Auction Theory by Vijay Krishna Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 Part I. Single Object Auctions 10 2. Private Value Auctions: A First Look 13 2.1 The Symmetric Model 2.2 Second-Price Auctions 2.3 First-Price Auctions 2.4 Revenue Comparison 2.5 Reserve Prices 3. The Revenue Equivalence Principle 29 3.1 Main Result 3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle 4. Qualifications and Extensions 37 4.1 Risk-Averse Bidders 4.2 Budget Constraints 4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders 4.4 Resale and Efficiency 5. Mechanism Design 61 5.1 Mechanisms 5.2 Optimal Mechanisms 5.3 Efficient Mechanisms 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values 83 6.1 The Symmetric Model 6.2 Second-Price Auctions 6.3 English Auctions 6.4 First-Price Auctions 6.5 Revenue Comparisons 6.6 Efficiency 7. The Revenue Ranking (“Linkage”) Principle 103 7.1 The Main Result 7.2 Public Information 7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications 111 8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle 8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions 8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders 8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees 9. Efficiency and the English Auction 125 9.1 The Single Crossing Condition 9.2 Two-Bidder Auctions 9.3 The Average Crossing Condition 9.4 Three or More Bidders 9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2 9.6 Miscellany 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values 141 10.1 Efficient Mechanisms 10.2 Optimal Mechanisms 11. Bidding Rings 151 11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions 11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions Part II. Multiple Object Auctions 163 12. An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions 165 12.1 Sealed-Bid Auctions for Selling Multiple Units 12.2 Some Open Auctions 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values 179 13.1 The Basic Model 13.2 Vickrey Auctions 13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions 13.4 Uniform Price Auctions 13.5 Discriminatory Auctions 14. Some Revenue Considerations 199 14.1 Revenue Equivalence in Multiunit Auctions 14.2 Revenue Equivalence with Multiunit Demand: An Example 15. Sequential Sales 209 15.1 Sequential First-Price Auctions 15.2 Sequential Second-Price Auctions 16. Nonidentical Objects 223 16.1 The Model 16.2 Efficient Allocations 16.3 Substitutes and Complements 16.4 Bundling 16.5 Some Computational Issues 16.6 Budget Constraints 17. Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values 235 17.1 One Dimensional Signals 17.2 Multidimensional Signals Part III. Appendices 251 A. Continuous Distributions 253 B. Stochastic Orders 259 C. Order Statistics 265 D. Affiliated Random Variables 269 E. Some Linear Algebra 273 F. Games of Incomplete Information 279 G. Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions 283 References 289 Index 299

http://econ.la.psu.edu/~vkrishna/book.htm

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Two-Sided Matching : A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

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Econ 2056 and Business 2150: Market Design

Professors Estelle Cantillon and Alvin E. Roth, Spring 2004

Fridays, 9am-noon in Littauer M-16

http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/~ec2056/Syllabus/MarketdesignRL2004.htm

Alvin E. Roth的学生:Michael Ostrovsky is one of Harvard's star theory graduates this year, and he has a great paper on matching

Table of Contents and Sample Chapters

Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts. The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book. Patrick Bolton is John H. Scully Professor of Finance at Princeton University and managing editor of The Journal of the European Economic Association. Mathias Dewatripont is Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, a Research Fellow at its European Centre for Adanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) and Research Director of the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=10275

Patrick Bolton 个人主页:http://www.princeton.edu/~pbolton/

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Although it is one of the major achievements in the history of economic thought, the general equilibrium model is not completely satisfactory as a descriptive tool. In the 1970s several economists settled on a new way to study economic relationships that is often called the "economics of information." The theory of contracts is one of its main building blocks.

The theory of contracts uses partial equilibrium models that take into account the full complexity of strategic interactions between privately informed agents in well-defined institutional settings. The models sum up the constraints imposed by the prevailing institutional setting through a contract, either explicit or implicit. They make intensive use of noncooperative game theory with asymmetric information.

The Economics of Contracts introduces graduate students and nonspecialist professional economists to the theory of contracts. It grew out of a course Professor Salanié gave to third-year Stanford graduate students and third-year students at the Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l''Administration Economique. The book focuses on the methods used to analyze the models, but also discusses a few of the many applications the theory has generated in various fields of economics. The author''s goal is to give readers the basic tools to create their own applications.

Bernard Salanié is Research Fellow of LEI (CREST) in Paris, Professor at École Polytechnique, and Managing Editor of the Review of Economic Studies. His books include The Microeconomics of Market Failures (2000) and The Economics of Taxation (2003), both published by The MIT Press.

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=6958