.”American Economic Review (papers and proceedings), vol.71.pp. 301-7.
Hart,O.,1983,“Optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information:an introduction”,Review of Economic Studies, 50, 3-36.
Grossman, S. J., and Hart, O. D. (1986). “The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, pp. 691–719.
Hart,O.,(1988). “Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4(1),pp.119-139.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1988). “Incomplete contracts and renegotiation”, Econometrica, vol. 56,pp. 755–85.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1990).“Property rights and the nature of the firm”, Journal of Political Economy,vol. 98, pp. 1119–58.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1994).“A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.109, No. 4(Nov., 1994), pp. 841-879.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1999): “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, ” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 115-138.
Hart,O. and Moore, J. (2005). “On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization”,The Journal of Political Economy; Aug; vol. 113, (4),pp. 675-702.
Hart,O. and Moore, J. (2007).“Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New Thoughts”,American Economic Review,may.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (2007): “Contracts as Reference Points ”, Quarterly Journal of Economics ,forthcoming.
Hart, Oliver, 1995, Firm, Contract and Financial Structure, Oxford Univ. Press.(中译本)
[此贴子已经被作者于2007-10-8 14:48:39编辑过]