《孙子兵法》 THE ART OF WAR：

1 始計 Laying Plans
2 作戰 Waging War
3 謀攻 Attack by Stratagem
4 軍形 Tactical Dispositions
5 兵勢 Energy
6 虛實 Weak Points and Strong
7 軍爭 Maneuvering
8 九變 Variation in Tactics
9 行軍 The Army on the March
10 地形 Terrain
11 九地 The Nine Situations
12 火攻 The Attack by Fire
13 用間 The Use of Spies



01《孙子兵法》计篇第一　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　计篇

孙子曰：兵者，国之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也。
故经之以五，校之以计，而索其情：
一曰道，
二曰天，
三曰地，
四曰将，
五曰法。

道者，令民于上同意者也，可与之死，可与之生，民不诡也。
天者，阴阳、寒暑、时制也。
地者，高下、远近、险易、广狭、死生也。
将者，智、信、仁、勇、严也。
法者，曲制、官道、主用也。
凡此五者，将莫不闻，知之者胜，不知之者不胜。
故校之以计，而索其情。
曰：主孰有道？
将孰有能？
天地孰得？
法令孰行？
兵众孰强？
士卒孰练？
赏罚孰明？
吾以此知胜负矣。
将听吾计，用之必胜，留之﹔
将不听吾计，用之必败，去之。
计利以听，乃为之势，以佐其外。势者，因利而制权也。
兵者，诡道也。故能而示之不能，用而示之不用，近而示之远，远而示之近。
利而诱之，乱而取之，实而备之，强而避之，怒而挠之，
卑而骄之，佚而劳之，亲而离之，攻其不备，出其不意。
此兵家之胜，不可先传也。
夫未战而庙算胜者，得算多也﹔
未战而庙算不胜者，得算少也。

多算胜，少算不胜，而况无算乎！吾以此观之，胜负见矣。



02《孙子兵法》作战篇第二　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　作战篇

孙子曰：凡用兵之法，驰车千驷，革车千乘，带甲十万，千里馈粮，
则内外之费，宾客之用，胶漆之材，车甲之奉，日费千金，然后十万
之师举矣。
其用战也贵胜，久则钝兵挫锐，攻城则力屈，久暴师则国用不足。
夫钝兵挫锐，屈力殚货，则诸侯乘其弊而起，虽有智者，不能善其后矣。
故兵闻拙速，未睹巧之久也。夫兵久而国利者，未之有也。
故不尽知用兵之害者，则不能尽知用兵之利也。
善用兵者，役不再籍，粮不三载﹔
取用于国，因粮于敌，故军食可足也。
国之贫于师者远输，远输则百姓贫。
近师者贵卖，贵卖则百姓竭，财竭则急于丘役。
力屈、财殚，中原内虚于家。
百姓之费，十去其七﹔公家之费：破军罢马，甲冑矢弩，戟盾蔽橹，丘牛大车，十去其六。
故智将务食于敌。
食敌一钟，当吾二十钟﹔
箕杆一石，当吾二十石。
故杀敌者，怒也﹔取敌之利者，货也。故车战，得车十乘已上，赏其
先得者，而更其旌旗，车杂而乘之，卒善而养之，是谓胜敌而益强。
故兵贵胜，不贵久。
故知兵之将，民之司命，国家安危之主也。


03《孙子兵法》谋攻篇第三
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　谋攻篇

孙子曰：凡用兵之法，
全国为上，破国次之﹔
全军为上，破军次之﹔
全旅为上，破旅次之﹔
全卒为上，破卒次之﹔
全伍为上，破伍次之。
是故百战百胜，非善之善也﹔
不战而屈人之兵，善之善者也。
故上兵伐谋，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城。攻城之法为不得已。
修橹轒辒 具器械、三月而后成，距闉，又三月而后已。
将不胜其忿，而蚁附之，杀士三分之一，而城不拔者，此攻之灾也。
故善用兵者，屈人之兵而非战也。
拔人之城而非攻也，破人之国而非久也，必以全争于天下，
故兵不顿，而利可全，此谋攻之法也。
故用兵之法，十则围之，五则攻之，倍则分之，敌则能战之，少则能
逃之，不若则能避之。故小敌之坚，大敌之擒也。
夫将者，国之辅也。辅周则国必强，辅隙则国必弱。
故君之所以患于军者三：不知军之不可以进而谓之进，不知军之不可
以退而谓之退，是为縻军﹔不知三军之事，而同三军之政者，则军士
惑矣﹔不知三军之权，而同三军之任，则军士疑矣。三军既惑且疑，
则诸侯之难至矣，是谓乱军引胜。
故知胜有五：
知可以战与不可以战者胜，
识众寡之用者胜，
上下同欲者胜，
以虞待不虞者胜，
将能而君不御者胜。
此五者，知胜之道也。
故曰：知己知彼，百战不贻﹔
不知彼而知己，一胜一负﹔
不知彼不知己，每战必贻。


04《孙子兵法》形篇第四
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　形篇

孙子曰：昔之善战者，先为不可胜，以侍敌之可胜。不可胜在己，可
胜在敌。故善战者，能为不可胜，不能使敌之必可胜。故曰：胜可知
，而不可为。不可胜者，守也﹔可胜者，攻也。守则不足，攻则有余
。善守者，藏于九地之下﹔善攻者，动于九天之上。故能自保而全胜
也。
见胜不过众人之所知，非善之善者也﹔战胜而天下曰善，非善之善者
也。故举秋毫不为多力，见日月不为明目，闻雷霆不为聪耳。古之所
谓善战者，胜于易胜者也。故善战之胜也，无智名，无勇功。故其战
胜不忒。不忒者，其所措必胜，胜已败者也。故善战者，立于不败之
地，而不失敌之败也。是故胜兵先胜而后求战，败兵先战而后求胜。
善用兵者，修道而保法，故能为胜败之政。
兵法：一曰度，二曰量，三曰数，四曰称，五曰胜。地生度，度生量
，量生数，数生称，称生胜。
故胜兵若以镒称铢，败兵若以铢称镒。
胜者之战民也，若决积水于千仞之溪者，形也。

