<div class="buying"><font size="3"><b class="sans">A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Hardcover)<!--Element not supported - Type: 8 Name: #comment--></b><br/></font>by <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/103-7459369-9698241?%5Fencoding=UTF8&search-type=ss&index=books&field-author=David%20M.%20Kreps"><font color="#003399">David M. Kreps</font></a> (Author) </div><div class="buying"></div><div class="buying"><font color="#ff0000" size="4"><strong>克瑞普斯这本微观教材应该是第一本以博弈论写的西方规范高级微观教材，</strong></font></div><div class="buying"><font color="#ff0000" size="4"><strong>MWG以前的最好的高微教材，至今仍是美国一流高校教授高级微观的重要参考教材！</strong></font></div><div class="buying"><font color="#ff0000" size="4"><strong>关键是：它的作者是大名鼎鼎的Kreps！</strong></font></div><div class="buying"><strong><font color="#ff0000" size="4">文件格式是Djvu（是pdf外国外图书馆主要的文献电子存储形式），装个Djvu浏览器就可。</font></strong></div><div class="buying"></div><div class="buying"></div><div class="buying"><div class="buying"><div class="buying"><div class="buying"><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0691042640/ref=sib_dp_pt/103-7459369-9698241#reader-link"><img id="prodImage" height="240" alt="A Course in Microeconomic Theory" src="http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51EzExxv0NL._BO2,204,203,200_PIlitb-dp-500-arrow,TopRight,45,-64_OU01_AA240_SH20_.jpg" width="240" border="0"/></a></div><div class="buying"><li><b>Hardcover:</b> 863 pages </li><li><b>Publisher:</b> Princeton University Press (February 21, 1990) </li><li><b>Language:</b> English </li></div><div class="buying"><li><div class="content"><b>Review</b><br/>The most complete, enjoyable, and worthwhile textbook treating both traditional and modern microeconomic theory. <br/><br/><b>Book Description</b><br/><p>David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses.</p><p>The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.</p></div></li><li><div class="content"><p>  </p></div></li><li><div class="content"><p><font size="4"><strong>contents </strong></font><br/><strong>preface <br/>chapter one: An overview <br/></strong>1.1. The basic categories: Actors, behavior, institutions, and equilibrium 3    <br/>1.2. The purpose of microeconomic theory <br/>1.3. Scope, detail, emphasis, and complexity <br/>1.4. A prcis of the plot 12 </p></div></li><li><div class="content"><p><strong>part I: Individual and social choice</strong><br/>        <br/><strong>chapter two: The theory of consumer choice and demand  Prologue to part I 17</strong><br/>        <br/>2.1. Preferences and choices 18<br/>2.2. Marshallian demand without derivatives 37 <br/>2.3. Marshallian demand with derivatives 51 <br/>2.4. Aggregate demand 62 <br/>2.5. Bibliographic notes 63 <br/>2.6. Problems 65 <br/><strong>chapter three: Choice under uncertainty</strong><br/>        <br/>3.1. Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility 72 <br/>3.2. On utility for money 81 <br/>3.3. Applications to market demand 87 <br/>3.4. States of nature and subjective probability 98 <br/>3.5. Problems with these models 112 <br/>3.6. Normarive applications of the theory 120 <br/>3.7. Bibliographic notes 122 <br/>3.8. Problems 124 <br/><strong>chapter four: Dynamic choice <br/></strong>4.1. Optimal dynamic strategies 133 <br/>4.2. Menus and meals 139 <br/>4.3. Bibliographic notes and discussion <br/>4.4. Problems 146 <br/><strong>chapter five: Social choice and efficiency</strong><br/>        <br/>5.1. The problem 149 <br/>5.2. Pareto efficiency and optimality: Defmiti6ns 153 <br/>5.3. Benevolent social dictators and social welfare ftmctionals<br/>5.4. Characterizing efficient social outcomes 164 <br/>5.5. Social apice rules and Arrow's possibility theorem 174 <br/>5.6. Bibliographic notes 181 <br/>5.7. Problems 182 </p></div></li><li><div class="content"><p><strong>part II: The price mechanism <br/>chapter six: Pure exchange and general equilibrium</strong>  Prologue to part II 187 <br/>6.1. Pure exchange and price equilibrium 187 <br/>6.2. Why (not) believe in Waltasian equffibrinm? 193 <br/>6.3. The efficiency of a general equilibrium 199 <br/>6.4. Existence and the number of equilibria 205 <br/>6.5. Tmae, uncertainty, and general equffibrium 216 <br/>6.6. Bibliographic notes 223 <br/>6.7. Problems 225 <br/><strong>chapter seven: The neoclassical firm</strong><br/>        <br/>7.1. Models of the firm's technological capabilities 234 <br/>7.2. The profit function 239 <br/>7.3. Conditional factor demands and cost functions 250 <br/>7.4. From profit or cost functions to technology sets 253 <br/>7.5. Cost functions and -runs 255 <br/>7.6. Bibliographic notes 259 <br/>7.7. Problems 259 <br/><strong>chapter eight: The competitive firm and perfect competition</strong><br/>        <br/>8.1. A perfectly competitive market 264 <br/>8.2. Perfect competition and -runs 267 <br/>8.3. What's wrong with partial equilibrimn analysis? <br/>8.4. General equffibrium with firms 283 <br/>8.5. Bibliographic notes 292 <br/>8.6. Problems 292 <br/><strong>chapter nine: Monopoly</strong><br/>        <br/>9.1. The standard theory 299 <br/>9.2. Maintaining monopoly 302 <br/>9.3. Multigood monopoly 304 <br/>9.4. Nonlinear pricing 306 <br/>9.5. Monopoly power? 