英文文献：Can the 'single point of entry' strategy be used to recapitalize a failing bank?-“单一进入点”战略能否用于对破产银行进行资本重组?
英文文献作者：Peter J. Wallison,Paul H. Kupiec
英文文献摘要：
We analyze the ability of the "Single Point of Entry" strategy (SPOE) to resolve large banks without financial market disruption. We identify several legal and financial impediments that could prevent SPOE's use. In particular, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act was conceived by Congress as an alternative to bankruptcy liquidation, not a mechanism for recapitalizing financial institutions through SPOE or otherwise, especially banks. The failure of the largest banks will not generally endanger the solvency of parent BHCs, preventing the secretary of the Treasury from using SPOE for these major institutions. However, other large BHCs would be bankrupt if their subsidiary bank failed, and here SPOE expands the government safety net and reinforces TBTF. On balance, the evidence suggests that SPOE does not solve TBTF or provide a way to recapitalize a failing bank.

我们分析了“单点进入”策略(SPOE)在不扰乱金融市场的情况下解决大型银行问题的能力。我们确定了几个法律和金融障碍，可以阻止SPOE的使用。特别是，多德-弗兰克法案的第二章是由国会提出的，作为破产清算的替代方案，而不是通过SPOE或其他方式对金融机构(尤其是银行)进行资本重组的机制。大型银行的破产通常不会危及母公司bhc的偿付能力，从而阻止财政部对这些主要机构使用SPOE。然而，如果其子银行倒闭，其他大型bhc将会破产，SPOE扩大了政府安全网，强化了TBTF。总的来说，证据表明，SPOE并不能解决TBTF问题，也不能为破产银行提供资本重组的途径。