英文文献：A Na????ve Approach to Bidding-NaA??ve方法来投标
英文文献作者：Paul Pezanis-Christou,Hang Wu
英文文献摘要：
We propose a novel approach to the modelling of bidding behavior in pay-your-bid auctions that builds on the presumption that bidders are mostly concerned with losing an auction if they happen to have the highest signal. Our models assume risk neutrality, no profit maximization and no belief about competitors' behavior. They may entail overbidding in first-price and all-pay auctions and we discuss conditions for the revenue equivalence of standard pay-your-bid auctions to hold. We fit the models to the data of first-price auction experiments and find that they do at least as well as Vickreys benchmark model for risk neutral bidders. Assuming probability misperception or impulse weighting (when relevant) improves their goodness-of-fit and leads to very similar revenue predictions. An analysis of individuals' heterogeneous behavioral traits suggests that impulse weighting is a more consistent rationale for the observed behavior than a power form of probability misperception.

我们提出了一种新颖的方法来模拟竞价拍卖中的竞价行为，这种方法建立在这样的假设之上:如果竞标者恰好拥有最高的信号，他们最关心的是失去拍卖。我们的模型假设风险中性，没有利润最大化，不相信竞争对手的行为。他们可能需要在第一价格和全部支付拍卖的出价过高，我们讨论的条件，为收入等价的标准支付你的出价拍卖举行。我们将这些模型与首价拍卖实验的数据进行拟合，发现它们对风险中性竞标者的效果至少与Vickreys基准模型一样好。假设概率错觉或脉冲加权(相关时)提高了它们的拟合优度，并导致非常相似的收入预测。对个体异质行为特征的分析表明，冲动加权是比概率错觉的权力形式更一致的观察行为的基本原理。