Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments page xi
Introduction and Synopsis 1
Morality, Moral Rules, and Normative Constraints 5
Synopsis of the Book 9
A Contextualized Proof of the First Fundamental Theorem
of Welfare Economics 15
A Framework for Analyzing Social Situations 16
Strict Rational Egoism 16
A Proof of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics 26
Other Definitions 28
Summary Discussion 31
The Moral Thesis: Moral Normative Constraints Are
Necessary Conditions of Pareto-Optimal Equilibrium
Allocations of Commodities Achieved through Market
Interaction 33
Alternative Explanations for Price-Taking Behavior 36
The Presumption against Nonmarket Action Entails
a Contradiction 37
Perfectly Competitive Markets Cannot Ensure Competitive
Behavior 38
Maximal Information-Processing Capabilities and
Perfect Information Are Not Sufficient for Pareto-Optimal
Equilibrium Allocations 41
There Exists a Set of Utility Functions That Render
These Decision Functions Not Effectively Computable
under Conditions of Perfect Information 50
Each Individual's Strategic Decision Process 52
Perfect Information Is Not a Sufficient Condition for Pareto-Optimal Equilibrium Allocations 53
Moral Normative Constraints Are Necessary for Economically Efficient Outcomes of Market Interaction 54
Summary 56
4 A Spontaneous Order Objection 58
The Conflation of Classes of Situations by Hume, Menger, and Hayek 60
Categorizing Types of Social Situations 61
The Requisite Normative Constraints Cannot Emerge within a Population of Strict Rational Egoists 66
Alternative Accounts of Spontaneous Order 70
Summary Discussion 72
5 The Roles of Moral Normative Constraints in Relation to Externalities 73
Externality 73
The Roles of Moral Normative Constraints in Achieving Economic Efficiency 75
Summary 81
6 The Moral Conditions of Economic Efficiency 82
The Concept of a Normative Social Practice 83
Rights in General 89
Compliance 94
The Specific Moral Rights Required for Efficient Trade 99
A Synopsis of a System of Normative Conditions of
Efficient Outcomes of Market Interaction 104
7 Implications 106
Concepts and Analytical Tools 106
Implications for Economic Theory 107
Implications for Political Theory and Moral Philosophy 110
Implications for Legal Theory 114
Summary and Concluding Comments 116
Notes 119
Bibliography 131
Index 137