<div class="buying"><font size="3"><b class="sans">Handbook of Law and Economics, Volume 2 (Handbook of Law and Economics) </b></font></div><div class="buying">by <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/105-7782265-0525238?%5Fencoding=UTF8&search-type=ss&index=books&field-author=A.%20Mitchell%20Polinsky"><font color="#003399">A. Mitchell Polinsky</font></a> (Editor), <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/105-7782265-0525238?%5Fencoding=UTF8&search-type=ss&index=books&field-author=Steven%20Shavell"><font color="#003399">Steven Shavell</font></a> (Editor) </div><div class="buying"></div><div class="buying"><strong><font color="#ff0000" size="5">非working paper,出版社清晰电子版。</font></strong></div><div class="buying"><strong><font color="#ff0000"></font></strong></div><div class="buying"></div><div class="buying"><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0444531203/ref=sib_dp_pt/105-7782265-0525238#reader-link"><img id="prodImage" height="240" alt="Handbook of Law and Economics, Volume 2 (Handbook of Law and Economics) (Handbook of Law and Economics)" src="http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41uHDHZuuWL._BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-dp-500-arrow,TopRight,45,-64_OU01_AA240_SH20_.jpg" width="240" border="0"/></a></div><div class="buying"></div><div class="buying"><li><b>Hardcover:</b><font color="#f73809"><strong>965 pages</strong></font><br/>  </li><li><b>Publisher:</b> North Holland; 1 edition<font color="#ff0000"><strong> (December 21, 2007)</strong></font><br/>  </li><li><b>Language:</b> English </li><li><div class="content"><b>Book Description</b><br/>Law can be viewed as a body of rules and legal sanctions that channel behavior in socially desirable directions for example, by encouraging individuals to take proper precautions to prevent accidents or by discouraging competitors from colluding to raise prices. The incentives created by the legal system are thus a natural subject of study by economists. Moreover, given the importance of law to the welfare of societies, the economic analysis of law merits prominent treatment as a subdiscipline of economics. This two volume Handbook is intended to foster the study of the legal system by economists.<br/><br/>*The two volumes form a comprehensive and accessible survey of the current state of the field. <br/>*Chapters prepared by leading specialists of the area. <br/>*Summarizes received results as well as new developments. </div></li><li><div class="content"> </div></li><li><div class="content"><strong><font size="4">CONTENTS OF VOLUME 2</font></strong><br/><strong>Introduction to the Series v</strong><br/>Contents of the Handbook vii<br/>Preface xv<br/><strong>PART II: Additional Areas of the Legal System—continued 827<br/>Chapter 12<br/>Corporate Law and Governance<br/>MARCO BECHT, PATRICK BOLTON, AND AILSA RÖELL 829<br/></strong>1. Introduction 833<br/>2. Historical origins: A brief sketch 834<br/>2.1. How representative is corporate government? 834<br/>2.2. Whom should corporate government represent? 836<br/>3. Why corporate governance is currently such a prominent issue 836<br/>3.1. The world-wide privatisation wave 837<br/>3.2. Pension funds and active investors 837<br/>3.3. Mergers and takeovers 840<br/>3.4. Deregulation and capital market integration 840<br/>3.5. The 1998 East Asia/Russia/Brazil crisis 841<br/>3.6. Scandals and failures at major U.S. corporations 841<br/>4. Conceptual framework 842<br/>4.1. Agency and contracting 842<br/>4.2. Ex-ante and ex-post efficiency 842<br/>4.3. Shareholder value 843<br/>4.4. Incomplete contracts and multiple constituencies 843<br/>4.5. Why do we need regulation? 