An Introduction to Auction Theory

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An Introduction to Auction Theory
By Flavio M. Menezes, Paulo K. Monteiro

Paperback: 200 pages
Publisher: OUP Oxford (12 Jun 2008)
Language English
ISBN-10: 0199275998
ISBN-13: 978-0199275991

Product Description:

The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. Indeed, economists have been recognized for their contribution to the design of several auction-like mechanisms, such as the U. S. Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, the 3G auctions in Europe and beyond, and the auction markets for electricity markets around the world.
Moreover, auction theory is now seen as an important component of an economist's training. For example, some of the more celebrated results from the single-object auction theory are now usually taught in advanced undergraduate and first-year graduate courses on the economics of information. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics.
This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. The aim is to provide an introductory textbook that will allow students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results. Coverage includes: the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions. The paperback edition of the text includes a new chapter which acts as a guide to current developments in auction theory.

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congbaobao

2009-3-2 02:46:00

Graduate microeconomics textbooks (such as Mas-Colell et al. 1995) typically
approach auctions as applications of mechanism design techniques. Game
theory textbooks (such as Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) examine auctions as an
application of Bayesian games. Thus, their focus is on techniques rather than
on results. On the other hand, there are several excellent surveys focusing on
the results of auction theory rather than on techniques. In contrast we will
focus both on results and techniques. The main idea is that although reading
some of the original papers can be quite a daunting task for an advanced undergraduate
student or for a first-year graduate student, it is possible to present
this material in a more friendly way. Paul Klemperer (1999), when referring
to some of the earlier literature on auctions, argues that with the exception of
Vickrey’s first 1961 paper, the other papers “are no longer for the beginner.”
Our aim is to make this material available to the “beginner.”

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