[size=10.000000pt]This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of [size=10.000000pt]Public Choice II[size=10.000000pt](1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previousedition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in publicchoice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all the major topicsof public choice are covered. These include why the state exists, voting rules,federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rentseeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voterparticipation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choiceare also examined, including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule,Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibilitytheorems, Rawls’s social contract theory, and the constitutional political economyof Buchanan and Tullock.