845<br/>4.6. Dispersed ownership 846<br/>4.7. Summary and conclusion 846<br/>5. Models 848<br/>5.1. Takeover models 848<br/>5.2. Blockholder models 853<br/>5.3. Delegated monitoring and large creditors 857<br/>5.4. Board models 859<br/>5.5. Executive compensation models 862<br/>5.6. Multi-constituency models 863<br/>6. Comparative perspectives and debates 869<br/>6.1. Comparative systems 870<br/>6.2. Views expressed in corporate governance principles and codes 875<br/>6.3. Other views 877<br/>7. Empirical evidence and practice 877<br/>7.1. Takeovers 878<br/>7.2. Large investors 886<br/>7.3. Minority shareholder action 895<br/>7.4. Boards 898<br/>7.5. Executive compensation and careers 900<br/>7.6. Multiple constituencies 906<br/>8. Recent developments 909<br/>8.1. Regulatory responses to corporate scandals 910<br/>8.2. Executive compensation and earnings manipulation 913<br/>8.3. Reforming the board of directors 915<br/>8.4. Other major research themes 916<br/>9. Conclusion 919<br/>References 920<br/><strong>Chapter 13<br/>Empirical Studies of Corporate Law<br/>SANJAI BHAGAT AND ROBERTA ROMANO 945<br/></strong>1. Introduction 947<br/>2. A guide to event studies 947<br/>2.1. Mechanics of event studies 948<br/>2.2. Statistical power of event studies 952<br/>2.3. Cross-sectional determinants of the stock market’s reaction 954<br/>2.4. Assessing the usefulness of the event study methodology for corporate law research 955<br/>3. Econometric issues: endogeneity in corporate governance and performance<br/>studies 956<br/>3.1. Corporate control, performance, and governance 956<br/>3.2. Corporate governance and performance 957<br/>3.3. Corporate ownership and performance 957<br/>3.4. Corporate governance and ownership structure 959<br/>3.5. Simultaneous equations estimation 959<br/>4. Empirical research in corporate law 960<br/>4.1. Shareholder wealth implications of corporate lawsuits 960<br/>4.2. Empirical research and the debate over state competition for corporate charters 970<br/>4.3. Empirical research on takeovers 987<br/>4.4. Research on corporate governance 992<br/>4.5. Event studies and securities regulation 999<br/>4.6. Comparative corporate governance 1000<br/>5. Conclusion 1003<br/>References 1003<br/>Contents of Volume 2 xv<br/><strong>Chapter 14<br/>Bankruptcy Law<br/>MICHELLE J. WHITE 1013<br/></strong>1. Introduction 1016<br/>Part A: Corporate bankruptcy 1019<br/>2. Legal background—corporate bankruptcy law 1019<br/>2.1. Chapter 7 liquidation 1019<br/>2.2. Chapter 11 reorganization 1021<br/>2.3. Non-bankruptcy workouts 1023<br/>3. Research on corporate bankruptcy—theory 1024<br/>3.1. Effects of priority rules on the bankruptcy decision, managerial effort, and the choice<br/>between safe versus risky investments 1024<br/>3.2. Proposed reforms of Chapter 11—auctions, options, and bankruptcy by contract 1034<br/>4. Research on corporate bankruptcy—empirical work 1040<br/>4.1. Bankruptcy costs 1040<br/>4.2. Deviations from the absolute priority rule 1041<br/>Part B: Personal bankruptcy 1043<br/>5. Legal background—personal bankruptcy law 1045<br/>5.1. Creditors’ legal remedies outside of bankruptcy 1045<br/>5.2. Chapter 7 “liquidation” 1045<br/>5.3. Chapter 13 “adjustment of debts of consumers with regular income” 1047<br/>5.4. The new bankruptcy law 1048<br/>6. Trends in personal bankruptcy filings 1049<br/>7. Research on personal bankruptcy—theory 1049<br/>7.1. Optimal personal bankruptcy policy—consumption insurance and work effort 