05《孙子兵法》势篇第五
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　势篇

孙子曰：凡治众如治寡，分数是也﹔斗众如斗寡，形名是也﹔三军之
众，可使必受敌而无败，奇正是也﹔兵之所加，如以碫投卵者，虚实
是也。
凡战者，以正合，以奇胜。故善出奇者，无穷如天地，不竭如江河。
终而复始，日月是也。死而复生，四时是也。声不过五，五声之变，
不可胜听也。色不过五，五色之变，不可胜观也。味不过五，五味之
变，不可胜尝也。战势不过奇正，奇正之变，不可胜穷之也。奇正相
生，如环之无端，孰能穷之？
激水之疾，至于漂石者，势也﹔鸷鸟之疾，至于毁折者，节也。是故
善战者，其势险，其节短。势如张弩，节如发机。
纷纷纭纭，斗乱而不可乱也。浑浑沌沌，形圆而不可败也。
乱生于治，怯生于勇，弱生于强。治乱，数也﹔勇怯，势也﹔强弱，
形也。
故善动敌者，形之，敌必从之﹔予之，敌必取之。以利动之，以卒动
之。
故善战者，求之于势，不责于人，故能择人而任势。任势者，其战人
也，如转木石。木石之性，安则静，危则动，方则止，圆则行。故善
战人之势，如转圆石于千仞之山者，势也。


06《孙子兵法》虚实篇第六
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　虚实篇

孙子曰：凡先处战地而待敌者佚，后处战地而趋战者劳。故善战者，
致人而不致于人。
能使敌自至者，利之也﹔能使敌不得至者，害之也。故敌佚能劳之，
饱能饥之，安能动之。
出其所不趋，趋其所不意。行千里而不劳者，行于无人之地也。攻而
必取者，攻其所不守也。守而必固者，守其所不攻也。
故善攻者，敌不知其所守。善守者，敌不知其所攻。
微乎微乎，至于无形，神乎神乎，至于无声，故能为敌之司命。
进而不可御者，冲其虚也﹔退而不可追者，速而不可及也。故我欲战
，敌虽高垒深沟，不得不与我战者，攻其所必救也﹔我不欲战，虽画
地而守之，敌不得与我战者，乖其所之也。
故形人而我无形，则我专而敌分﹔我专为一，敌分为十，是以十攻其
一也，则我众而敌寡﹔能以众击寡者，则吾之所与战者，约矣。吾所
与战之地不可知，不可知，则敌所备者多，敌所备者多，则吾之所战
者，寡矣。
故备前则后寡，备后则前寡，故备左则右寡，备右则左寡，无所不备
，则无所不寡。寡者备人者也，众者使人备己者也。
故知战之地，知战之日，则可千里而会战。不知战之地，不知战之日
，则左不能救右，右不能救左，前不能救后，后不能救前，而况远者
数十里，近者数里乎？
以吾度之，越人之兵虽多，亦奚益于胜败哉？！
故曰：胜可为也。敌虽众，可使无斗。
故策之而知得失之计，作之而知动静之理，形之而知死生之地，角之
而知有余不足之处。
故形兵之极，至于无形﹔无形，则深间不能窥，智者不能谋。
因形而错胜于众，众不能知﹔人皆知我所以胜之形，而莫知吾所以制
胜之形。故其战胜不复，而应形于无穷。
夫兵形象水，水之形避高而趋下，兵之形，避实而击虚，水因地而制
流，兵应敌而制胜。故兵无常势，水无常形，能因敌变化而取胜者，
谓之神。
故五行无常胜，四时无常位，日有短长，月有死生。


07《孙子兵法》军争篇第七
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　军争篇

孙子曰：凡用兵之法，将受命于君，合军聚众，交和而舍，莫难于军
争。军争之难者，以迂为直，以患为利。故迂其途，而诱之以利，后
人发，先人至，此知迂直之计者也。
故军争为利，军争为危。举军而争利，则不及﹔委军而争利，则辎重
捐。是故卷甲而趋，日夜不处，倍道兼行，百里而争利，则擒三将军
，劲者先，疲者后，其法十一而至﹔五十里而争利，则蹶上将军，其
法半至﹔三十里而争利，则三分之二至。是故军无辎重则亡，无粮食
则亡，无委积则亡。
故不知诸侯之谋者，不能豫交﹔不知山林、险阻、沮泽之形者，不能
行军﹔不用乡导者，不能得地利。
故兵以诈立，以利动，以分和为变者也。
故其疾如风，其徐如林，侵掠如火，不动如山，难知如阴，动如雷震
。
掠乡分众，廓地分守，悬权而动。
先知迂直之计者胜，此军争之法也。
军政曰：「言不相闻，故为金鼓；视而不见，故为旌旗。」夫
金鼓旌旗者，所以一人之耳目也；人既专一， 则勇者不得独进，
怯者不得独退，此用众之法也。故夜战多火鼓，
昼战多旌旗，所以变人之耳目也。
故三军可夺气，将军可夺心。是故朝气锐，昼气惰，暮气归。故善用
兵者，避其锐气，击其惰归，此治气者也。以治待乱，以静待哗，此
治心者也。以近待远，以佚待劳，以饱待饥，此治力者也。无邀正正
之旗，无击堂堂之阵，此治变者也。
故用兵之法，高陵勿向，背丘勿逆，佯北勿从，锐卒勿攻，饵兵勿食
，归师勿遏，围师遗阙，穷寇勿迫，此用兵之法也。

　

08《孙子兵法》九变篇第八
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　九变篇

孙子曰：凡用兵之法，将受命于君，合军聚众，圮地无舍，衢地交和
，绝地勿留，围地则谋，死地则战。
途有所不由，军有所不击，城有所不攻，地有所不争，君命有所不受
。
故将通于九变之利者，知用兵矣﹔将不通于九变之利，虽知地形，不
能得地之利矣﹔治兵不知九变之朮，虽知地利，不能得人之用矣。
是故智者之虑，必杂于利害。杂于利，而务可信也﹔杂于害，而患可
解也。
是故屈诸侯者以害，役诸侯者以业，趋诸侯者以利。
故用兵之法，无恃其不来，恃吾有以待也﹔无恃其不攻，恃吾有所不
可攻也。
故将有五危：必死，可杀也﹔必生，可虏也﹔忿速，可侮也﹔廉洁，
可辱也﹔爱民，可烦也。凡此五者，将之过也，用兵之灾也。覆军杀
将，必以五危，不可不察也。
　

