“大联盟”是联盟状态的最简单的一种状态

Maskin, E., Bargaining, Coalition and Externalities. 2003: Princeton University Pres.中对“大联盟总是可以形成的”观点的抨击：

“Perhaps one reason that cooperative theory has not been more influential on the
mainstream is that its two most important solution concepts for games of three or more
players, the core and the Shapley value, presume that the grand coalition—the coalition of
all players—always forms.  And thus the possibility of interaction between coalitions—
often important in reality— is ruled out from the beginning.
  Indeed, insisting that the grand coalition should always form is highly restrictive,
not only realistically but theoretically.  As I will argue below, there are many games in
which it is implausible to expect that the grand coalition will form.  Specifically, these are
situations in which coalitions generate significant positive externalities.  Roughly speaking,
if a player need not join a coalition to derive benefits from its activity, he may have the
incentive to remain apart, i.e., to free-ride. ”