1049<br/>7.2. Additional theoretical issues 1054<br/>8. Research on personal and small business bankruptcy—empirical work 1058<br/>8.1. Political economy of bankruptcy 1059<br/>8.2. Studies of the bankruptcy filing decision using aggregate data 1060<br/>8.3. Studies of the bankruptcy filing decision using household-level data 1060<br/>8.4. Empirical research on work effort and the “fresh start” 1063<br/>8.5. Bankruptcy and the decision to become an entrepreneur 1063<br/>8.6. Bankruptcy and credit markets 1064<br/>8.7. Macroeconomic effects of bankruptcy 1067<br/>References 1068<br/><strong>Chapter 15<br/>Antitrust<br/>LOUIS KAPLOW AND CARL SHAPIRO 1073<br/></strong>1. Introduction 1077<br/>2. Market power 1078<br/>2.1. Definition of market power 1079<br/>2.2. Single-firm pricing model accounting for rivals 1080<br/>xvi Contents of Volume 2<br/>2.3. Multiple-firm models 1083<br/>2.4. Means of inferring market power 1087<br/>2.5. Market power in antitrust law 1095<br/>3. Collusion 1098<br/>3.1. Economic and legal approaches: an introduction 1099<br/>3.2. Oligopoly theory 1103<br/>3.3. Industry conditions bearing on the likelihood of collusive outcomes 1108<br/>3.4. Agreements under antitrust law 1121<br/>3.5. Other horizontal arrangements 1129<br/>3.6. Antitrust enforcement 1136<br/>4. Horizontal mergers 1138<br/>4.1. Oligopoly theory and unilateral competitive effects 1139<br/>4.2. Oligopoly theory and coordinated effects 1149<br/>4.3. Empirical evidence on the effects of horizontal mergers 1152<br/>4.4. Antitrust law on horizontal mergers 1157<br/>4.5. Market analysis under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1169<br/>4.6. Predicting the effects of mergers 1178<br/>5. Monopolization 1180<br/>5.1. Monopoly power: economic approach 1181<br/>5.2. Legal approach to monopolization 1186<br/>5.3. Predatory pricing 1194<br/>5.4. Exclusive dealing 1203<br/>6. Conclusion 1213<br/>Acknowledgements 1214<br/>References 1214<br/>Cases 1224<br/><strong>Chapter 16<br/>Regulation of Natural Monopoly<br/>PAUL L. JOSKOW 1227<br/></strong>1. Introduction 1229<br/>2. Definitions of natural monopoly 1232<br/>2.1. Technological definitions of natural monopoly 1232<br/>2.2. Behavioral and market equilibrium considerations 1238<br/>2.3. Sunk costs 1240<br/>2.4. Contestible markets: subadditivity without sunk costs 1241<br/>2.5. Sunk costs and barriers to entry 1244<br/>2.6. Empirical evidence on cost subadditivity 1248<br/>3. Why regulate natural monopolies? 1248<br/>3.1. Economic efficiency considerations 1249<br/>3.2. Other considerations 1255<br/>3.3. Regulatory goals 1260<br/>4. Historical and legal foundations for price regulation 1262<br/>Contents of Volume 2 xvii<br/>5. Alternative regulatory institutions 1265<br/>5.1. Overview 1265<br/>5.2. Franchise contracts and competition for the market 1267<br/>5.3. Franchise contracts in practice 1269<br/>5.4. Independent “expert” regulatory commission 1270<br/>6. Price regulation by a fully informed regulator 1273<br/>6.1. Optimal linear prices: Ramsey-Boiteux pricing 1274<br/>6.2. Non-linear prices: simple two-part tariffs 1276<br/>6.3. Optimal non-linear prices 1277<br/>6.4. Peak-load pricing 1281<br/>7. Cost of service regulation: response to limited information 1285<br/>7.1. Cost-of-service or rate-of-return regulation in practice 1286<br/>7.2. The Averch-Johnson model 1298<br/>8. Incentive regulation: theory 1301<br/>8.1. Introduction 1301<br/>8.2. Performance Based Regulation typology 1306<br/>8.3. Some examples of incentive regulation mechanism design 1310<br/>8.4. Price regulation when cost is not