09《孙子兵法》行军篇第九
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　行军篇

孙子曰：凡处军、相敌，绝山依谷，视生处高，战隆无登，此处山之
军也。绝水必远水﹔客绝水而来，勿迎之于水内，令半济而击之，利
﹔欲战者，无附于水而迎客﹔视生处高，无迎水流，此处水上之军也
。绝斥泽，惟亟去无留﹔若交军于斥泽之中，必依水草，而背众树，
此处斥泽之军也。平陆处易，而右背高，前死后生，此处平陆之军也
。凡此四军之利，黄帝之所以胜四帝也。
凡军好高而恶下，贵阳而贱阴，养生而处实，军无百疾，是谓必胜。
丘陵堤防，必处其阳，而右背之。此兵之利，地之助也。
上雨，水沫至，欲涉者，待其定也。
凡地有绝涧、天井、天牢、天罗、天陷、天隙，必亟去之，勿近也。
吾远之，敌近之﹔吾迎之，敌背之。
军旁有险阻、潢井、葭苇、林木、蘙荟者，必谨慎复索之，此伏奸之
所处也。
敌近而静者，恃其险也﹔远而挑战者，欲人之进也﹔其所居易者，利
也。
众树动者，来也﹔众草多障者，疑也﹔鸟起者，伏也﹔兽骇者，覆也
﹔尘高而锐者，车来也﹔卑而广者，徒来也﹔散而条达者，樵采也﹔
少而往来者，营军也。
辞卑而备者，进也﹔辞强而进驱者，退也﹔轻车先出其侧者，阵也﹔
无约而请和者，谋也﹔奔走而陈兵者，期也﹔半进半退者，诱也。
杖而立者，饥也﹔汲而先饮者，渴也﹔见利而不进者，劳也﹔鸟集者
，虚也﹔夜呼者，恐也﹔军扰者，将不重也﹔旌旗动者，乱也﹔吏怒
者，倦也﹔粟马肉食，军无悬缶而不返其舍者，穷寇也﹔谆谆翕翕，
徐与人言者，失众也﹔数赏者，窘也﹔数罚者，困也﹔先暴而后畏其
众者，不精之至也﹔来委谢者，欲休息也。兵怒而相迎，久而不合，
又不相去，必谨察之。
兵非贵益多也，惟无武进，足以并力、料敌、取人而已。夫惟无虑而
易敌者，必擒于人。
卒未亲附而罚之，则不服，不服则难用也。卒已亲附而罚不行，则不
可用也。故令之以文，齐之以武，是谓必取。令素行以教其民，则民
服﹔令素不行以教其民，则民不服。令素行者，与众相得也。

10《孙子兵法》地形篇第十
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　地形篇

孙子曰：地形有通者、有挂者、有支者、有隘者、有险者、有远者。
我可以往，彼可以来，曰通。通形者，先居高阳，利粮道，以战则利
。可以往，难以返，曰挂。挂形者，敌无备，出而胜之，敌若有备，
出而不胜，则难以返，不利。我出而不利，彼出而不利，曰支。支形
者，敌虽利我，我无出也，引而去之，令敌半出而击之，利。隘形者
，我先居之，必盈之以待敌。若敌先居之，盈而勿从，不盈而从之。
险形者，我先居之，必居高阳以待敌﹔若敌先居之，引而去之，勿从
也。远形者，势均，难以挑战，战而不利。凡此六者，地之道也，将
之至任，不可不察也。
故兵有走者、有驰者、有陷者、有崩者、有乱者、有北者。凡此六者
，非天之灾，将之过也。夫势均，以一击十，曰走。卒强吏弱，曰驰
。吏强卒弱，曰陷。大吏怒而不服，遇敌怼而自战，将不知其能，曰
崩。将弱不严，教道不明，吏卒无常，陈兵纵横，曰乱。将不能料敌
，以少合众，以弱击强，兵无选锋，曰北。凡此六者，败之道也，将
之至任，不可不察也。
夫地形者，兵之助也。料敌制胜，计险厄远近，上将之道也。知此而
用战者必胜﹔不知此而用战者必败。
故战道必胜，主曰无战，必战可也﹔战道不胜，主曰必战，无战可也
。故进不求名，退不避罪，惟人是保，而利合于主，国之宝也。
视卒如婴儿，故可以与之赴深溪﹔视卒如爱子，故可与之俱死。厚而
不能使，爱而不能令，乱而不能治，譬若骄子，不可用也。
知吾卒之可以击，而不知敌之不可击，胜之半也﹔知敌之可击，而不
知吾卒之不可以击，胜之半也﹔知敌之可击，知吾卒之可以击，而不
知地形之不可以战，胜之半也。故知兵者，动而不迷，举而不穷。故
曰：知己知彼，胜乃不殆﹔知天知地，胜乃可全。


11《孙子兵法》九地篇第十一
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　九地篇

孙子曰：用兵之法，有散地，有轻地，有争地，有交地，有衢地，有
重地，有圮地，有围地，有死地。诸侯自战其地，为散地。入人之地
不深者，为轻地。我得则利，彼得亦利者，为争地。我可以往，彼可
以来者，为交地。诸侯之地三属，先至而得天下众者，为衢地。入人
之地深，背城邑多者，为重地。山林、险阻、沮泽，凡难行之道者，
为圮地。所从由入者隘，所从归者迂，彼寡可以击我之众者，为围地
。疾战则存，不疾战则亡者，为死地。是故散地则无战，轻地则无止
，争地则无攻，衢地则合交，重地则掠，圮地则行，围地则谋，死地
则战。
所谓古之善用兵者，能使敌人前后不相及，众寡不相恃，贵贱不相救
，上下不相收，卒离而不集，兵合而不齐。合于利而动，不合于利而
止。敢问：“敌众整而将来，待之若何？"曰：“先夺其所爱，则听
矣。"
兵之情主速，乘人之不及，由不虞之道，攻其所不戒也。
凡为客之道：深入则专，主人不克。掠于饶野，三军足食。谨养而勿
劳，并气积力，运并计谋，为不可测。投之无所往，死且不北。死焉
不得，士人尽力。兵士甚陷则不惧，无所往则固，深入则拘，不得已
则斗。是故其兵不修而戒，不求而得，不约而亲，不令而信。禁祥去
疑，至死无所之。吾士无余财，非恶货也﹔无余命，非恶寿也。令发
之日，士卒坐者涕沾襟，偃卧者泪交颐。投之无所往者，诸、刿之勇
也。
故善用兵者，譬如率然。率然者，常山之蛇也。击其首则尾至，击其
尾则首至，击其中则首尾俱至。敢问：“兵可使如率然乎？"曰：“
可。"夫吴人与越人相恶也，当其同舟而济，遇风，其相救也，如左
右手。是故方马埋轮，未足恃也。齐勇如一，政之道也，刚柔皆得，
地之理也。故善用兵者，携手若使一人，不得已也。
将军之事：静以幽，正以治。能愚士卒之耳目，使之无知。易其事，
革其谋，使人无识。易其居，迂其途，使人不得虑。帅与之期，如登
高而去其梯。帅与之深入诸侯之地，而发其机，焚舟破釜，若驱群羊
。驱而往，驱而来，莫知所之。聚三军之众，投之于险，此谓将军之
事也。九地之变，屈伸之力，人情之理，不可不察也。
凡为客之道：深则专，浅则散。去国越境而师者，绝地也﹔四达者，
衢地也﹔入深者，重地也﹔入浅者，轻地也﹔背固前隘者，围地也﹔
无所往者，死地也。
是故散地，吾将一其志﹔轻地，吾将使之属﹔争地，吾将趋其后﹔交
地，吾将谨其守﹔衢地，吾将固其结﹔重地，吾将继其食﹔圮地，吾
将进其途﹔围地，吾将塞其阙﹔死地，吾将示之以不活。
故兵之情：围则御，不得已则斗，过则从。
是故不知诸侯之谋者，不能预交。不知山林、险阻、沮泽之形者，不
能行军。不用乡导，不能得地利。四五者，不知一，非霸、王之兵也
。夫霸、王之兵，伐大国，则其众不得聚﹔威加于敌，则其交不得合
。是故不争天下之交，不养天下之权，信己之私，威加于敌，则其城
可拔，其国可隳。施无法之赏，悬无政之令，犯三军之众，若使一人
。犯之以事，勿告以言。犯之以利，勿告以害。
投之亡地然后存，陷之死地然后生。夫众陷于害，然后能为胜败。
故为兵之事，在于佯顺敌之意，并敌一向，千里杀将，是谓巧能成事
者也。
是故政举之日，夷关折符，无通其使﹔励于廊庙之上，以诛其事。敌
人开阖，必亟入之，先其所爱，微与之期。践墨随敌，以决战事。是
故始如处女，敌人开户，后如脱兔，敌不及拒。



