[下载]2007《法与经济学手册》(Handbook of Law and Economics,Volume 1)

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收藏 2007-12-07

Handbook of Law and Economics, Volume 1 (Handbook of Law and Economics) (Hardcover) by <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/105-7782265-0525238?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;search-type=ss&amp;index=books&amp;field-author=A.%20Mitchell%20Polinsky">A. Mitchell Polinsky</a> (Editor), <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/105-7782265-0525238?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;search-type=ss&amp;index=books&amp;field-author=Steven%20Shavell">Steven Shavell</a> (Editor)非working paper,出版社清晰电子版。<a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0444512357/ref=sib_dp_pt/105-7782265-0525238#reader-link"><img id="prodImage" height="240" alt="Handbook of Law and Economics, Volume 1 (Handbook of Law and Economics)" src="http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41qUItesUDL._BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-dp-500-arrow,TopRight,45,-64_OU01_AA240_SH20_.jpg" width="240" border="0"/></a><li>Hardcover: &nbsp;&nbsp;870 pages &nbsp;</li><li>Publisher: North Holland; 1 edition (August 12, 2007) &nbsp;</li><li>Language: English </li><li>Book Description Law can be viewed as a body of rules and legal sanctions that channel behavior in socially desirable directions for example, by encouraging individuals to take proper precautions to prevent accidents or by discouraging competitors from colluding to raise prices. The incentives created by the legal system are thus a natural subject of study by economists. Moreover, given the importance of law to the welfare of societies, the economic analysis of law merits prominent treatment as a subdiscipline of economics. Our hope is that this two volume Handbook will foster the study of the legal system by economists. *The two volumes form a comprehensive and accessible survey of the current state of the field. *Chapters prepared by leading specialists of the area. *Summarizes received results as well as new developments. </li><li>

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</li><li>CONTENTS OF VOLUME 1 Introduction to the Series v Contents of the Handbook vii Preface xi PART I: Primary Elements of the Legal System 1 Chapter 1 Contract Law BENJAMIN E. HERMALIN, AVERY W. KATZ, AND RICHARD CRASWELL 3 1. Introduction 7 1.1. The economic motive for contracts 7 1.2. Law &amp; economics issues in contracting 13 1.3. What this chapter is not 17 1.4. Organization of the chapter 18 2. Freedom of contract 18 2.1. Freedom of contract defined 19 2.2. The economic case for freedom of contract 21 2.3. The economic case against freedom of contract 30 2.4. Other arguments for regulating private contracts 46 2.5. Legal doctrines regulating freedom of contract 48 3. Formation of contracts 57 3.1. Pre-contractual behavior 58 3.2. Avoiding miscommunication 61 3.3. Legal doctrines addressing contract formation 62 4. Interpretation of contracts: contractual incompleteness 68 4.1. Modeling incomplete contracts 68 4.2. The sources of contractual incompleteness 75 4.3. Consequences of contractual incompleteness 80 4.4. Legal doctrines addressing contractual incompleteness 86 4.5. Overall assessment of the law of contract interpretation 99 5. Enforcement of contracts 99 5.1. General issues in enforcement 99 5.2. Monetary damages for breach of contract 102 5.3. Complications in determining monetary damages 115 5.4. Private enforcement of contracts 120 5.5. Other law bearing on contract enforcement 126 xiii xiv Contents of Volume 1 6. Conclusions 127 References 128 Chapter 2 Liability for Accidents STEVEN SHAVELL 139 1. Introduction 142 Part A: Central theory of liability 142 2. Incentives 143 2.1. Unilateral accidents and levels of care 143 2.2. Bilateral accidents and levels of care 144 2.3. Unilateral accidents, levels of care, and levels of activity 146 2.4. Bilateral accidents, levels of care, and levels of activity 147 3. Risk-bearing and insurance 147 3.1. First-best solution