observable 1318<br/>8.5. Pricing mechanisms based on historical cost observations 1320<br/>9. Measuring the effects of price and entry regulation 1321<br/>9.1. Incentive regulation in practice 1322<br/>10. Competitive entry and access pricing 1329<br/>10.1. One-way network access 1331<br/>10.2. Introducing local network competition 1335<br/>10.3. Two-way access issues 1337<br/>11. Conclusions 1339<br/>References 1340<br/><strong>Chapter 17<br/>Employment Law<br/>CHRISTINE JOLLS 1349<br/></strong>1. Framework 1352<br/>1.1. Employment law in the absence of market failure 1352<br/>1.2. Market failures in the employer-employee relationship 1354<br/>2. Workplace safety mandates 1357<br/>2.1. Theoretical analysis of workplace safety mandates 1358<br/>2.2. Empirical analysis of workplace safety mandates 1359<br/>3. Compensation systems for workplace injuries 1361<br/>4. Workplace privacy mandates 1362<br/>4.1. Theoretical analysis of workplace privacy mandates 1362<br/>4.2. Empirical analysis of workplace privacy mandates 1363<br/>5. Fringe benefits mandates 1363<br/>5.1. Theoretical analysis of fringe benefits mandates 1365<br/>xviii Contents of Volume 2<br/>5.2. Empirical analysis of fringe benefits mandates 1365<br/>6. Targeted mandates 1366<br/>6.1. Theoretical analysis of targeted mandates 1367<br/>6.2. Empirical analysis of targeted mandates 1371<br/>7. Wrongful discharge laws 1374<br/>7.1. Theoretical analysis of wrongful discharge laws 1375<br/>7.2. Empirical analysis of wrongful discharge laws 1376<br/>8. Unemployment insurance systems 1379<br/>9. Minimum wage rules 1379<br/>10. Overtime pay requirements 1380<br/>10.1. Theoretical analysis of overtime pay requirements 1380<br/>10.2. Empirical analysis of overtime pay requirements 1381<br/>11. Conclusion 1382<br/>References 1383<br/><strong>Chapter 18<br/>Antidiscrimination Law<br/>JOHN J. DONOHUE 1387<br/></strong>1. Introduction 1389<br/>2. The contours of antidiscrimination law 1392<br/>3. Theories of discrimination 1394<br/>3.1. Employer discrimination 1396<br/>3.2. Customer and fellow-worker discrimination 1404<br/>3.3. The cartel model of discrimination 1409<br/>3.4. Statistical discrimination 1411<br/>4. Should private discrimination be prohibited? 1417<br/>5. Discrimination versus disparities 1424<br/>6. Measuring the extent of discrimination 1428<br/>6.1. Regression studies 1429<br/>6.2. The debate over the current degree of discrimination 1430<br/>6.3. Some new audit pair studies 1434<br/>7. Antidiscrimination law in practice 1437<br/>8. The impact of antidiscrimination law on black economic welfare 1439<br/>8.1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and black employment 1439<br/>8.2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA) of 1972 1440<br/>8.3. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 1442<br/>9. Discrimination on the basis of sex 1447<br/>9.1. Differences in male and female behavior and preferences 1450<br/>9.2. Sex harassment 1454<br/>10. Discrimination in credit and consumer markets 1455<br/>10.1. Housing and credit markets 1455<br/>10.2. Auto sales 1458<br/>11. Criminal justice and racial profiling 1459<br/>Contents of Volume 2 xix<br/>12. Conclusion 1463<br/>References 1467<br/><strong>Chapter 19<br/>Intellectual Property Law<br/>PETER S. MENELL AND SUZANNE SCOTCHMER 1473<br/></strong>1. Promoting innovation 1476<br/>1.1. The economic problem 1476<br/>1.2. An overview of the principal IP regimes promoting innovation and creativity 1478<br/>1.3. Policy levers 1479<br/>1.4. Administration 1511<br/>1.5. Enforcement 1519<br/>1.6. Interaction