昨天看的一篇文章，转自网易博客：http://scottsumner.blog.163.com/blog/static/117647242200942015741919/

天堂的烦恼

有 人曾经问我这样一个问题，对于像爱沙尼亚以及拉脱维亚这样的国家，确定名义GDP（NGDP）5%的目标规则是否是一个很好的政策。在回答这个问题之前， 我首先想谈谈为什么这样的小国家有如此重要的地位。我谈论的重点将主要放在爱沙尼亚上，为什么这个仅仅只有140万人口的欧洲小国会如此重要呢？因为它是 为唯一一个同时具备我所谈到的经济成功所需的三个特征的国家：

1.自由市场

2.低税率

3.开明的文化

    我可以十分坦承的说对于这个国家我并不十分了解，因此，我以下所谈的大家可以完全持有保留甚至怀疑的态度。在传统基金会(Heritage Foundation）的经济自由指数 (Index of Economic Freedom)排名中，爱沙尼亚的经济自由程度排在第13位，作为唯一一个在前苏联瓦解后冲进排名前25之列的国家，这已经是相当不错的成绩了。对于公 司和个人收入，爱沙尼亚执行21%的统一税率（flat tax rate），并计划将此税率在2012年前逐渐削减至18%。如果我没有记错的话，该国具有北欧文化（与芬兰类似）。

    当然这已经超过了我学术的范畴。我早前的研究表明，北欧文化是世界上最自由开明的文化。然而在爱沙尼亚人口中仅有69%的人真正是爱沙尼亚人，其余的都是 俄罗斯人，而俄罗斯文化相对来说并不十分开明。因此把这些因素综合起来考虑，他们实际的文化是否真正开明我们就不得而知了。因此经济自由指数的排名让我相 当好奇。

    我曾在丹麦对一篇论述开明文化能够最终走向自由经济的实证研究进行过讨论。例如，在丹麦，政府制定的税率较高，国内消费水平也很高，在传统基金会其他8个 分类中，它是世界上最自由的经济体。目前，爱沙尼亚紧随其后，似乎也在朝着丹麦的方向发展，但它的税率水平与新加坡和香港接近。爱沙尼亚的文化意味着，从 长期来看它比这些亚洲城市更具有管理优势，不仅仅是体现在政治管理，还有公司管理上。对于像我这样的右翼（保守）的开明人士（right wing liberal ）来说，相信都会喜欢上爱沙尼亚这样的国家。

    昨日我查了一下爱沙尼亚今年来的实际GDP数值-以每年15.6%的速率递减（拉脱维亚GDP跌幅为18%）。难道这意味着为了实现最佳社会经济模型它已 经退回到初级阶段（drawing boards ）？我认为这样说还为时尚早。像1982年的智利以及1998年的韩国都遭受了严重的经济下滑，但随后经济迅速复苏，直到现在都还是发展中国家的成功楷 模。尽管当前全球面临严重的经济危机，但我相信爱沙尼亚在将来几十年里一定会成为一个相当成功的经济体。

　　乔治亚大学的经济学家、电子货币专家乔治·塞尔金(George Selgin)曾大篇幅谈到的“好的通货紧缩”(good deflation)，即由技术进步所带来的通货紧缩。目前爱沙尼亚的经济就可以用“好的通货膨胀”这个词来形容，即由高经济增长以及固定汇率（对欧元） 地综合作用所带来的通货膨胀。Balassa-Samuelson效应就指出，当一个国家经济出现高增长时，国内贸易行业的价格有较大上涨空间。这其实降 低了贸易品的相对价格，推高了国家的实际汇率。如果名义汇率实行固定汇率，国家将会面临通货紧缩。而这就很简单的体现在理发价格上。根据美国的标准来看， 贫穷国家的工资是很低的，因此理发价格就会很便宜。当实际工资出现上涨之后，就连专业理发师收入的增幅都会出现下降。当这些人变得富裕之后，理发价格将会 上升到与美国标准相同的水平。名义货币升值，带来通货紧缩。在2005-2007年间，中国名义货币升值，而爱沙尼亚国内出现了通货紧缩（爱沙尼亚的汇率 盯住欧元，最终有望加入欧元）就是这个道理。

    有了上述背景知识后，爱沙尼亚应该成为5%名义GDP规则的适用对象吗？按照经济学家惯用的回答方式，我会说“不，或者可能。”

   “否”的理由：如果爱沙尼亚货币真正打算加入欧元，我认为他们有必要继续推行盯住欧元的固定汇率。那么爱沙尼亚货币是否会加入欧元呢？我认为他们满足 Mundellian框架下的最适通货区间（optimal currency zone）的标准。他们国家面积小，地域上靠近其他欧元区

