公司金融经典文献必读目录（契约理论部分）

编者：周业安

中国人民大学经济学院 2005年3月7日

一、 基本文献——MM定理：

1、Modigliani, Franco and Merton H. Miller (1958), “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment,” American Economic Review 48: 261-297. 中译本参见卢俊（2003）《资本结构理论研究译文集》，上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，ISBN 7-208-04705-7。第1－51页。

2、Miller, Merton H. (1977), “Debt and Taxes,” Journal of Finance 32: 261-275.中译本参见卢俊（2003）第266－290页。

3、Miller, Merton H. (1988), “The M-M Propositions After 30 Years,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2: 99-120. （见电子版）

二、 基本文献——代理理论：

1、Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360. 中译本参见卢俊（2003）第184－265页。

2、Jensen, Michael C. (1986), “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,” American Economic Review 76: 323-329. （见电子版）

三、 基本文献——信息不对称模型：

1、Ross, Stephen A., 1977, “The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach”, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.8(1), pp:23-40.参见电子版。

2、Myers, Stewart C. (1984), “The Capital Structure Puzzle,” Journal of Finance 39: 575-592. 中译本参见卢俊（2003）第316－345页。

3、Myers, Stewart C. and N. Majluf (1984), “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial Economics 13: 187-222. 参见Michael J. Brennan, 1996, The Theory of Corporate Finance, Vol.1， An Elgar Reference Collection. 第207－241页。

四、 基本文献——完全合同模型：

1、Townsend, R. M. 1979. “Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification”. Journal of Economic Theory 21: 265-93. 参见电子版。

2、Gale, D. and M. Hellwig 1985. “Incentive compatible debt contracts: the one-period problem”. Review of Economic Studies 52:647-63. 参见电子版。

五、 经验实证：

1、Fama, E., and K. French 2002. Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about dividends and debt, Review of Financial Studies 15, 1-33. 参见电子版。

2、Graham, J., Harvey, C. 2001. The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-243. 参见电子版。

3、Murray Z. Frank and Vidhan K. Goyal，2004. Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors are Reliably Important? Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Working paper. 参见电子版。

2、Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart, 1986, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”, Journal of Political Economy, 94:691-719. 也可以在Foss编的论文集中找到。Nicolai J. Foss(ed.), 2000, The Theory of the Firm, Vol. III, London and New York: Routledge.第63－89页。

3、Aghion, P. and P. Bolton. “ An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting”. Review of Economic Studies ,1992(59):473-94.