东亚货币区，East Asian Currency Union，by Jong-Wha Lee ，Robert J. Barro，发表于October 2006，Abstract：This paper analyzes the feasibility of various types of currency unions, such as a dollar bloc, Euro bloc, Yen bloc, and basket currency bloc in East Asia, and empirically estimates welfare effects of a currency union for East Asian economies. Judging from optimum currency area (OCA) criteria, including the symmetry of output and price shocks across countries, commitment to price stability, and trade and financial integration, East Asia does not appear to have very favorable economic conditions for a currency union, particularly when compared to the euro area. The low political proximity between Japan and other East Asian economies restricts Japan’s leadership in the creation of an East Asian currency union. Calibrations of a representative agent model suggest that, for most countries in East Asia, a currency union involving a broad group of economies would generate net welfare gain. However, if the increased volatility due to the loss of monetary policy independence incurs a significantly negative effect on growth, the larger East Asian economies such as China, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea may suffer from net welfare loss. A substantial welfare gain from joining an East Asian currency union would occur if a currency union lowers the probability and size of disasters such as wars and financial crises in East Asia.

东亚国家汇率制度幻影，The Mirage of Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Market Countries，Guillermo A. Calvo and Frederic S. Mishkin，发表于Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 17, Number 4—Fall 2003—Pages 99–118。In recent years, a number of emerging market countries have experienced devastating financial crises and macroeconomic turbulence, including Argentina (2001–2002), Turkey (2000–2001), Ecuador (1999), Russia (1998), east Asia (1997), Mexico (1994–1995) and even Chile (1982). In the ensuing postmortems, an active debate has followed over how the choice of exchange rate regime might have contributed to macroeconomic instability—and conversely, how a shift in exchange rate regime might have improved  acroeconomic performance. Should an emerging market economy prefer a floating exchange rate, a fixed exchange rate or some blend of the two, like an exchange rate that was usually fixed but might sometimes shift? Many countries used to choose an intermediate path: that is, an exchange rate that was often stabilized by the central bank, but might sometimes shift, often known as a “soft peg.” However, in the aftermath of the macroeconomic crisis across east Asia in 1997–1998, a view emerged that this exchange rate regime was in part responsible for the depth of the macroeconomic crisis. The governments of Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea and other nations in that region had kept exchange rates fixed. There was no explicit institutional guarantee that the exchange
rate would remain fixed, but the rates had been stable for long enough that local financial institutions borrowed in dollars abroad and then loaned freely in U.S. dollars to domestic borrowers. But when a surge of foreign investment stopped, the existing exchange rate became unsustainable. For example, when the Thai baht collapsed against the U.S. dollar, Thai borrowers were unable to repay their dollar-denominated loans—and in turn many Thai financial institutions were insolvent. This meltdown of the financial sector led to an enormous economic contraction.

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