12《孙子兵法》火攻篇第十二
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　火攻篇

孙子曰：凡火攻有五：一曰火人，二曰火积，三曰火辎，四曰火库，
五曰火队。行火必有因，烟火必素具。发火有时，起火有日。时者，
天之燥也。日者，月在萁、壁、翼、轸也。凡此四宿者，风起之日也
。
凡火攻，必因五火之变而应之。火发于内，则早应之于外。火发而其
兵静者，待而勿攻。极其火力，可从而从之，不可从而止。火可发于
外，无待于内，以时发之。火发上风，无攻下风。昼风久，夜风止。
凡军必知有五火之变，以数守之。
故以火佐攻者明，以水佐攻者强。水可以绝，不可以夺。
夫战胜攻取，而不修其功者凶，命曰“费留"。故曰：明主虑之，良
将修之。非利不动，非得不用，非危不战。主不可以怒而兴师，将不
可以愠而致战。合于利而动，不合于利而止。怒可以复喜，愠可以复
悦，亡国不可以复存，死者不可以复生。故明君慎之，良将警之。此
安国全军之道也。


13《孙子兵法》用间篇第十三
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　用间篇

孙子曰：凡兴师十万，出征千里，百姓之费，公家之奉，日费千金。
内外骚动，怠于道路，不得操事者，七十万家。相守数年，以争一日
之胜，而爱爵禄百金，不知敌之情者，不仁之至也。非人之将也，非
主之佐也，非胜之主也。故明君贤将，所以动而胜人，成功出于众者
，先知也。先知者，不可取于鬼神，不可象于事，不可验于度。必取
于人，知敌之情者也。
故用间有五：有因间，有内间，有反间，有死间，有生间。五间俱起
，莫知其道，是谓神纪，人君之宝也。因间者，因其乡人而用之。内
间者，因其官人而用之。反间者，因其敌间而用之。死间者，为诳事
于外，令吾闻知之，而传于敌间也。生间者，反报也。
故三军之事，莫亲于间，赏莫厚于间，事莫密于间。非圣智不能用间
，非仁义不能使间，非微妙不能得间之实。微哉！微哉！无所不用间
也。间事未发，而先闻者，间与所告者兼死。
凡军之所欲击，城之所欲攻，人之所欲杀，必先知其守将、左右、谒
者、门者、舍人之姓名，令吾间必索知之。
必索敌人之间来间我者，因而利之，导而舍之，故反间可得而用也。
因是而知之，故乡间、内间可得而使也﹔因是而知之，故死间为诳事
可使告敌﹔因是而知之，故生间可使如期。五间之事，君必知之，知
之必在于反间，故反间不可不厚也。
昔殷之兴也，伊挚在夏﹔周之兴也，吕牙在殷。故惟明君贤将能以上
智为间者，必成大功。此兵之要，三军之所恃而动也。

THE ART OF WAR


by Sun Tzu


　　Chapter 1 :

　　Estimates War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life or death, the road either to survival or to ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be studied thoroughly. Therefore, appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors and make comparisons of the various conditions of the antagonistic sides in order to ascertain the results of a war. The first of these factors is politics; the second, weather; the third, terrain; the fourth, the commander; and the fifth, doctrine. Politics means the thing which causes he people to be in harmony with their ruler so that they will follow him in disregard of their lives and without fear of any danger. Weather signifies night and day, cold and heat, fine days and rain, and change of seasons. Terrain means distances, and refers to whether the ground is traversed with ease or difficulty and to whether it is open or constricted, and influences your chances of life or death. The commander stands for the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, and strictness. Doctrine is to be understood as the organization of the army, the gradations of rank among the officers, the regulations of supply routes, and the provision of military materials to the army. These five fundamental factors are familiar to every general. Those who master them win; those who do not are defeated. Therefore, in laying plans, compare the following seven elements, appraising them with the utmost care. Which ruler is wise and more able? Which commander is more talented? Which army obtains the advantages of nature and the terrain? In which army are regulations and instructions better carried out? Which troops are stronger? Which army has the better-trained officers and men? Which army administers rewards and punishments in a more enlightened and correct way? By means of these seven elements, I shall be able to forecast which side will be victorious and which will be defeated. The general who heeds my counsel is sure to win. Such a general should be retained in command. One who ignores my counsel is certain to be defeated. Such a one should be dismissed. Having paid attention to my counsel and plans, the general must create a situation which will contribute to their accomplishment. By "situation" I mean he should take the field situation into consideration and act in accordance with what is advantageous. All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable of attacking, feign incapacity; when active in moving troops, feign inactivity. When near the enemy, make it seem that you are far away; when far away, make it seem that you are near. Hold out baits to lure the enemy. Strike the enemy when he is in disorder. Prepare against the enemy when he is secure at all points. Avoid the enemy for the time being when he is stronger. If your opponent is of choleric temper, try to irritate him. If he is arrogant, try to encourage his egotism. If the enemy troops are well prepared after reorganization, try to wear them down. If they are united, try to sow dissension among them. Attack the enemy where he is unprepared, and appear where you are not expected. These are the keys to victory for a strategist. It is not possible to formulate them in detail beforehand. Now, if the estimates made before a battle indicate victory, it is because careful calculations show that your conditions are more favorable than those of your enemy; if they indicate defeat, it is because careful calculations show that favorable conditions for a battle are fewer. With more careful calculations, one can win; with less, one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who makes no calculations at all! By this means, one can foresee the outcome of a battle.