成员国。因此我对爱沙尼亚的建议是，维持盯住汇率制，而不需要以NGDP为目标。对于欧元区的政策我并不十分了解，因此一次性贬值10%是合理的还是令人满意的，对此我也不知道。但由于爱沙尼亚拥有大量的欧元债务，汇率贬值可能弊大于利。

   “可能”的理由：我也很愿意从另外一个角度来分析这个问题。如果仅仅把爱沙尼亚看做是一个独立、开放的经济体，而不需要考虑它是否会加入欧元区，就如同新 西兰一样。如果国内产值下滑了15%，他们应该推行什么样的货币政策来应对经济危机呢？5%的NGDP目标会不会导致20%的通货紧缩呢？如果真是这样， 那不是很糟？看上去这两个问题都很难回答。

    我绝对相信，如果美国、欧洲以及日本的真实GDP增长率(RGDP）下降了15%的话，扩张性的货币政策是解决问题的最好办法。除非遇到像战败这样的极端 情况，因为很难想象，对于一个实力强大的经济体来说，经济的极端下滑并非由国内需求疲软而导致。我相信，货币政策能够且应该能阻止由产出下降对需求造成的 冲击。但小国家就另当别论了。因为世界总需求的变化以及行业冲击会对它们带来很大的影响，如果国际环境恶化，它们很难运用货币政策阻止RGDP的快速下 滑。

    我想，当前在房地产以及银行领域，爱沙尼亚当前正在遭受和其他欧洲国家（西班牙、爱尔兰、冰岛、拉脱维亚）同样的困境。近年来，爱沙尼亚经济高速增长，或 许这样的下滑并不会对它造成什么实质的影响。我所关心的一点就是，NGDP的下滑是如何造成的。当前爱沙尼亚出现了温和的通货膨胀，因此名义GDP和实际 GDP都快速下滑。那么当前的失业率高吗？很多外国建筑工人失业了吗？工人的名义工资下降了吗？

    在危机中制定NGDP目标的最大好处就在于，它会促进资源的最有效配置。看看厄尔·汤普森（Earl Thompson）的名义工资规则就知道这是什么原因了。假定在当前危机的冲击下，每个人的实际收入都下降了15%，此外假设工人的实际工资被提高了 5%。如果名义工资上涨5%，这意味着如果要保证实际工资跌幅是最优的，需要20%的通货膨胀率。这就是为什么RGDP为-15%，NGDP才能保证为 5%。（如果真是那样，RGDP的跌幅可能会小于15%）

    那么这会导致工资-价格螺旋吗？如果人们都是理性的，那不会。如果假定工资粘性是劳动力市场上唯一存在的问题，那么保证名义工资稳定的增长实际上是在确保 实际工资率接近价格无粘性的水平。此外，目前全球经济仍然深处严重的经济危机之中（RGDP为-15%），因此即便是工资合理，但由于资源的不合理配置， 也会带来失业率的急速攀升。尽管是通货膨胀，但失业率也会带来工资的加速增长。

    这岂不是对于那些购买政府债券的储蓄者很不公平？我认为并非如此。他们损失了15%（根据费雪效应(Fisher Effect)，另外5%的通胀是预期利率造成的），换句话来说，他们的股票就好比是在爱沙尼亚工人的工资。

    我再次重申，我不是想说明这是一个小经济体所必须采取的策略。如果它们选择联系汇率制度（如香港），或者最终选择加入欧元区（如爱沙尼亚和拉脱维亚），但 这不是解决问题的方式。如果像新西兰和智利的汇率目标制下的自由浮动汇率，那么可以采取这样的方式。我相信，所有的这些国家目前都在以通货膨胀为目标。但 我仍不认为NGDP的目标有什么不妥。你或许觉得RGDP为-15%这样的情况很少见，但一旦发生，当前的调整机制岂不是很糟糕？通常我们会推断，与确定 以通胀目标相比，NGDP目标将会带来更加长期的通货膨胀。但这是我们仅仅考虑当前危机而造成的幻觉。当前所产生的通货膨胀都会被未来经济繁荣时的通货膨 胀效应所抵消。

    我回答“不，或者可能”而不是“不或者是”取决于汇率制度。往往那些在大国家看来不足为奇的事情，在小国家却显得十分重要。价格的转移和行业的变化更加隐 蔽。对于美国，我赞成以NGD为目标，一部分原因在于它的情况与理论上合理的名义工资规则很相近。但对于那些不稳定的小经济体来说，这两个规则并不适用。 或许其他一些规则更为适用一些，如塞尔金的“生产力准则”（productivity norm）和厄尔·汤普森的名义工资规则。甚至那些斟酌使用的政策(Discretionary policy）。虽然我并不赞成斟酌体制，但或许拉姆斯菲尔德说的对，“你是在用已有的政策体制应对经济危机，而不是运用想象中的所希望的体制。”

