请查收了。

楼主，没有找到这篇论文，建议给作者写信求助吧：Hsiang-Tsai Chiang，Feng Chia University，htchiang@fcu.edu.tw

以下信息来源于：
http://www.jaabc.com/jaabcv6n1preview.html

An Empirical Study of Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance
Hsiang-tsai Chiang, Feng Chia University, Taiwan

ABSTRACT
Recent accounting scandals have renewed attention to corporate transparency. According to signaling theory, under information asymmetry, corporations with superior information transparency signal better corporate governance. Prior research also indicates that corporations that have better corporate governance signal better performance. This study provides an empirical analysis of the relationship between information transparency and corporate governance in Taiwan’s high-tech industry. This research adopts Standard & Poor’s (S&P) information transparency measurement criteria to gauge information transparency of selected companies. Companies’ annual reports are used in S&P research. However, from the investor’s point of view, transparency information can be obtained not only from the annual report but also from other public sources, such as the company’s web site and the Taiwanese Security Exchange Committee and Taiwan Economic Journal databases. Therefore, this study supplements S&P criteria with information gathered from all public materials in order to obtain more comprehensive transparency information.  The results indicate that board size, board ownership, institution ownership, financial transparency, information disclosure, and board and management structure and process have significant relationships with operating performance. The results of this study also support that information transparency is one of the most important indicators for evaluating corporate performance. Recent accounting scandals have renewed attention to corporate transparency. According to signaling theory, under information asymmetry, corporations with superior information transparency signal better corporate governance. Prior research also indicates that corporations that have better corporate governance signal better performance. This study provides an empirical analysis of the relationship between information transparency and corporate governance in Taiwan’s high-tech industry. The theory base of this study is signaling theory. Spence (1973) states that if information asymmetry exists between a company’s managers and investors, the company can provide information to the investor in order to eliminate the asymmetry. In other words, if information asymmetry exists, there is no way for the investor to understand the real situation of the company’s operations. Prior research indicates that investors rely on the information sent out from the company to make investment decisions (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977; Bhattacharya, 1979; Ambarish, John and Williams, 1987; Poitevin, 1990; Ravid and Saring, 1991). In practice, companies with good operating performance often disclose information to the public to promote positive impressions of their company. Yeh, Lee, and Ko (2002) state that major contributions of corporate governance to the company include enhancing operating performance and preventing fraud. According to the research of Black, Jang, and Kan (2002), companies with better corporate governance have better operating performance than companies with poor corporate governance. A sound corporate governance structure not only provides useful information to investors and creditors to reduce information asymmetry but also helps the company to improve operations.  According to related literature, major corporate governance indicators include the structure of the board of directors, the structure of ownership, and information transparency. These indicators are discussed in detail below. The board of directors is the top executive unit of a company and is charged with the responsibility of supervising operations of the company’s management. Indicators to evaluate the governance function of this structure are as follows:Inside directors generally have a greater understanding of the company’s operations; therefore, they can enhance the efficiency of the board of directors and the precision of their decisions (Yermack, 1996; Lang, 1999). However, independent directors are more professional in business operations and can more easily achieve the supervising function, reduce the possibility of collusion of top executives, and prevent the abuse of company resources, thus improving operating performance. The optimal number of directors is a dilemma for companies. Efficiency is reduced if the number of directors is too large because there is an increased difficulty in achieving agreement concerning decisions. On the other hand, decision-making precision is reduced if the number of directors is too small because there may not be adequate discussion of issues involved.

楼主，不好意思，刚才发的信息不对啊，现在更正一下啊：
在期刊网页确实找不到：http://www.jaabc.com/jaabcv6n1preview.html
但是在道客巴巴发现一个题目跟这个一样的，没有下载下来：http://www.doc88.com/p-043804030512.html

非常感谢

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