to the accident problem 148 3.2. The accident problem given liability but in the absence of insurance 148 3.3. The accident problem given liability in the presence of insurance 149 4. Administrative costs 151 4.1. Volume of suit 151 4.2. Level of care and volume of suit 153 4.3. Comments 154 4.4. Strict liability and negligence 155 Part B: Extensions 156 5. Liability of firms 156 5.1. Victims are strangers 156 5.2. Victims are consumers 157 6. Aspects of the negligence determination 158 6.1. Differences among injurers 159 6.2. Imperfect assessment of care by courts 159 6.3. Imperfect ability to control care by injurers 160 6.4. Errors in the calculation of due care 160 7. Causation 161 7.1. Strict liability 161 7.2. Negligence rule 162 7.3. Uncertainty over causation 162 7.4. Proximate causation 163 8. The magnitude of liability: damages 164 8.1. Basic theory: strict liability 164 8.2. Basic theory: negligence rule 165 8.3. Difficulty in estimating harm 166 8.4. Punitive damages 166 8.5. Accuracy of damages and legal costs 167 Contents of Volume 1 xv 9. Multiple injurers 167 9.1. Strict liability 168 9.2. Negligence rule 168 10. The judgment-proof problem 168 10.1. Incentives to engage in harmful activities 169 10.2. Incentives to take care 169 10.3. Incentives to purchase liability insurance 170 10.4. Policies to ameliorate the judgment-proof problem 170 11. Vicarious liability 171 12. Nonpecuniary harm 173 12.1. Incentives in the risk-neutral case 173 12.2. Incentives and insurance in the risk-averse case; fines as a supplement to liability 173 Part C: Methods of controlling risk 175 13. Liability versus other methods of controlling risk 175 13.1. Methods of control 175 13.2. Comparison 175 13.3. Resolution of externalities through bargaining by affected parties 178 14. Conclusion 179 References 179 Chapter 3 Property Law DEAN LUECK AND THOMAS J. MICELI 183 1. Introduction 186 1.1. Property rights and property law 186 1.2. Property rights, transaction costs, and the Coase Theorem 187 1.3. The impact of transaction costs: when does law matter? 189 1.4. Outline of chapter 189 2. Basic property rights models 190 2.1. Open access 191 2.2. Private property rights 192 2.3. Common property rights 194 2.4. State property rights 196 2.5. Mixed property rights and complex assets 198 3. The origin of property rights 200 3.1. First possession 200 3.2. Claiming the asset 202 3.3. The rule of capture for asset flows 204 3.4. First possession in law 204 3.5. Alternatives: auctions, bureaucracy, politics, and violence 208 4. The evolution of property rights 209 4.1. The Demsetz thesis 209 xvi Contents of Volume 1 4.2. Empirical studies 210 4.3. The theory of rights evolution and variation 211 4.4. The mechanism of rights changes 212 5. Voluntary transfers of property 214 5.1. Protection of ownership and market exchange 214 5.2. Leases 217 5.3. Inheritance of land 223 6. Involuntary transfers of property 224 6.1. Adverse possession 224 6.2. The mistaken improver problem 226 6.3. Partition of real estate 228 6.4. Theft 228 7. Land use conflicts: externalities and property 229 7.1. A model of externalities in the short and long run 229 7.2. The Pigovian tax-subsidy approach 231 7.3. The property rule–liability rule framework 231 7.4. The law of trespass and nuisance 233 7.5. Zoning, covenants, and common law control 235 8. Public property and public use of private property 236 8.1. The optimal scale of ownership 236 8.2. The public trust doctrine 237 8.3. Eminent domain and regulatory takings 238 9. Inalienability of property rights 245 10. Conclusion 249 Acknowledgements 249 References 249 Chapter 4 Litigation KATHRYN E. SPIER 259 1. Introduction 262 2. Basic framework 263 2.1. The decision to litigate 264 2.2. Out-of-court settlement 268 3. Topics 282 3.1. Accuracy 282 3.2. Evidence 285 3.3. Sequential litigation 292 3.4. Allocating the costs of litigation 300 3.5. Negative expected value (NEV) claims and “frivolous litigation” 305 3.6. Contingent fees 307 3.7. Tribunals 312 Contents of Volume 1 xvii 3.8. Multiparty litigation 318 