　　Chapter 2 :

　　Waging War In operations of war-when one thousand fast four-horse chariots onethousand heavy chariots, and one thousand mail-clad soldiers are required; when provisions are transported for a thousand li; when thereare expenditures at home and at the front, and stipends for entertainment of envoys and advisers-the cost of materials such as glue and lacquer, and of chariots and armor, will amount to one thousand pieces of gold a day. One hundred thousand troops may be dispatched only when this money is in hand. A speedy victory is the main object in war. If this is long in coming, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. If troops are attacking cities, their strength will be exhausted. When the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of the state will fall short. When your weapons are dulled and ardor dampened, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, the chieftains of the neighboring states will take advantage of your crisis to act. In that case, no man, however wise, will be able to avert the disastrous consequences that ensue. Thus, while we have heard of stupid haste in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged. for there has never been a protracted war which benefited a country. Therefore, those unable to understand the evils inherent in employing troops are equally unable to understand the advantageous ways of doing so. Those adept in waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts or more that two provisionings. They carry military equipment from the homeland, but rely on the enemy for provisions. Thus, the army is plentifully provided with food. When a country is impoverished by military operations, it is due to distant transportation; carrying supplies for great distances renders the people destitute. Where troops are gathered, prices go up. When prices rise, the wealth of the people is drained away. When wealth is drained away, the people will be afflicted with urgent and heavy exactions. With this loss of wealth and exhaustion of strength, the households in the country will be extremely poor and seven-tenths of their wealth dissipated. As to government expenditures, those due to broken-down chariots, worn-out horses, armor and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, draft oxen, and wagons will amount to 60 percent of the total. Hence, a wise general sees to it that his troops feed on the enemy, for one zhong of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own and one shi of the enemy's fodder to twenty shi of one's own. In order to make the soldiers courageous in overcoming the enemy, they must be roused to anger. In order to capture more booty from the enemy, soldiers must have their rewards. Therefore, in chariot fighting when more than ten chariots are captured, reward those who take the first. Replace the enemy's flags and banners with you own, mix the captured chariots with yours, and mount them. Treat the prisoners of war well, and care for them. This is called "winning a battle and becoming stronger." Hence, what is valued in war is victory, not prolonged operations. And the general who understands how to employ troops is the minister of the people's fate and arbiter of the nation's destiny.

　Chapter 3 :

　　Offensive Strategy Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy's entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy is to attack cities.Attack cities only when there is no alternative because to prepare big shields and wagons and make ready the necessary arms and equipment require at least three months, and to pile up earthen ramps against the walls requires an additional three months. The general, unable to control his impatience, will order his troops to swarm up the wall like ants, with the result that one-third of them will be killed without taking the city. Such is the calamity of attacking cities. Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture the enemy's cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations. Their aim is to take all under heaven intact by strategic considerations. Thus, their troops are not worn out and their gains will be complete. This is the art of offensive strategy. Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to the enemy's one, surround him. When five times his strength, attack him. If double his strength, divide him. If equally matched, you may engage him with some good plan. If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing. And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for one more powerful if it fights recklessly. Now, the general is the assistant to the sovereign of the state. If this assistance is all-embracing, the state will surely be strong; if defective, the state will certainly be weak. Now, there are three ways in which a sovereign can bring misfortune upon his army: When ignorant that the army should not advance, to order anadvance; or when ignorant that it should not retire, to order a retirement. This is described as "hobbling the army." When ignorant of military affairs, to interfere in their administration. This causes the officers to be perplexed. When ignorant of command problems, to interfere with the direction of the fighting. This engenders doubts in the minds of the officers. If the army is confused and suspicious, neighboring rulers will take advantage of this and cause trouble. This is what is meant by: "A confused army leads to another's victory." Thus, there are five points in which victory may be predicted: He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious. He who understands how to fight in accordance with the strength of antagonistic forces will be victorious. 　 He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious. He who is well prepared and lies in wait for an enemy who is not well prepared will be victorious. He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious. It is in these five matters that the way to victory is known. Therefore, I say: Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.

　　Chapter 4 :

　　Dispositions The skillful warriors in ancient times first made themselves invincible and then awaited the enemy's moment of vulnerability. Invincibility depends on oneself, but the enemy' vulnerability on himself. It follows that those skilled in war can make themselves invincible but cannot cause an enemy to be certainly vulnerable. Therefore, it can be said that, one may know how to win, but cannot necessarily do so. Defend yourself when you cannot defeat the enemy, and attack the enemy when you can. One defends when his strangth is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant. Those who are skilled in defense hide themselves as under the nine-fold earth; those in attack flash forth as from above the ninefold heavens. Thus, they are capable both of protecting themselves and of gaining a complete victory. To foresee a victory which the ordinary man can foresee is not the acme of excellence. Neither is it if you triumph in battle and are universally acclaimed "expert," for to lift an autumn down requires no great strength, to distinguish between the sun and moon is no test of vision, to hear the thunderclap is no indication of acute hearing. In ancient times, those called skilled in war conquered an enemy easily conquered. And, therefore, the victories won by a master of war gain him neither reputation for wisdom nor merit for courage. For he wins his victories without erring. Without erring he establishes the certainty of his victory; he conquers an enemy already defeated. Therefore, the skillful commander takes up a position in which he cannot be defeated and misses no opportunity to overcome him enemy. Thus, a victorious army always seeks battle after his plans indicate that victory is possible under them, whereas an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning but without any planning. Those skilled in war cultivate their policies and strictly adhere to the laws and regulations. Thus, it is in their power to control success. Now, the elements of the art of war are first, the measurement of space; second, the estimation of quantities; third, calculations; fourth, comparisons; and fifth, chances of victory. Measurements of space are derived from the ground. Quantities, comparisons from figures, and victory from comparisons. Thus, a victorious army is as one yi balanced against a grain, and a defeated army is as a grain balanced against one yi. It is because of disposition that a victorious general is able to make his soldiers fight with the effect of pent-up waters which, suddenly released, plunge into a bottomless abyss.

