Acknowledgments vii
Preface xi
Table of Cases xix
Table of Legislation xxiii
1 INTRODUCTION 1
CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 1
Defining ‘bank’ and ‘banking business’ 2
Deposit-taking 7
Conclusion 9
2 CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING
SUPERVISION AND SYSTEMIC BANK RESTRUCTURING 11
INTRODUCTION 11
The Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 12
IMF STANDARDS FOR SOUND BANKING 18
What the IMF can do 20
IMF’S IDENTIFICATION OF SOME SOURCES OF BANKING
SYSTEM PROBLEMS 21
Sources of banking system problems 21
Legal aspects of systemic bank restructuring 23
Some lessons of experience in systemic bank restructuring 26
Beyond banking supervision and systemic restructuring 29
Conclusion 32
3 CONTEMPORARY ISSUES FACING A MODERN LEGAL
FRAMEWORK 33
INTRODUCTION 33
The legal framework for banking supervision in Zambia 34
The Banking and Financial Services Act 1994 38
Chapter 6 of the Banking and Financial Services Act 1994 48
Conclusion 57
4 BANK SHAREHOLDERS AND THEIR OBLIGATION TO
PAY UP FOR SHARES 59
INTRODUCTION 59
Obligations of bank shareholders to pay up the called-up
share capital 61
Conclusion 65
xv
Banking Supervision and Systemic Bank Restructuring
xvi
5 REGULATING NON-TRADITIONAL BANKING
INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS COLLECTIVE
INVESTMENT SCHEMES 67
INTRODUCTION 67
Collective investment schemes as a mechanism through which
banks engage in non-traditional banking activities 69
Authorisation of collective investment schemes 70
Further distinctions between unit trusts and other types of
collective investment schemes 72
Restrictive regulations on banking systems in emerging markets
as a constraint 73
Drawing distinctions between investment companies and openended
investment companies in Zambia 74
Constraints relating to protection of investors’ assets under a
collective investment scheme 75
Conclusion 76
6 BANKS AND THE USE OF CHINESE WALLS IN
MANAGING CONFLICT OF DUTIES 79
Salient features of a Chinese wall 82
Management of fiduciary duties relating to non-public and
material information as the raison d’être behind Chinese walls 84
Some fiduciary duties which Chinese walls attempt to manage 86
Conclusion 91
7 BANKING SUPERVISION AND INSIDER DEALING 93
INTRODUCTION 93
Insider dealing 94
Theoretical arguments against insider dealing 97
Conclusion 100
8 LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 101
A model for integrated financial supervision 103
Central bank independence in the UK: the salient features of
the financial economics underpinning the legal framework 104
The UK Financial Services Authority as a model of central
bank independence 107
Regulatory constraints and related developments 116
The limitations to heavy reliance on ‘capital adequacy
requirements’ 119
The limitations to heavy reliance on ‘deposit insurance’ 123
Contents
Lack of transparency as a regulatory constraint 125
Conclusion 125
BIBLIOGRAPHY 127
BOOKS 127
ARTICLES 130
SOURCES EXTRACTED FROM INTERNET WEBSITES 132
OTHER SOURCES, INCLUDING UNPUBLISHED
SEMINAR PAPERS 133
Index 137