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NEP: New Economics Papers Experimental Economics
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2013-08-22
NEP: New Economics Papers
Experimental Economics
Edited by:Daniel Houser
George Mason University
Issue date:2013-08-10
Papers:11
Note: Access to full contents may be restricted.
NEP is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Victoria University of Wellington.
To subscribe/unsubscribe follow this link http://lists.repec.org/mailman/options/nep-exp
In this issue we have:Contents.
  • [url=]Carry a big stick, or no stick at all An experimental analysis of trust and capacity of punishment[/url]
    Date:2013-08
    By:Vicente Calabuig (ERICES, Universidad de Valencia)
    Enrique Fatas (University of East Anglia)
    Gonzalo Olcina (ERICES, Universidad de Valencia)
    Ismael Rodriguez-Lara (ERICES, Universidad de Valencia)
    URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0413&r=exp
    We investigate the effect of punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity in which the investor may punish the allocator at a cost. Our results indicate that the effect of the punishment crucially depends on the investor’s capacity of punishment, that is measured in our experiment by the proportion of the allocator’s payoffs that the investor can destroy. We find that punishment fosters trust when the capacity of punishment is high (i.e., when the cost of punishing is relatively low). Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior, crowding out intrinsic motivation to trust. Trustworthiness is higher with punishment than without punishment, except if investors have a high capacity of punishment
    Keywords:Trust game, punishment, crowding-out, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, experimental economics
    JEL:C91
  • [url=]Trust and Trustworthiness Under The Prospect Theory and Quasi-Hyperbolic Preferences: A Field Experiment in Vietnam[/url]
    Date:2013-01
    By:Quang NGUYEN (Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 637332, Singapore)
    Marie Claire VILLEVAL (University of Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE, 93, ChemindesMouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany)
    Hui XU (University of Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE, 93, ChemindesMouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France. Beijing Normal University,19 XinjiekouWai Street, Beijing 100875, P. R. China.)
    URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nan:wpaper:1301&r=exp
    This study incorporates risk, time, and social preferences. We conduct a field experiment in Vietnamese villages and estimate the effect of the Cumulative Prospect Theory and of quasi-hyperbolic time preferences parameters on trust and trustworthiness. We find that both probability sensitivity and risk aversion are not related to trust. Yet, more risk averse and less present biased participants are found to be trustworthier. People with longer exposure to a collectivist economy tend to have a lower level of trust and trustworthiness.
    Keywords:Trust, Trustworthiness, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Risk preferences, Time preferences, Quasi–hyperbolic preferences, Vietnam, Field experiment
    JEL:C91
  • [url=]Do short-term laboratory experiments provide valid descriptions of long-term economic interactions? A study of Cournot markets[/url]
    Date:2013
    By:Normann, Hans-Theo
    Requate, Till
    Waichman, Israel
    URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:100&r=exp
    One key problem regarding the external validity of laboratory experiments is their duration: while economic interactions out in the field are often lengthy processes, typical lab experiments only last for an hour or two. To address this problem for the case of both symmetric and asymmetric Cournot duopoly, we conduct internet treatments lasting more than a month. Subjects make the same number of decisions as in the short-term counterparts, but they decide once a day. We compare these treatments to corresponding standard laboratory treatments and also to short-term internet treatments lasting one hour. We do not observe differences in behavior between the short- and long-term in the symmetric treatments, and only a small difference in the asymmetric treatments. We overall conclude that behavior is not considerably different between the short- and long-term. --
    Keywords:internet experiment,Cournot oligopoly,long-term interactions,methodology,internet vs. laboratory experiment
    JEL:L13
  • [url=]Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: Theory and Experimental Evidence[/url]
    Date:2013-08
    By:John Duffy
    Alexander Matros
    URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:509&r=exp
    We consider a model where two players compete for n items having different common values in a Blotto game. Players have to decide how to allocate their budgets across all n items. The winner of each item is determined stochastically using a lottery mechanism. We analyze two payoff objectives: (i) players aim to maximize their total expected payoff and (ii) players maximize the probability of winning a majority value of all n items. We develop some new theoretical results for the majority rule case and show that the majority rule objective results in qualitatively different equilibrium behavior than the total expected payoff objective. We report the results of an experiment where the two payoff mechanisms are compared and we find strong support for the theoretical predictions.
    Keywords:Colonel Blotto game, Contests, Resource Allocation, Lotteries, Electoral College, Game Theory, Political Theory, Experimental Economics
    JEL:C72
  • [url=]Intertemporal Choice Shifts in Households: Do they occur and are they good?[/url]
    Date:2013-07-31
    By:Carlsson, Fredrik (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)
    Yang, Xiaojun (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)
    URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0569&r=exp
    We examine whether and to what extent joint choices are more or less patient and time-consistent than individual choices in households. We use data from an artefactual field experiment where both individual and joint time preferences were elicited. We find a substantial shift from individual to joint household decisions. Interestingly, joint decisions do not only generate beneficial shifts, i.e., patient and time-consistent shifts. On the contrary, a majority of the observed shifts are impatient and time-inconsistent shifts. A number of observable characteristics are significantly correlated with these shifts in preferences from individual decisions to joint decisions.
    Keywords:individual decisions; joint decisions; patience; time-consistency; choice shifts; rural China
    JEL:C91
  • [url=]Changing Eating Habits – A Field Experiment in Primary Schools.[/url]
    Date:2013-08-02
    By:Michèle Belot (University of Edinburgh), Jonathan James (University of Bath) and Patrick Nolen (University of Essex)
    URL:http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:219&r=exp
    We conduct a field experiment in 31 primary schools in England to test whether incentives to eat fruit and vegetables help children develop healthier habits. The intervention consists of rewarding children with stickers and little gifts for a period of four weeks for choosing a portion of fruit and vegetables at lunch. We compare the effects of two incentive schemes (competition and piece rate) on choices and consumption over the course of the intervention as well as once the incentives are removed and six months later. We find that the intervention had positive effects, but the effects vary substantially according to age and gender. However, we find little evidence of sustained long term effects, except for the children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds.
    Keywords:Incentives, Health, Habits, Child nutrition, Field experiment.
    JEL:J13

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jsg999000
2013-8-22 14:47:31
7. Decision time and steps of reasoning in a competitive market entry game
Date: 2013-07
By: Florian Lindner
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2013-19&r=exp  
Entry decisions in market entry games usually depend on the belief about how many others are entering the market, the belief about the own rank in a real effort task, and subjects' risk preferences. In this paper I am able to replicate these basic results and examine two further dimensions: (i) the level of strategic sophistication, which has a positive impact on entry decisions, and (ii) the impact of time pressure, which has a (partly) negative influence on entry rates. Furthermore, when ranks are determined using a real effort task, differences in entry rates are explainable by higher competitiveness of males. Additionally, I show that individual characteristics are more important for the entry decision in more competitive environments.
Keywords: Market entry game, Time pressure, Level-k reasoning, Risk, Competitiveness, Experiment
JEL: C72

Using elicitation mechanisms to estimate the demand for nutritious maize: Evidence from experiments in rural Ghana
Date: 2013
By: Banerji, A.
Chowdhury, Shyamal K.
de Groote, Hugo
Meenakshi, Jonnalagadda V.
Haleegoah, Joyce
Ewoo, Manfred
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:harvwp:10&r=exp  
In this paper we assess (a) consumersâ
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