    让我们回到最初的问题：为什么爱沙尼亚如此重要？因为它的成功可以告诉我们，北欧国家的社会成就能够通过它们的体制、低税率和自由市场来实现。能这样吗？ 我认为新加坡的实例肯定地回答了这一点。但很多西方的学者压根不会考虑新加坡，因为它只是一个半民主国家。尽管它的人口多于爱沙尼亚，但并不是一个真正的 民主国家。

    北欧文化对于那些研究世界经济的人来说是个有趣的素材。比如，荷兰和瑞典就因教育券计划（school voucher programs）取得了成功，当前爱沙尼亚正在尝试推行统一税率，这值得我们关注。 （pure）

英文原文：

Trouble in Paradise

I received a question from someone about whether my 5% NGDP rule would be a good policy for a country like Estonia or Latvia.  Before answering that question, I’d like to talk a bit about why these small countries matter.  I will focus on Estonia, the most interesting case.  Why is a tiny Eastern European country with 1.4 million people important?  Because it might be the only country in the world with the three characteristics that I have argued favor economic success:

1.  Free markets

2.  Low tax rates

3.  Liberal culture

I should say right up front that I know relatively little about Estonia, so please take the following with a grain of salt.  The Heritage Index of Economic Freedom lists Estonia as the 13th freest economy, which is pretty good, especially when you consider that it is the only former communist country to even break the top 25.  Estonia has a flat tax rate of 21% on corporate and personal income—scheduled to gradually decline to 18% by 2012.  And if I am not mistaken, it has a Nordic culture (similar to Finland.)

Here is where I am going a bit beyond my knowledge.  My previous research convinced me that the Nordic countries had the most liberal cultures in the world.  However, Estonia’s population is only 69% ethnic Estonian.  Most of the rest are Russians, which is not a particularly liberal culture.  So I don’t know how all that plays out in terms of their actual culture.  But the high Heritage ranking has me intrigued.

In my post on Denmark I discussed empirical research that showed liberal cultures led to market-oriented economic policies.  For instance, although Denmark has a high level of government taxes and spending, in the other 8 Heritage categories it is actually the freest economy in the world.  Now Estonia comes along and seems to be moving in Denmark’s direction, but with tax rates closer to Singapore and Hong Kong.  But Estonia’s culture suggests that in the long run it should have superior governance to those Asian city-states.  And not just better political governance, but also superior corporate governance.  For a right wing liberal like me, there isn’t much not to like about Estonia.

Yesterday I checked in on the latest real GDP figures from Estonia—down 15.6%, year over year.  (Latvia was down 18%.)  Ouch!  Is it back to the drawing boards for optimal socioeconomic models?  I think it is much too soon to say.  Countries like Chile (1982) and Korea (1998) went through severe downturns, but then recovered and are still considered among the more successful developing countries.  Despite the current depression, I expect Estonia to be a highly successful economy in future decades.

George Selgin talks a lot about “good deflation,” that is, deflation produced by technological progress.  Estonia has had what might be termed “good inflation,” which is inflation produced by a combination of rapid economic growth and a fixed exchange rate (to the euro.)  Balassa and Samuelson showed that when a country grows rapidly, the progress is usually most rapid in tradable goods.  This decreases the relative price of tradable goods and pushes up the country’s real exchange rate.  If the nominal rate is fixed, then they will have lots of inflation.  The easiest way to visualize this is the price of haircuts.  In a poor country wages are low by American standards, and this makes haircuts cheap.  As they develop real wages go up; even for professions like barbers where productivity growth is slow.  When they become rich, the price of haircuts can rise to American levels in one of two ways, nominal currency appreciation, or inflation.  In 2005-07 China chose nominal currency appreciation, while Estonia chose inflation (as they kept their currency pegged to the euro, with the hope of eventually joining the euro.)

With all that as background, should Estonia have a 5% NGDP target?  In the typically annoying way economists answer questions, I will say “no, or maybe.”

No: If Estonia is serious about joining the euro, then I think they need to keep the exchange rate fixed to the euro.  Should Estonia join the euro?  It seems to me that they meet the Mundellian “optimal currency zone” criteria.  They are small, geographically close to other eurozone members, in the EU labor market, etc.  So my specific recommendation for Estonia is to keep the currency peg, which does not allow them to target NGDP.  I don’t know enough about the politics of the eurozone to know whether a one-time 10% devaluation would be feasible or desirable.  Because the Baltic states have a great deal of euro debt, currency devaluation might do more harm than good.

Maybe: I’d also like to answer this question from another perspective, what if we simply considered Estonia to be a small open economy, but not a likely candidate for joining the euro, perhaps a country like New Zealand.  Then what should they do with monetary policy if they are in a severe recession where output is falling at a 15% rate?  Would 5% NGDP targeting lead to 20% inflation?  And if so, would that be a bad thing?  It turns out that both questions are surprisingly difficult to answer.

