<p></p><p> <br/></p><p><font size="4"><font color="#0909f7">Behavioral Economics and Its Applications<br/>By Peter Diamond, Hannu Vartiainen</font><br/></font><br/>Publisher: Princeton University Press <br/>Number Of Pages: 336 <br/>Publication Date: 2007-03-26 <br/>ISBN-10 / ASIN: 0691122849 <br/>ISBN-13 / EAN: 9780691122847 <br/>Binding: Hardcover <br/><a target="_blank" href="http://www.*****.org/bbs/attachment.php?aid=47435"><img border="0" src="http://www.*****.org/bbs/attachments/day_080709/20080709_0b017ec7b7d612b241b4lI5VPWArL7hi.jpg" alt=""/></a></p><p><font color="#0000ff" size="5">Contents</font><br/>Foreword ix<br/>List of Contributors xi<br/>Chapter One<br/>Introduction 1<br/>Peter Diamond and Hannu Vartiainen<br/>Chapter Two<br/>Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with Nonstandard<br/>Decision-Makers 7<br/>B. Douglas Bernheim and Antonio Rangel<br/>2.1 Introduction 7<br/>2.2 Conceptualizing and MeasuringWelfare 10<br/>2.3 Saving 20<br/>2.4 Addiction 40<br/>2.5 Public Goods 57<br/>2.6 The Road Ahead 66<br/>Comment by Nicholas Stern 78<br/>Comment by Emmanuel Saez 81<br/>Chapter Three<br/>Psychology and Development Economics 85<br/>Sendhil Mullainathan<br/>3.1 Introduction 85<br/>3.2 Immediate Barriers to Education 86<br/>3.3 Demand for Commitment, Default Settings, and Savings 90<br/>3.4 Defaults and Financial Institutions 95<br/>3.5 Status Quo Bias and Diffusion of Innovations 97<br/>3.6 Self-Serving Bias and Evaluation 102<br/>v<br/>CONTENTS<br/>3.7 Interesting Further Directions 104<br/>3.8 Concluding Observations 110<br/>Comment by Anne Case 113<br/>Chapter Four<br/>Behavioral Law and Economics 115<br/>Christine Jolls<br/>4.1 Introduction 115<br/>4.2 The Endowment Effect in Behavioral Economics and<br/>Behavioral Law and Economics 116<br/>4.3 The Modern Domain of Behavioral Law and Economics 121<br/>4.4 Illustrative Applications of Behavioral Law and Economics 126<br/>4.5 Debiasing through Law 137<br/>4.6 Conclusion 140<br/>Comment by Ian Ayres 145<br/>Comment by Christoph Engel 148<br/>Chapter Five<br/>Fairness, Reciprocity, andWage Rigidity 157<br/>Truman F. Bewley<br/>5.1 Introduction 157<br/>5.2 AreWages and Salaries Downwardly Rigid? 157<br/>5.3 Evidence from Surveys by Economists 160<br/>5.4 Evidence from Experimental Economics 170<br/>5.5 Evidence from Organizational Psychology and Managerial<br/>Science 176<br/>5.6 Conclusion 181<br/>Comment by Seppo Honkapohja 188<br/>Chapter Six<br/>Behavioral Economics and Health Economics 195<br/>Richard G. Frank<br/>6.1 Introduction and Background 195<br/>6.2 Models of Physician Behavior 197<br/>6.3 Health-Care Demand and Insurance 213<br/>6.4 Final Observations 217<br/>Comment by Jacob Glazer 223<br/>Comment by Botond Koszegi 230<br/>vi<br/>CONTENTS<br/>Chapter Seven<br/>Behavioral Economics of Organizations 235<br/>Colin F. Camerer and Ulrike Malmendier<br/>7.1 Introduction 235<br/>7.2 Complicating the Single-Agent Risk-Incentive Model 237<br/>7.3 Workers as Members of Multi-Agent Firms 248<br/>7.4 Top Managers and Corporate Finance 258<br/>7.5 Implications for Corporate Governance 267<br/>7.6 Organizational Reactions: Sorting, Repairs, and Exploitation 268<br/>7.7 Conclusion 272<br/>Comment by Michael D. Cohen 281<br/>Chapter Eight<br/>Wrap-Up Panel 291<br/>8.1 The Problematic Content and Context of Decisions:<br/>Comment by Eldar Shafir 291<br/>8.2 Comment by Jean Tirole 294<br/>8.3 Comment by Timothy D.Wilson 299<br/>8.4 Comment by Peter Diamond 301<br/>8.5 General Discussion 304<br/>Index 309</p><p></p>