诺贝尔奖获得者马斯金教授11月5日开始讲课的参考资料(重复对策论专题) <div class="item-label"><span class="itemOpr" id="itemId_67345142"></span></div><div class="clear"></div><div class="item-body"><div class="item-content">标签：<span id="tagsBox">
                                <a href="http://tag.blog.sohu.com/Âí˹½ð/" target="_blank"><font color="#96b0af" size="2">马斯金</font></a>  </span></div><div class="item-content"><p><strong><font size="5">诺贝尔奖获得者马斯金教授11月5日开始讲课的参考资料(重复对策论专题)</font></strong></p><p><strong><font size="5">Topics in Repeated Games E. Maskin</font></strong></p><p>CEMA, November 5-9, 2007</p><p>General Reference: G. Mailath and L. Samuelson (2006), <i>Repeated Games and</i></p><p><i>Reputations</i>, Oxford University Press</p><p>D. Abreu (1988), “On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting,”</p><p><i>Econometrica</i>, 383-396</p><p>D. Abreu, P. Milgrom, D. Pearce (1991), “Information and Timing in Repeated</p><p>Partnerships,” <i>Econometrica</i>, 1713-1733</p><p>D. Abreu, D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (1990), “Toward a Theory of Discounted</p><p>Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” <i>Econometrica</i>, 1041-1063</p><p>R. Aumann and S. Sorin (1989), “Cooperation and Bounded Recall,” <i>Games and</i></p><p><i>Economic Behavior</i>, 5-39</p><p>J. Benoit and V. Krishna (1985), “Finitely Repeated Games,” <i>Econometrica</i>, 905-922</p><p>M. Cripps, G. Mailath, and L. Samuelson (2004), “Imperfect Monitoring and</p><p>Impermanent Reputations,” <i>Econometrica</i>, 407-432</p><p>J. Ely, J. Horner, and W. Olszewski (2005), “Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games,”</p><p><i>Econometrica</i>, 377-416</p><p>J. Farrell and E. Maskin (1989), “Renegotiation in Repeated Games,” <i>Games and</i></p><p><i>Economic Behavior</i>, 327-360</p><p>D. Fudenberg and D. Levine (1989), “Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games</p><p>with a Patient Player,” <i>Econometrica</i>, 759-778</p><p>D. Fudenberg and D. Levine, and E. Maskin (1994), “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect</p><p>Public Information,” <i>Econometrica</i>, 997-1039</p><p>D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin (1986), “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with</p><p>Discounting or with Incomplete Information,” <i>Econometrica</i>, 553-554</p><p>D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin (1990), Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated</p><p>Games,” <i>American Economic Review</i>, 274-279</p><p>M. Kandori (1992), “Social Norms and Community Enforcement,” <i>Review of Economic</i></p><p><i>Studies</i>, 63-80.</p><p>M. Kandori and H. Matsushima (1998), “Private Observation, Communication and</p><p>Collusion,” <i>Econometrica</i>, 627-652</p><p>D. Kreps, P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982), “Rational Cooperation in the</p><p>Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i>, 245-252</p><p>H. Matsushima (2004), “Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players,”</p><p><i>Econometrica</i>, 823-852</p><p>A. Rubinstein (1986), “Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma” <i>Journal</i></p><p><i>of Economics Theory</i>, 83-96</p><p>K. Schmidt (1993), “Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of</p><p>Conflicting Interests,” <i>Econometrica</i>, 325-351</p><p> </p><p>PDF文档下载地址：<a href="http://www.91files.com/?X1G10SZS8EJRAPR97XDE"><font color="#96b0af" size="2">http://www.91files.com/?X1G10SZS8EJRAPR97XDE</font></a></p><p><font size="2">不能下载此PDF文档的同学，请发邮件至</font><a href="mailto:xueyoujiangtang@163.com"><font color="#96b0af" size="2">xueyoujiangtang@163.com</font></a><font size="2">，邮件主题请说明需要Professor Maskin's reading list。</font></p><p>   </p><p><img alt="" src="http://119.img.pp.sohu.com/images/blog/2007/10/16/8/9/11641509036.jpg" border="0" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; TEXT-ALIGN: center;"/><img alt="" src="http://121.img.pp.sohu.com/images/blog/2007/10/16/8/10/116415f94d0.jpg" border="0" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; TEXT-ALIGN: center;"/></p><div class="clear"></div></div></div>