I strongly believe that if the U.S., European, or Japanese RGDP was falling at a 15% rate, then a more expansionary monetary policy would be desirable.  Except in obvious cases like losing a war, it is almost unimaginable for a big industrial economy to see a decline that sharp without domestic demand playing some role.  And I believe monetary policy can and should prevent demand shocks from reducing output.  But small countries may be different.  Because they are strongly impacted by shifts in world AD, and sectoral shocks, it may not be possible for them to prevent RGDP from falling rapidly if the international environment turns against them.

I am guessing that Estonia is suffering for some of the same reasons as other formerly high flying European economies (Spain, Ireland, Iceland, Latvia, etc.) problems in the real estate and banking areas.  Estonia had been growing very fast, so some of the slowdown presumably reflects less construction, etc.  One question that I would focus on is how the drop in NGDP was distributed.  Estonia now has low inflation, so both nominal and real GDP are falling fast.  Is there high unemployment?  Were there a lot of foreign construction workers who lost jobs?  Did workers take nominal pay cuts?

The best argument for NGDP targeting in a depression is that is leads to the most efficient allocation of resources.  To see why, consider Earl Thompson’s closely related nominal wage rule.  Suppose you have an international shock which requires a 15% reduction in everyone’s real income.  But also suppose workers have been getting 5% pay increases, and wages are sticky.  If nominal wages are rising 5%, then you need 20% inflation to get the optimal fall in real wage rates.  And that is exactly what you get with 5% NGDP targeting and negative 15% RGDP growth.  (And if it works, the RGDP decline may be smaller than 15%.)

Won’t this just lead to a wage price spiral?  It shouldn’t if people are rational.  If you assume sticky wages are the only problem in the labor market, then keeping nominal wage growth steady actually keeps the real wage rate close to where it would be with no wage stickiness.  And remember that you still have a severe recession (-15% RGDP growth.)  So even with wages where they should be, unemployment will rise sharply for the usual Austrian “misallocation of resources” reasons.  This unemployment should keep wages from accelerating, despite the high inflation.

Isn’t this unfair to savers who bought government bonds?  I don’t see why.  They lose 15% (the other 5% of inflation was built into interest rates, ex ante, due to the Fisher effect.)  In other words, they share equally with workers in Estonia’s economic misfortune.

Again, I’m not saying this is necessarily the way a small country should react.  If they are committed to a currency board (Hong Kong), or to eventually joining the euro (Estonia, Latvia), it is not the way to go.  If like New Zealand and Chile they seem committed to a freely floating currency combined with nominal targeting, then I think it is worth considering.  I believe both of those countries now target inflation.  But I don’t see any obvious reasons why NGDP targeting would be worse.  Of course you’d hope that 15% declines in RGDP are rare, but if they did occur once in a while would this adjustment mechanism really be so bad?  There is a tendency to extrapolate into thinking that NGDP targeting would lead to higher long run inflation than inflation targeting.  But that is an illusion created by the fact that we are only considering recession periods in this thought experiment.  Any extra inflation during these periods would be offset by lower inflation (or deflation) during boom periods.

So why did I say “no or maybe,” why not “no or yes” depending on the exchange rate regime?  Because a lot of odd things can happen in a small country that are much less important in a large economy.  Relative price shifts and sectoral changes loom much larger.  For the U.S., I support NGDP targeting partly because it tends to closely replicate the more theoretically desirable nominal wage rule.  But in an unstable small economy those two rules may diverge sharply.  In that case some other rule might be better.  Perhaps Selgin’s productivity norm, or Thompson’s nominal wage rule.  Maybe even a discretionary policy aimed at replicating those norms, until the crisis is over.  I’m not generally in favor of discretionary regimes, but as Rumsfeld might say “you fight against an economic crisis with the policy regime you have, not the one you wish you had.”

Let’s return to the question of why Estonia is important.  Its success would show that the enviable social achievements of the Nordic countries could be achieved with a regime combining low taxes and free markets.  Can it be done?  I think Singapore is showing the answer is yes.  But Singapore is easy for Western intellectuals to write off.  It’s an authoritarian quasi-democracy.  And although it has more people than Estonia, it doesn’t seem like a real country, with cities, towns and rural areas.

The Nordic countries are an interesting laboratory for the world economy.  For instance Holland and Sweden have had success with comprehensive school voucher programs.  Now Estonia is trying another experiment—flat taxes.  It is a country to watch.

This entry was posted on May 16th, 2009 and is filed under Monetary Policy. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response or Trackback from your own site.

原文地址：http://blogsandwikis.bentley.edu/themoneyillusion/?p=1282