3.9. Additional topics 324 4. Conclusion 333 References 334 Chapter 5 Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System DANIEL P. KESSLER AND DANIEL L. RUBINFELD 343 1. Introduction 345 2. Contract law 346 2.1. Introduction 346 2.2. The effects of contract law versus non-contractual relations 347 2.3. The effects of voluntary, or default rules of contract law 348 2.4. The effects of mandatory rules of contract law 350 3. Torts 351 3.1. Introduction 351 3.2. Medical malpractice 352 3.3. Auto accidents 358 3.4. Products liability 361 3.5. Punitive damages 363 3.6. Mass torts 366 4. Property 367 4.1. Introduction 367 4.2. The development of private property 368 4.3. Shared ownership 370 4.4. Property rights versus liability rules 370 4.5. Consequences for efficiency and economic growth of poorly defined/enforced property rights 372 5. The litigation process 373 5.1. Introduction: the costs of litigation 373 5.2. The chronology of a legal suit 374 5.3. Forum and law choice 375 5.4. Pre-trial 378 5.5. Settlement 381 5.6. Trial 383 5.7. Appeal 386 5.8. Alternatives to litigation: arbitration and mediation 387 5.9. Fee-shifting 389 5.10. Class actions 390 Acknowledgements 390 References 391 xviii Contents of Volume 1 Chapter 6 The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law A. MITCHELL POLINSKY AND STEVEN SHAVELL 403 1. Introduction 405 2. Why public enforcement rather than private enforcement? 406 3. The general problem of public law enforcement 406 Part A: Basic theory when enforcement is certain 407 4. Monetary sanctions 407 5. Nonmonetary sanctions 409 6. Combined sanctions 411 Part B: Basic theory when enforcement is uncertain 412 7. Monetary sanctions 413 7.1. The risk-neutral case 413 7.2. The risk-averse case 414 8. Nonmonetary sanctions 417 8.1. The risk-neutral case 417 8.2. The risk-averse case 418 8.3. The risk-preferring case 419 9. Combined sanctions 419 Part C: Basic theory summarized and compared to practice 420 10. Summary of the basic theory 420 11. Theory versus practice 420 Part D: Extensions of the basic theory 422 12. Accidental harms 422 13. Precautions 424 14. Activity level 425 15. Errors 427 16. Costs of imposing fines 430 17. General enforcement 431 18. Marginal deterrence 432 19. Principal–agent relationship 434 20. Settlements 435 21. Self-reporting 437 22. Repeat offenders 438 23. Imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of sanctions 439 24. Corruption 440 25. Incapacitation 443 26. Costly observation of wealth 444 27. Social norms 446 28. Fairness 447 29. Conclusion 449 References 450 Contents of Volume 1 xix Chapter 7 Empirical Study of Criminal Punishment STEVEN D. LEVITT AND THOMAS J. MILES 455 1. Introduction 457 2. Basic theory: economic v. criminologic 458 2.1. The economic model of crime 458 2.2. Criminological approaches 460 3. Empirical tests of the economic model of crime 462 3.1. Challenges to empirical testing of the economic model 462 3.2. Data sources 463 3.3. Testing the economic model using the scale of policing 466 3.4. Testing the economic model using the scale of imprisonment 470 3.5. Testing the economic model using capital punishment 474 3.6. Testing the economic model using victim precautions 476 4. Empirical study of particular aspects of the criminal enforcement system 478 4.1. Challenges to empirical study of the criminal enforcement system 478 4.2. Policing strategies 479 4.3. Prosecution of offenses 480 4.4. Sentencing 484 4.5. Incarceration strategies 487 4.6. Post-release 488 5. Conclusion 489 References 489 PART II: Additional Areas of the Legal System 497 Chapter 8 Environmental Law RICHARD L. REVESZ AND ROBERT N. STAVINS 499 1. Introduction 502 2. Setting goals and targets: the ends of environmental policy 504 2.1. Normative issues and analysis 505 2.2. Positive issues and analysis 526 3. Choosing instruments: the means of environmental policy 534 3.1. Normative issues and analysis 535 3.2. Positive issues and analysis 558 4. Allocation of responsibility across levels of government 564 4.1. Positive review of responsibility of