英文文献：Game Theory Analysis Of Competition For Groundwater Involving El Paso, Texas And Ciudad Juarez, Mexico-涉及德克萨斯州埃尔帕索和墨西哥华雷斯城地下水竞争的博弈论分析
英文文献作者：Nakao, Megumi,Wichelns, Dennis,Montgomery, John T.
英文文献摘要：
We examine the potential gains from cooperation in the withdrawal of water from the Hueco Bolson aquifer that provides municipal water supply for El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. The aquifer lies beneath the international border, and both cities operate independently regarding pumping rates and withdrawals. We estimate the gains by comparing four scenarios in a dynamic setting: 1) a status quo scenario in which both cities continue extracting groundwater as they are at present, 2) a Nash non-cooperative game scenario, 3) a Nash bargaining scenario, and 4) a scenario that involves maximizing the sum of net benefits in both cities. All scenarios, including the non-cooperative game, provide a longer useful life of the Hueco Bolson aquifer than does the status quo. In the Nash bargaining scenario, both cities gain from cooperation and the sum of net benefits approaches the maximum that can be obtained by maximizing that value explicitly.

我们考察了合作抽取Hueco Bolson含水层水的潜在收益，该含水层为德克萨斯州埃尔帕索市和墨西哥华雷斯市提供市政供水。地下蓄水层位于国际边界之下，两个城市在抽水和取水方面是独立运作的。我们估计的收益通过比较四个场景中动态设置:1)一个场景,在该场景中,这两个城市继续提取地下水现状目前,2)纳什非合作游戏场景中,3)纳什讨价还价的场景,和4)场景,包括净收益最大化的在这两个城市。所有的场景，包括非合作的游戏，提供了比现状更长的Hueco Bolson含水层的使用寿命。在纳什讨价还价的情形下，两个城市都从合作中获得利益，并且净收益总和接近通过明确地最大化该价值所能获得的最大值。