英文文献：Can regulatory oversight help firm performance? Evidence from U.S. commercial banks-监管监督能帮助公司业绩吗?来自美国商业银行的证据
英文文献作者：Stan Veuger,Kristin Wilson
英文文献摘要：
Information frictions between firms and regulators are typically seen as a means by which firms evade enforcement or, alternatively, a means through which they can limit rent-seeking behavior. In contrast, we argue that information frictions between firms and regulators reduce the efficiency of firms' compliance efforts, particularly when industry rules are open-ended or qualitative. We use physical distance between firms and regulators to test these competing theories of information exchange on a panel of U.S. community banks between 2001 and 2010. We exploit overlapping regulatory jurisdictions to generate plausibly exogenous variation in distance between bank and supervisor. We find that banks located at a greater distance from regulatory field offices face significantly higher administrative costs, at an average rate of about 20% of administrative costs per hour of travel time. These cost differences are not accompanied by differences in compliance outcomes, are not driven by endogenous regulator choice, and are stable over our time period. Further, the inefficiency of distant firms is negatively related to the scale of the jurisdiction in which they operate, suggesting that information spillovers within jurisdictions limit the uncertainty about regulatory expectations in decentralized oversight regimes.

企业与监管机构之间的信息摩擦通常被视为企业逃避执法的一种手段，或者是限制寻租行为的一种手段。相反，我们认为，企业和监管机构之间的信息摩擦会降低企业合规努力的效率，特别是当行业规则是开放式的或定性的。我们利用公司和监管机构之间的物理距离，在一个由美国社区银行组成的小组中测试了2001年至2010年期间这些相互竞争的信息交换理论。我们利用监管权限的重叠，在银行与监管机构之间的距离上产生看似合理的外生变异。我们发现，距离监管外地办事处较远的银行，其管理成本明显较高，平均约为每小时旅行时间管理成本的20%。这些成本差异并不伴随着合规结果的差异，也不受内源性监管机构选择的驱动，而且在我们的时间段内是稳定的。此外，远方公司的无效率与它们所经营的管辖范围负相关，这表明，管辖范围内的信息溢出限制了分散监督制度中监管预期的不确定性。