314 <br/>9.6. Bibliographic notes 317 <br/>9.7. Problems 318 <br/><strong>chapter ten: Imperfect competition</strong><br/>        <br/>10.1. The classic models of duopoly 325 <br/>10.2. Bibliographic notes and discussion 340 <br/>10.3. Problems 347 <br/><strong>part III: Noncooperative game theory <br/>chapter eleven: Modeling competitive situations</strong><br/>        <br/>Prologue to part III 355 <br/>11.1. Games in extensive form: An example 356 <br/>11.2. Games in extensive form: Formalities 363 <br/>11.3. Games in normal or stategic form 376 <br/>11.4. Mixed strategies and Kuhn's theorem <br/>11.5. Bibliographic notes 384 <br/>11.6. Problems 385 <br/><strong>chapter twelve: Solution concepts for noncooperative games 387</strong><br/>        <br/>12.1. Opening remarks 387 <br/>12.2. Dominance and iterated dominance for normal form games 393 <br/>12.3. Backwards induction in games of complete and perfect information ' 399 <br/>12.4. Nash equilibrium 402 <br/>12.5. Equilibria in mixed strategies 407 <br/>12.6. Why might there be an obvious way to play a given game? 410 <br/>12.7. Refinements of Nash equilibrium 417 <br/>  12.7.1. Weak dominance 418 o <br/>  12.7.2. Subgame perfection (and iterated weak dominance) 421<br/>  12.7.3. Sequential equilibrium 425 <br/>  12.7.4. Restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs 432 , <br/>  12.7.5. Trembling-hand perfectio'.n 437<br/>  12.7.6. Proper eqttih'bria and stable sets of eqttih'bria 442 <br/>12.8. Reprise: Classic duopoly .443 <br/>12.9. Bibliographic notes 449 <br/>12.10. Problems 451 <br/><strong>chapter thirteen: Incomplete information and irrationality 463</strong><br/>        <br/>13.1. Games of incomplete information 463 <br/>13.2. An application: Etry deterfence 468 <br/>13.3. Modeling irrationality 480 <br/>13.4. More on refinements: Complete theories <br/>13.5. Bibliographic notes 496 <br/>13.6. Problems 498 <br/><strong>chapter fourteen: Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation 503</strong><br/>        <br/>14.1. The prisoners' dilemma 503 <br/>14.2. Repeating games can yield cooperation: The folk theorem 505 <br/>14.3. Noisy observables 515 <br/>14.4. Implicit collusion in oligopoly 524 <br/>14.5. Reputation 531 <br/>14.6. Reputation redux: Incomplete information 536 <br/>14.7. Bibliographic notes 543 <br/>14.8. Problems 546 <br/><strong>chapter fifteen: Bilateral bargaining</strong><br/>        <br/>15.1. Simultaneous offers and indetermifiancy 552 <br/>15.2. Focal equilibria 554 <br/>15.3. Rubinstein's model 556 <br/>15.4. The experimental evidence about alternating offers 565 <br/>15.5. Models with incomplete information 568 <br/>15.6. Bibliographic notes 570 <br/>15.7. Problems 571 <br/><strong>part IV: Topics in information economics <br/>chapter sixteen: Moral hazard and incentives 577</strong><br/>        <br/>Prologue to part IV 577 <br/>16.1. Introduction 578 <br/>16.2. Effort incentives: A simple example 579 <br/>16.3. Fruitely many actions and outcomes 586 <br/>16.4. Continuous actions: The first-order approach 604 <br/>16.5. Bibliographic notes and variations 608 <br/>16.6. Problems 616 <br/><strong>chapter seventeen: Adverse selection and market signaling 625</strong><br/>        <br/>17.1. Akerlof's model of lemons 625 <br/>17.2. Signaling quality 629 <br/>17.3. Signaling and game theory 645 <br/>17.4. Bibliographic notes and discussion 650 <br/>17.5. Problems 654 <br/><strong>chapter eighteen: The revelation principle and mechanism design</strong><br/>        <br/>18.1. Optimal contracts designed for a single party <br/>18.2. Optimal contracts for interacting parties 680 <br/>18.3. The pivot mechanism 704 <br/>18.4. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 712 <br/>18.5. Bibliographic notes 713 <br/>18.6. Problems 715 <br/><strong>part V: Firms and transactions <br/>chapter nineteen: Theories of the firm 723</strong><br/>        <br/>19.1. The firm as a profit-maximizing entity 724 <br/>19.2. The firm as a maximizing entity 729 <br/>19.3. The firm as a behavioral entity 731 <br/>19.4. Firms in tJae category of markets 739 <br/>19.5. Bibliographic notes 740 <br/>19.6. Problems 740 <br/><strong>chapter twenty: Transaction cost economics and the firm 743</strong><br/>        <br/>20.1. Transaction cost economics and firms 743 <br/>20.2. Mathematical models of transaction cost economics 756 <br/>20.3. Bibliogr. aphic notes 769 <br/>postscript 771 <br/><strong>appendix one: Constrained optimization</strong><br/>        <br/>A1.1. A recipe for solving problems 775 <br/>A1.2. The recipe at worlc An example 778 <br/>A1.3. Intuition 782 <br/>A1.4. Bibliographic notes 788 <br/>A1.5. Problems 789 <br/><strong>appendix two: Dynamic programming</strong><br/>        <br/>A2.1. An example with a finite horizon 791 <br/>A2.2. Finite horizon dynamic programming 796 <br/>A2.3. An example with an infinite horizon 801 <br/>A2.4. Stationary Markov decision problems 806 <br/>A2.5. Bibliographic notes and discussion 813 <br/>A2.6. Problems 814 <br/>addendttm to the second and <br/>subsequent printings <br/><strong>index <br/></strong></p></div></li></div></div></div></div>

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