供应链金融注重把供应链中的资金流问题引入到传统的运营决策中。之前的文章着重研究资金约束下运营决策，以及引入各种融资模式，例如延期支付，银行短贷，解决企业运营问题。随着信息技术，物流技术，大数据技术的发展，供应链金融在商业活动中得到应用和推广。目前供应链金融的本质是风险共担，将传统的以中小企业为还款来源转移到供应链整体为还款来源。研究重点为以各种物权和财权的担保的融资，例如应收账款融资（保理，转让等），库存融资（在途物资，原材料，半成品，成品等），预付账款融资。这些方面在学术文章开始研究，但目前研究较少。为了实现供应链金融，需要一些配套组织，如银行，保险公司（物流保险，贸易保险），物流公司，以及其他一些组织（ZF机构，协会等）。

目前国内做的比较好的有平安的供应链金融，以及各大商业银行的贸易金融，阿里的蚂蚁金融的供应链金融，京东，敦煌网，一大通。电商企业在供应链金融中有重要的发展空间，电商平台为电商提供了一系列平台上中小企业的经营活动所产生的数据，利用数据挖掘，大数据等技术，分析企业的营运能力，违约风险等，从而降低信息不对称问题。之前看到一个阿里上的商家，因为自己的生意比较小，资金周转出了问题，向银行借钱，银行拒绝了，后来知道阿里有供应链金融服务，就想阿里申请了50W的短贷，一周不到就批了，利率低于银行贷款利率。
坛里之前有人分享过基本供应链融资的书，在这里上传几篇比较经典的文章，发表在MS,OR领域的top文章。
1.Inventory Management with Asset-Based Financing (MS)
Abstract: Most of the traditional models in production and inventory control ignore the financial states of an organization
and can lead to infeasible practices in real systems. This paper is the first attempt to incorporate
asset-based financing into production decisions. Instead of setting a known, exogenously determined budgetary
constraint as most existing models suggest, we model the available cash in each period as a function of assets
and liabilities that may be updated periodically according to the dynamics of the production activities. Furthermore,
our models allow different interest rates on cash balance and outstanding loans, which is an enhancement
over most traditional models in that inventory financed by a loan may be more expensive than that by out-ofpocket
cash. We demonstrate the importance of joint consideration of production and financing decisions in a
start-up setting in which the ability to grow the firm is mainly constrained by its limited capital and dependence
on bank financing. We then explain the motivation for asset-based financing by examining the decision making
at a bank and a set of retailers in a newsvendor setting.


2.Financing the Newsvendor: Supplier vs. Bank, and the Structure of Optimal Trade Credit Contracts (OR)
Abstract: We consider a supply chain with a retailer and a supplier: A newsvendor-like retailer has a single opportunity to order a
product from a supplier to satisfy future uncertain demand. Both the retailer and supplier are capital constrained and in
need of short-term financing. In the presence of bankruptcy risks for both the retailer and supplier, we model their strategic
interaction as a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader. We use the supplier early payment discount scheme
as a decision framework to analyze all decisions involved in optimally structuring the trade credit contract (discounted
wholesale price if paying early, financing rate if delaying payment) from the supplier’s perspective. Under mild assumptions
we conclude that a risk-neutral supplier should always finance the retailer at rates less than or equal to the risk-free rate.
The retailer, if offered an optimally structured trade credit contract, will always prefer supplier financing to bank financing.
Furthermore, under optimal trade credit contracts, both the supplier’s profit and supply chain efficiency improve, and the
retailer might improve his profits relative to under bank financing (or equivalently, a rich retailer under wholesale price
contracts), depending on his current “wealth” (working capital and collateral).
3.Equilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint (POM)
Abstract:There exist capital constraints in many distribution channels. We examine a channel consisting of one manufacturer
and one retailer, where the retailer is capital constrained. The retailer may fund its business by borrowing credit
either from a competitive bank market or from the manufacturer, provided the latter is willing to lend. When only one
credit type (either bank or trade credit) is viable, we show that trade credit financing generally charges a higher wholesale
price and thus becomes less attractive than bank credit financing for the retailer. When both bank and trade credits are
viable, the unique equilibrium is trade credit financing if production cost is relatively low but is bank credit financing
otherwise. We also study the case where both the retailer and the manufacturer are capital constrained and demonstrate
that, to improve the overall supply chain efficiency, the bank should finance the manufacturer if production cost is low
but finance the retailer otherwise. Our analysis further suggests that the equilibrium region of trade credit financing
shrinks as demand variability or the retailer’s internal capital level increases.

4.The Newsvendor Problem and Price-Only Contract When Bankruptcy Costs Exist (POM)
Abstract:We study a supply chain of a supplier selling via a wholesale price contract to a financially constrained retailer who faces
stochastic demand. The retailer might need to borrow money from a bank to execute his order. The bank offers a fairly
priced loan for relevant risks. Failure of loan repayment leads to a costly bankruptcy (fixed administrative costs, costs
proportional to sales, and a depressed collateral value). We identify the retailer’s optimal order quantity as a function of the
wholesale price and his total wealth (working capital and collateral). The analysis of the supplier’s optimal wholesale price
problem as a Stackelberg game, with the supplier the leader and the retailer the follower, leads to unique equilibrium
solutions in wholesale price and order quantity, with the equilibrium order quantity smaller than the traditional newsvendor
one. Furthermore, in the presence of the retailer’s bankruptcy risks, increases in the retailer’s wealth lead to increased
supplier’s wholesale prices, but without the retailer’s bankruptcy risks the supplier’s wholesale prices stay the same or
decrease in retailer’s wealth.