是讲义，76页，不是课件

Lectures on the theory of contracts in corporate finance：FROM DISCRETE-TIME TO CONTINUOUS-TIME MODELS

by Jaeyoung Sung, University of Illinois at Chicago

Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of various areas of finance, and describes how agency problems can arise in corporate management. Then we examine moral hazard and adverse selection problems using discrete-time and continuous-time models in chapters 2 to 4. In particular, the moral hazard problems are investigated with a discrete-time formulation in chapter 2 and with a continuous-time formulation in chapter 3. Chapter 4 introduces interactions between moral hazard
and adverse selection problems.

Lectures on the theory of contracts in corporate finance：FROM DISCRETE-TIME TO CONTINUOUS-TIME MODELS

by Jaeyoung Sung, University of Illinois at Chicago

Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of various areas of finance, and describes how agency problems can arise in corporate management. Then we examine moral hazard and adverse selection problems using discrete-time and continuous-time models in chapters 2 to 4. In particular, the moral hazard problems are investigated with a discrete-time formulation in chapter 2 and with a continuous-time formulation in chapter 3. Chapter 4 introduces interactions between moral hazard
and adverse selection problems.

[此贴子已经被作者于2009-1-17 13:15:53编辑过]