with competition policy 1522<br/>1.7. Organization of industry 1526<br/>1.8. Comparative analysis: intellectual property versus other funding mechanisms 1530<br/>1.9. International treaties 1534<br/>2. Protecting integrity of the market 1536<br/>2.1. The economic problem 1536<br/>2.2. An overview of trademark law 1537<br/>2.3. Confusion-based protection 1540<br/>2.4. Dilution-based protection 1552<br/>2.5. Administration 1555<br/>2.6. Comparative analysis 1555<br/>Acknowledgements 1556<br/>References 1557<br/><strong>PART III: Other Topics 1571<br/>Chapter 20<br/>Norms and the Law<br/>RICHARD H. MCADAMS AND ERIC B. RASMUSEN 1573<br/></strong>1. Introduction 1575<br/>2. Defining “norms” 1576<br/>3. How norms work 1578<br/>3.1. Types of normative incentives 1578<br/>3.2. Conventions 1581<br/>3.3. The origin of norms 1586<br/>4. The importance of norms to legal analysis 1588<br/>4.1. Positive analysis: how norms affect behavior 1588<br/>4.2. Normative analysis: how norms affect welfare 1593<br/>5. Specific applications 1597<br/>5.1. Tort law 1597<br/>5.2. Contracts and commercial law 1597<br/>xx Contents of Volume 2<br/>5.3. Corporate law 1600<br/>5.4. Property and intellectual property law 1600<br/>5.5. Criminal law 1603<br/>5.6. Discrimination and equality law 1604<br/>5.7. Family law 1605<br/>5.8. Other public law 1606<br/>5.9. Constitutional law 1607<br/>5.10. International law 1608<br/>6. Conclusion: the state of research on norms 1609<br/>References 1611<br/><strong>Chapter 21<br/>Experimental Study of Law<br/>COLIN CAMERER AND ERIC TALLEY 1619<br/></strong>1. Introduction 1621<br/>2. Motivation and methodology for experimental law and economics 1623<br/>2.1. Purpose of experiments 1624<br/>2.2. Generalizability 1625<br/>2.3. Psychology and economics experimental conventions 1627<br/>2.4. Behavioral economics 1628<br/>3. Applications 1631<br/>3.1. Contracting, legal entitlements, and the Coase theorem 1631<br/>3.2. Litigation and settlement 1634<br/>3.3. Adjudication, jury behavior and judge behavior 1637<br/>3.4. Legal rules and legal norms 1640<br/>4. Looking ahead 1643<br/>References 1645<br/>Further Reading 1650<br/><strong>Chapter 22<br/>The Political Economy of Law<br/>MCNOLLGAST 1651<br/></strong>1. Introduction 1654<br/>2. Schools of legal thought 1655<br/>2.1. Traditionalists 1657<br/>2.2. Realism 1657<br/>2.3. The foundations of PPT of law 1663<br/>3. Elections, representation and democratic legitimacy 1664<br/>3.1. Elections and democratic legitimacy 1665<br/>3.2. Critiques of democratic elections 1668<br/>4. The Positive theory of legislative politics 1674<br/>4.1. Understanding legislative politics 1674<br/>4.2. Delegation, monitoring and legislation 1682<br/>Contents of Volume 2 xxi<br/>4.3. Policy consequences of legislative structure 1687<br/>5. The President 1689<br/>5.1. Presidential law-making powers 1690<br/>5.2. Executive powers 1693<br/>5.3. Assessing of the role of the president 1696<br/>6. The bureaucracy 1697<br/>6.1. Schools of thought on bureaucratic autonomy 1698<br/>6.2. PPT of administrative law 1702<br/>6.3. PPT of political control of the bureaucracy: summary 1714<br/>7. The courts 1715<br/>7.1. PPT and statutory interpretation 1716<br/>7.2. The courts and legal doctrine in a system of separated powers 1720<br/>7.3. Interpreting statutes in a system of separated and shared powers 1722<br/>8. PPT of law: concluding observations 1724<br/><strong>References 1725<br/>Author Index of Volume 2 I-1<br/>Subject Index of Volume 2 I-33</strong></div></li></div>

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