levels of government 564 4.2. Normative review of allocation of regulatory responsibility 565 5. Conclusions 570 Acknowledgements 571 References 571 xx Contents of Volume 1 Chapter 9 Regulation of Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks W. KIP VISCUSI 591 1. The rise of risk regulation 593 2. Model of risky decisions 595 3. Sources of market failure 598 3.1. Imperfect perception of risk 598 3.2. Irrational behavior and addiction 602 3.3. Externalities 604 3.4. Modes of intervention 606 4. Hazard warnings and risk communication policies 609 4.1. Principles for hazard warnings 609 4.2. Responses to multiple information sources 610 4.3. A brief history of warnings 611 5. Risk assessment 612 5.1. Objectives 612 5.2. EPA risk assessment practices 614 6. Valuing the benefits of regulation 617 6.1. Risk valuation 617 6.2. Contingent valuation and survey methods 623 7. Benefit-cost analysis 626 8. Risk-risk analysis 633 8.1. Health effects 633 9. The enforcement and performance of government regulations 637 10. Conclusion 638 Acknowledgements 639 References 639 Chapter 10 Taxation LOUIS KAPLOW 647 1. Introduction 651 2. Framework 652 2.1. Purposes of taxation 652 2.2. Integrated view 652 2.3. Social objective 656 3. Optimal income taxation 658 3.1. Model 658 3.2. Linear income tax 660 3.3. Two-bracket income tax 663 3.4. Nonlinear income tax 664 3.5. Elaboration 669 Contents of Volume 1 xxi 4. Commodity taxation 670 4.1. Model 672 4.2. Analysis 673 4.3. Qualifications 675 4.4. Ramsey taxation 676 5. Other types of taxation 678 5.1. Capital taxation 678 5.2. Transfer (estate and gift) taxation 684 5.3. Social security taxation 686 5.4. State and local taxation 687 5.5. International taxation 688 6. Taxation and transfer payments 689 6.1. Optimal transfers 690 6.2. Categorical assistance 691 6.3. Work inducements 693 6.4. Cash versus in-kind transfers 694 7. Taxation and public goods 695 7.1. Distributive incidence and optimal redistribution 695 7.2. Distribution and distortion 697 7.3. Benefit taxation 700 8. Corrective taxation 701 8.1. Pigouvian taxes and subsidies 701 8.2. Choice of instruments 702 8.3. Distribution and distortion 704 9. Additional dynamic issues 705 9.1. Inflation 705 9.2. Risk-bearing 707 9.3. Transitions and capital levies 709 9.4. Capital gains 711 9.5. Human capital 712 9.6. Lifetime horizon 714 9.7. Budget deficits and intergenerational redistribution 716 10. Unit of taxation 717 10.1. Framework 717 10.2. Intrafamily sharing 718 10.3. Economies of scale 719 10.4. Altruism 720 10.5. Children 721 10.6. Incentives 722 11. Tax administration and enforcement 724 11.1. Choice of tax systems 725 11.2. Optimal administration and enforcement 726 11.3. Elasticity of taxable income 729 xxii Contents of Volume 1 12. Additional features of tax systems 730 12.1. Tax base 730 12.2. Forms of consumption taxation 733 13. Tax equity 735 13.1. Welfarism 735 13.2. Choice of social welfare function 737 13.3. Other normative criteria 738 14. Conclusion 740 Acknowledgements 740 References 741 Chapter 11 International Law ALAN O. SYKES 757 1. Introduction 759 2. Legal background 760 3. Economic aspects of international law 761 3.1. States as rational actors 762 3.2. The economics of customary international law and “soft” law 763 3.3. The economics of treaties and other international agreements 766 3.4. The interface between domestic and international law 778 4. Security issues in international law 781 4.1. International alliances 781 4.2. The laws of war 784 5. International trade law 786 5.1. Trade policy, trade externalities and trade agreements 786 5.2. The legal architecture of world trade and its lessons for international law 789 5.3. Miscellaneous trade issues 804 6. International investment law 810 7. International antitrust 813 8. Human rights law 815 9. Conflicts of law 816 10. The international commons: the example of fisheries 818 11. Conclusion 821 Acknowledgements 822 References 822 Author Index of Volume 1 I-1 Subject Index of Volume 1 I-29</li>

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