　　Chapter 5 :

　　Posture of Army Generally, management of a large force is the same as management of a few men. It is a matter of organization. And to direct a large force is the same as to direct a few men. This is a matter of formations and signals. That the army is certain to sustain the enemy's attack without suffering defeat is due to operations of the extraordinary and the normal forces. Troops thrown against the enemy as a grindstone against eggs is an example of a solid acting upon a void. Generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage and use the extraordinary forces to win. Now, the resources of those skilled in the use of extraordinary forces are as infinite as the heavens and earth, as inexhaustible as the flow of the great rivers, for they end and recommence - cyclical, as are the movements of the sun and moon. They die away and are reborn - recurrent, as are the passing seasons. The musical notes are the passing seasons. The musical notes are only five in number, but their combinations are so infinite that one cannot visualize them all. The flavors are only five in number, but their blends are so various that one cannot taste them all. In battle, there are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all. For these two forces are mutually reproductive. It is like moving in an endless circle. Who can exhaust the possibility of their combination? When torrential water tosses boulders, it is because of its momentum; when the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing. Thus, the momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming, and his attack precisely timed. His potential is that of a fully drawn crossbow; his timing, that of the release of the trigger. In tumult and uproar, the battle seems chaotic, but there must be no disorder in one's own troops. The battlefield may seem in confusion and chaos, but one's array must be in good order. That will be proof against defeat. Apparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength. Order of disorder depends on organization and direction; courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength or weakness on tactical dispositions. Thus, one who is skilled at making the enemy move does so by creating a situation, according to which the enemy will act. He entices the enemy with something he is certain to want. He keeps the enemy on the move by holding out bait and then attacks him with picked troops. Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates. He selects suitable men and exploits the situation. He who utilizes the situation uses his men in fighting as one rolls logs or stones. Now, the nature of logs and stones is that on stable ground they are static; on a slope, they move. If square, they stop; if round, they roll. Thus, the energy of troops skillfully commanded in battle may be compared to the momentum of round boulders which roll down from a mountain thousands of feet in height.

　Chapter 6 :

　　Void and Actuality Generally, he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease, and he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary. And, therefore, those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him. One able to make the enemy come of his own accord does so by offering him some advantage. And one able to stop him from coming does so by preventing him. Thus, when the enemy is at ease, be able to tire him, when well fed, to starve him, when at rest to make him move. Appear at places which he is unable to rescue; move swiftly in a direction where you are least expected. That you may march a thousand li without tiring yourself is because you travel where there is no enemy. To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy does not or cannot protect. To be certain to hold what you defend is to defend a place the enemy dares not or is not able to attack. Therefore, against those skilled in attack, the enemy does not know where to defend, and against the experts in defense, the enemy does not know where to attack. How subtle and insubstantial, that the expert leaves no trace. How divinely mysterious, that he is inaudible. Thus, he is master of his enemy's fate. His offensive will be irresistible if he makes for his enemy's weak positions; he cannot be overtaken when he withdraws if he moves swiftly. When I wish o give battle, my enemy, even though protected by high walls and deep moats, cannot help but engage me, for I attack a position he must relieve. When I wish to avoid battle, I may defend myself simply be drawing a line on the ground; the enemy will be unable to attack me because I divert him from going where he wishes. If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while, at the same time, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate my forces and his must be divided. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. Therefore, I will be numerically superior. Then, if I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with will fall into hopeless straits. The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle, he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in will be few. For if he prepares to the front, his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be fragile. If he strengthens his left, his right will be vulnerable, and if his right, there will be few troops on his left. And when he sends troops everywhere, he will be weak everywhere. Numerical weakness comes from having to guard against possible attacks; numerical strength from forcing the enemy to make these preparations against us. If one knows where and when a battle will be fought, his troops can march a thousand li and meet on the field. But if one knows neither the battleground nor the day of battle, the left will be unable to aid the right and the right will be unable to aid the left, and the van will be unable to support the rear and the rear, the van. How much more is this so when separated by several tens of li or, indeed, be even a few! Although I estimate the troops of Yue as many, of what benefit is this superiority with respect to the outcome of war? Thus, I say that victory can be achieved. For even if the enemy is numerically stronger, I can prevent him from engaging. Therefore, analyze the enemy's plans so that you will know his shortcomings as strong points. Agitate him in order to ascertain the pattern of his movement. Lure him out to reveal his dispositions and ascertain his position. Launch a probing attack in order to learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient. The ultimate in disposing one's troops is to conceal them without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry nor can the wise lay plans against you. It is according to the situations that plans are laid for victory, but the multitude does not comprehend ts. Although everyone can see the outward aspects, none understands how the victory is achieved. Therefore, when a victory is won, one's tactics are not repeated. One should always respond to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways. Now, an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army should avoid strength and strike weakness. And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy. And as water has no constant form, there are in warfare no constant conditions. Thus, one able to win the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine. Of the five elements [water, fire, metal, wood, and earth], none is always predominant; of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are long and some short, and the moon waxes and wanes. That is also the law of employing troops.

　　Chapter 7 :

　　Manuevering Normally, in war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. During the process from assembling his troops and mobilizing the people to blending the army into a harmonious entity and encamping it, nothing is more difficult than the art of maneuvering for advantageous positions. What is difficult about it is to make the devious route the most direct routeand divert the enemy by enticing him with a bait. So doing, you may set out after he does and arrive at the battlefield before him. One able to do this shows the knowledge of the artifice of diversion. Therefore, both advantage and danger are inherent in maneuvering for an advantageous position. One who sets the entire army in moriton with impediments to pursue an advantageous position will not attain it. If he abandons the camp and all the impediments to contend for advantage, the stores will be lost. Thus, if one orders his men to make forced marches without armor, stopping neithe day nor night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, and doing a hundred li to wrest an advantage, it is probable that the commanders will be captured. The stronger men will arrive first and the feeble ones will struggle along behind; so, if this method is used, only one-tenth of the army will reach its destination. In a forced march of fifty li, the commander of the van will probably fall, but half the army will arrive. Ina forced march of thirty li, just two-thirds will arrive. It follows that an army which lacks heavy equipment, fodder, food, and stores will be lost. One who is not acquainted with the designs of his neighbors should not enter into aliances with them. Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army. Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain the advantages of the ground. Now, war is based on deception. Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces,. When campainging, be swift as the wind; in leisurely marching, majestic as the forest; in raiding and plundering, be fierce as fire; in standing, firm as the mountains. When hiding, be as unfathomable as things behind the clouds; when moving, fall like a thunderbolt. When you plunder the countryside, divide your forces. When you conquer territory, defend strategic points. Weigh the situation before you move. He who knows the artifice of diversion will be victorious. Such is the art of manuevering.

孙子兵法中英文对照 《孫子兵法》計篇第一

孫子曰：兵者，國之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也。

故經之以五，校之以計，而索其情：一曰道，二曰天，三曰地，四曰將，五曰法。道者，令民于上同意者也，可與之死，可與之生，民不詭也。天者，陰陽、寒暑、時制也。地者，高下、遠近、險易、廣狹、死生也。將者，智、信、仁、勇、嚴也。法者，曲制、官道、主用也。凡此五者，將莫不聞，知之者勝，不知之者不勝。故校之以計，而索其情。曰：主孰有道？將孰有能？天地孰得？法令孰行？兵眾孰強？士卒孰練？賞罰孰明？吾以此知勝負矣。

將聽吾計，用之必勝，留之﹔將不聽吾計，用之必敗，去之。

計利以聽，乃為之勢，以佐其外。勢者，因利而制權也。

兵者，詭道也。故能而示之不能，用而示之不用，近而示之遠，遠而示之近。利而誘之，亂而取之，實而備之，強而避之，怒而撓之，卑而驕之，佚而勞之，親而離之，攻其不備，出其不意。此兵家之勝，不可先傳也。

夫未戰而廟算勝者，得算多也﹔未戰而廟算不勝者，得算少也。多算勝，少算不勝，而況無算乎！吾以此觀之，勝負見矣。

I. LAYING PLANS

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.

