The eurozone crisis is over, or so we are being told. Butcan a couple of quarters of economic growth support claims of recovery?

There is no doubt that theoutlook for Europe has brightened since early 2012. Ten eurozone countries hadjust been downgraded by the ratings agency Standard & Poor’s. Economicactivity was spiraling downward, while nervous investors were fleeing southernEuropean banks. The Spanish government was about to nationalize Bankia, thecountry’s fourth-largest bank, but could not say where it would obtain thefunds to recapitalize it. Interest rates on government bonds were racingupward.

In Greece, meanwhile,an election was approaching, amid fears that the new government would rejectthe country’s financing agreement with the European Union and the InternationalMonetary Fund. At that point, the country might be forced out of the eurozone.

And what happened inGreece would not stay in Greece. Once the process of euro exit had started,there was no telling where it would stop. The general feeling was that thecommon currency was doomed.

In fairness, thisdark prognosis was not universally embraced. My own favorite recollection ofthis period is from March 2012, when I shared a podium in New York withanother, more famous economist. We were asked: “What probability do you attachto Greece leaving the eurozone by the end of the year?” He said 100%. I said0%. This caused no little amusement in the audience. In the end, one of us wasmore right than the other.

What those forecastingthe eurozone’s collapse overlooked was the commitment of elected officials andtheir constituents to the European project. In Greece, where tensions ranhighest, Syriza, the main leftist anti-euro party, received only 27% of thevote in the 2012 parliamentary election. In the run-up to Germany’s general election later thismonth, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats have indistinguishablepro-euro positions. Alternativefür Deutschland, the anti-euro party, is polling a mere 4%. It mayyet win a few seats in the Bundestag; but the numbers indicate thateuro-skepticism remains a fringe position.

Along with this deepand abiding commitment to the European project, there is fear of the unknown.The consequences of abandoning the euro are highly uncertain, and few Europeanleaders are willing to go there. When push comes to shove, they are prepared todo just enough to hold the eurozone together, even if the necessary steps areeconomically and politically distasteful.

So what changed inthe last year? First, Europe now has a true lender of last resort. In July 2012, EuropeanCentral Bank President Mario Draghi pledged that the ECB would do “whatever ittakes” to preserve the euro. Draghi was still new on the job, so marketsinterpreted his pledge as signaling the advent of a new regime.

A few days later, theECB established its “outright monetary transactions” program, which promisedpotentially unlimited purchases of troubled eurozone governments’ bonds. As aresult, a mad dash for the exits by investors could no longer cause Europeanfinancial markets to collapse.

Eurozone memberstates then agreed to address their banking problems by creating a singlesupervisor and a mechanism for winding down bad banks. Spain conducted a systematic audit ofits banking system, and