Course Description
 Optimal decisions of economic agents depend on expectations of other agents' actions. Subject examines various models of equilibrium, which correspond to different ways that agents might make their decisions, and various kinds of games: static games, dynamic games, and games of incomplete information. 
 Syllabus
 Textbooks
 Primary
 Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991.
 Osborne, Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994.
 Supplementary
 Weibull, Jörgen W. Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995.
 Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998.
 Krishna, Vijay. Auction Theory. San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 2002.
 Articles
 Games and Economic Behavior articles (1993-, vol. 5-) in the list are downloadable from the journal website: http://www.sciencedirect.com
 Journal of Economic Theory articles (1993-, vol. 59-) in the list are downloadable from the journal website: http://www.sciencedirect.com
 Articles before 1997 in Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies or Quarterly Journal of Economics are downloadable from JSTOR: http://www.jstor.org