2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.

3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.

4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.

9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.

10. By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions,    the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.

11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.

12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:

13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? (5) Which army is stronger? (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? (7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?

14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.

15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it will suffer defeat: let such a one be dismissed!

16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.

17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans.

18. All warfare is based on deception.

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.

26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.
The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.


02《孫子兵法》作戰篇第二　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

孫子曰：凡用兵之法，馳車千駟，革車千乘，帶甲十萬，千里饋糧，則內外之費，賓客之用，膠漆之材，車甲之奉，日費千金，然後十萬之師舉矣。其用戰也貴勝，久則鈍兵挫銳，攻城則力屈，久暴師則國用不足。夫鈍兵挫銳，屈力殫貨，則諸侯乘其弊而起，雖有智者，不能善其後矣。故兵聞拙速，未睹巧之久也。夫兵久而國利者，未之有也。故不盡知用兵之害者，則不能盡知用兵之利也。

善用兵者，役不再籍，糧不三載﹔取用于國，因糧于敵，故軍食可足也。

國之貧于師者遠輸，遠輸則百姓貧。近師者貴賣，貴賣則百姓竭，財竭則急於丘役。力屈、財殫，中原內虛于家。百姓之費，十去其七﹔公家之費：破軍罷馬，甲冑矢弩，戟盾蔽櫓，丘牛大車，十去其六。

故智將務食于敵。食敵一鐘，當吾二十鐘﹔箕杆一石，當吾二十石。

故殺敵者，怒也﹔取敵之利者，貨也。故車戰，得車十乘已上，賞其先得者，而更其旌旗，車雜而乘之，卒善而養之，是謂勝敵而益強。

故兵貴勝，不貴久。

故知兵之將，民之司命，國家安危之主也。

II. WAGING WAR
1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away.

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength.

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.
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03《孫子兵法》謀攻篇第三　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

孫子曰：凡用兵之法，全國為上，破國次之﹔全軍為上，破軍次之﹔全旅為上，破旅次之﹔全卒為上，破卒次之﹔全伍為上，破伍次之。是故百戰百勝，非善之善也﹔不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也。

故上兵伐謀，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城。攻城之法為不得已。修櫓轒轀、具器械、三月而後成，距闉，又三月而後已。將不勝其忿，而蟻附之，殺士三分之一，而城不拔者，此攻之災也。故善用兵者，屈人之兵而非戰也。拔人之城而非攻也，破人之國而非久也，必以全爭于天下，故兵不頓，而利可全，此謀攻之法也。

故用兵之法，十則圍之，五則攻之，倍則分之，敵則能戰之，少則能逃之，不若則能避之。故小敵之堅，大敵之擒也。

夫將者，國之輔也。輔周則國必強，輔隙則國必弱。

故君之所以患于軍者三：不知軍之不可以進而謂之進，不知軍之不可以退而謂之退，是為縻軍﹔不知三軍之事，而同三軍之政者，則軍士惑矣﹔不知三軍之權，而同三軍之任，則軍士疑矣。三軍既惑且疑，則諸侯之難至矣，是謂亂軍引勝。

故知勝有五：知可以戰與不可以戰者勝，識眾寡之用者勝，上下同欲者勝，以虞待不虞者勝，將能而君不御者勝。此五者，知勝之道也。

故曰：知己知彼，百戰不貽﹔不知彼而知己，一勝一負﹔不知彼不知己，每戰必貽。

III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM

1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.

2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.

5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.

11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:

13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.

15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.

17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks. (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. (5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.

18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
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04《孫子兵法》形篇第四　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

孫子曰：昔之善戰者，先為不可勝，以侍敵之可勝。不可勝在己，可勝在敵。故善戰者，能為不可勝，不能使敵之必可勝。故曰：勝可知，而不可為。不可勝者，守也﹔可勝者，攻也。守則不足，攻則有餘。善守者，藏于九地之下﹔善攻者，動于九天之上。故能自保而全勝也。

見勝不過眾人之所知，非善之善者也﹔戰勝而天下曰善，非善之善者也。故舉秋毫不為多力，見日月不為明目，聞雷霆不為聰耳。古之所謂善戰者，勝于易勝者也。故善戰之勝也，無智名，無勇功。故其戰勝不忒。不忒者，其所措必勝，勝已敗者也。故善戰者，立于不敗之地，而不失敵之敗也。是故勝兵先勝而後求戰，敗兵先戰而後求勝。善用兵者，修道而保法，故能為勝敗之政。

兵法：一曰度，二曰量，三曰數，四曰稱，五曰勝。地生度，度生量，量生數，數生稱，稱生勝。

故勝兵若以鎰稱銖，敗兵若以銖稱鎰。

勝者之戰民也，若決積水于千仞之谿者，形也。

IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS

1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.

5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.

7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.

13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.

17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

孙子兵法中英文对照  《孫子兵法》勢篇第五　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

孫子曰：凡治眾如治寡，分數是也﹔鬥眾如鬥寡，形名是也﹔三軍之眾，可使必受敵而無敗，奇正是也﹔兵之所加，如以碫投卵者，虛實是也。

凡戰者，以正合，以奇勝。故善出奇者，無窮如天地，不竭如江河。終而復始，日月是也。死而復生，四時是也。聲不過五，五聲之變，不可勝聽也。色不過五，五色之變，不可勝觀也。味不過五，五味之變，不可勝嘗也。戰勢不過奇正，奇正之變，不可勝窮之也。奇正相生，如環之無端，孰能窮之？

激水之疾，至于漂石者，勢也﹔鷙鳥之疾，至于毀折者，節也。是故善戰者，其勢險，其節短。勢如張弩，節如發機。

紛紛紜紜，鬥亂而不可亂也。渾渾沌沌，形圓而不可敗也。

亂生于治，怯生于勇，弱生于強。治亂，數也﹔勇怯，勢也﹔強弱，形也。

故善動敵者，形之，敵必從之﹔予之，敵必取之。以利動之，以卒動之。

故善戰者，求之于勢，不責于人，故能擇人而任勢。任勢者，其戰人也，如轉木石。木石之性，安則靜，危則動，方則止，圓則行。故善戰人之勢，如轉圓石于千仞之山者，勢也。

V. ENERGY

1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.

3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken this is affected by maneuvers direct and indirect.

4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg. This is effected by the science of weak points and strong.

5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.

6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.

8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.

9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.

10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack, the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.

11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle. You never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.

13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger.

16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.

17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.

18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.

19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something that the enemy may snatch at it.

20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.

22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down.

23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.
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06《孫子兵法》虛實篇第六　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

孫子曰：凡先處戰地而待敵者佚，後處戰地而趨戰者勞。故善戰者，致人而不致于人。

能使敵自至者，利之也﹔能使敵不得至者，害之也。故敵佚能勞之，飽能飢之，安能動之。

出其所不趨，趨其所不意。行千里而不勞者，行于無人之地也。攻而必取者，攻其所不守也。守而必固者，守其所不攻也。

故善攻者，敵不知其所守。善守者，敵不知其所攻。

微乎微乎，至于無形，神乎神乎，至于無聲，故能為敵之司命。

進而不可御者，沖其虛也﹔退而不可追者，速而不可及也。故我欲戰，敵雖高壘深溝，不得不與我戰者，攻其所必救也﹔我不欲戰，雖畫地而守之，敵不得與我戰者，乖其所之也。

故形人而我無形，則我專而敵分﹔我專為一，敵分為十，是以十攻其一也，則我眾而敵寡﹔能以眾擊寡者，則吾之所與戰者，約矣。吾所與戰之地不可知，不可知，則敵所備者多，敵所備者多，則吾之所戰者，寡矣。

故備前則後寡，備後則前寡，故備左則右寡，備右則左寡，無所不備，則無所不寡。寡者備人者也，眾者使人備己者也。

故知戰之地，知戰之日，則可千里而會戰。不知戰之地，不知戰之日，則左不能救右，右不能救左，前不能救後，後不能救前，而況遠者數十里，近者數里乎？

以吾度之，越人之兵雖多，亦奚益于勝敗哉？！

故曰：勝可為也。敵雖眾，可使無鬥。

故策之而知得失之計，作之而知動靜之理，形之而知死生之地，角之而知有餘不足之處。

故形兵之極，至于無形﹔無形，則深間不能窺，智者不能謀。

因形而錯勝于眾，眾不能知﹔人皆知我所以勝之形，而莫知吾所以制勝之形。故其戰勝不復，而應形于無窮。

夫兵形象水，水之形避高而趨下，兵之形，避實而擊虛，水因地而制流，兵應敵而制勝。故兵無常勢，水無常形，能因敵變化而取勝者，謂之神。

故五行無常勝，四時無常位，日有短長，月有死生。


VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG

1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted.

2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.

3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.

4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.

6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.

7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended. You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked.

8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.

9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.

10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.

11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.

13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided.

14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.

15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.

18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.

19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest are separated by several LI!

21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.

22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.

23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.

24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.

25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.

27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.

28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.

29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.

31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.

32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.

33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.
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07《孫子兵法》軍爭篇第七　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

孫子曰：凡用兵之法，將受命于君，合軍聚眾，交和而舍，莫難于軍爭。軍爭之難者，以迂為直，以患為利。故迂其途，而誘之以利，後人發，先人至，此知迂直之計者也。

故軍爭為利，軍爭為危。舉軍而爭利，則不及﹔委軍而爭利，則輜重捐。是故卷甲而趨，日夜不處，倍道兼行，百里而爭利，則擒三將軍，勁者先，疲者後，其法十一而至﹔五十里而爭利，則蹶上將軍，其法半至﹔三十里而爭利，則三分之二至。是故軍無輜重則亡，無糧食則亡，無委積則亡。

故不知諸侯之謀者，不能豫交﹔不知山林、險阻、沮澤之形者，不能行軍﹔不用鄉導者，不能得地利。

故兵以詐立，以利動，以分和為變者也。

故其疾如風，其徐如林，侵掠如火，不動如山，難知如陰，動如雷震。

掠鄉分眾，廓地分守，懸權而動。

先知迂直之計者勝，此軍爭之法也。

軍政曰：「言不相聞，故為金鼓；視而不見，故為旌旗。」夫金鼓旌旗者，所以一人之耳目也；人既專一， 則勇者不得獨進，怯者不得獨退，此用眾之法也。故夜戰多火鼓，晝戰多旌旗，所以變人之耳目也。

故三軍可奪氣，將軍可奪心。是故朝氣銳，晝氣惰，暮氣歸。故善用兵者，避其銳氣，擊其惰歸，此治氣者也。以治待亂，以靜待嘩，此治心者也。以近待遠，以佚待勞，以飽待飢，此治力者也。無邀正正之旗，無擊堂堂之陣，此治變者也。

故用兵之法，高陵勿向，背丘勿逆，佯北勿從，銳卒勿攻，餌兵勿食，歸師勿遏，圍師遺闕，窮寇勿迫，此用兵之法也。

VII. MANEUVERING

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.

2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.

3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.

5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an vantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.

8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.

10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.

11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.

12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.

13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.

15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.

16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, it must be decided by circumstances.

17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest.

18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immovability like a mountain.

19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.

21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.

22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.

23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.

24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.

25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.

26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.

29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy: this is the art of retaining self-possession.

31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.

32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array: this is the art of studying circumstances.

33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.

34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

37. Such is the art of warfare.




08《孫子兵法》九變篇第八　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

孫子曰：凡用兵之法，將受命于君，合軍聚眾，圮地無舍，衢地交和，絕地勿留，圍地則謀，死地則戰。

途有所不由，軍有所不擊，城有所不攻，地有所不爭，君命有所不受。

故將通于九變之利者，知用兵矣﹔將不通于九變之利，雖知地形，不能得地之利矣﹔治兵不知九變之朮，雖知地利，不能得人之用矣。

是故智者之慮，必雜于利害。雜于利，而務可信也﹔雜于害，而患可解也。

是故屈諸侯者以害，役諸侯者以業，趨諸侯者以利。

故用兵之法，無恃其不來，恃吾有以待也﹔無恃其不攻，恃吾有所不可攻也。

故將有五危：必死，可殺也﹔必生，可虜也﹔忿速，可侮也﹔廉潔，可辱也﹔愛民，可煩也。凡此五者，將之過也，用兵之災也。覆軍殺將，必以五危，不可不察也。

VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces

2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.

3. There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not be contested, and commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.

4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.

5. The general who does not understand these may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.

6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.

7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.

8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.

9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.

10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.

11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:
    (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
    (2) Cowardice, which leads to capture;
    (3) A hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
    (4) A delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
    (5) Over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.

13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.

14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.